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   ABSTRACT	  	   THE	  LABOR	  SHARE	  QUESTION	  IN	  CHINA	  SEPTEMBER	  2015	  	  HAO	  QI	  B.A.,	  RENMIN	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  CHINA	  M.A.,	  RENMIN	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  CHINA	  Ph.D.,	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  MASSACHUSETTS	  AMHERST	  	  Directed	  by:	  David	  M.	  Kotz	  and	  Deepankar	  Basu	  	  In	  this	  study	  I	  explore	  why	  China’s	  labor	  share	  measured	  by	  the	  conventional	  approach	  experienced	   a	  major	   decline	   over	   the	   period	   from	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	   to	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	  global	   financial	   and	   economic	   crisis	   in	   2008.	   I	   adopt	   a	  Marxian	   approach	   to	   address	   this	  question.	  Following	  the	  Marxian	  approach,	  I	  focus	  on	  how	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	   production	   affects	   labor’s	   share.	   I	   argue	   that	  major	   changes	   in	   the	   power	   relation	   that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  transition	  of	  China’s	  economic	  system	  have	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  changes	  of	  distribution.	  	  To	   this	   end,	   I	   build	   homogenous	   series	   of	   labor’s	   share	   measured	   by	   the	   Marxian	  approach.	  This	  measure	  changes	  following	  an	  inverse-­‐U	  shape	  over	  the	  reform	  era.	  Further,	  I	   analyze	   the	   relationship	   between	   labor’s	   share	  measured	   by	   the	   conventional	   approach	  and	   that	  measured	  by	   the	  Marxian	  approach	  with	   the	  cointegration	  method,	  which	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  between	  them.	  	  
vii	  	  
I	  divide	  the	  reform	  era	  into	  two	  stages	  according	  to	  the	  Marxian	  measure.	  I	  find	  that,	  in	  the	   first	  stage	  (from	  1978	  to	   the	  early	  1990s),	   resulting	   from	  the	  power	  relation	  between	  the	  state,	  cadres	  and	  workers,	  labor’s	  share	  continuously	  increased,	  which	  led	  to	  recurrent	  inflation	  and	  squeezed	  profits.	  In	  the	  second	  stage	  (from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  to	  2008),	  the	  state	  launched	  a	  series	  of	  reforms	  to	  resolve	  these	  problems,	  resulting	  in	  the	  commodification	  of	  labor	  power	  and	   the	  division	  between	  cadres	  and	  workers,	  which	  repressed	   the	  power	  of	  workers	  and	  caused	  labor’s	  share	  to	  decline.	  	  Based	   on	   the	   historical	   analysis	   of	   the	   power	   relation	  during	   the	   transition	  process,	   I	  provide	   an	   econometric	   analysis	   of	   the	   determinants	   of	   labor’s	   share	   measured	   by	   the	  conventional	  approach	  over	  the	  reform	  era,	  using	  region-­‐level	  data.	  I	  find	  that	  there	  is	  a	  U-­‐shaped	  relationship	  between	  the	  bonus-­‐wage	  ratio	  and	  labor’s	  share	  in	  the	  first	  stage;	  also,	  variables	   that	   reflect	   the	   power	   relation	   (reserve	   army	   effect,	   fallback	   position,	   and	  management-­‐worker	   inequality)	   in	   the	   second	   stage	   have	   significant	   effects	   on	   labor’s	  share.	  Both	  macro	  and	  micro	  evidences	  support	  that	  the	  power	  relation	  is	  a	  crucial	  factor	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  labor’s	  share.	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   CHAPTER	  1 	  INTRODUCTION	  	  In	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  China’s	  fast	  economic	  growth	  has	  been	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	   investment	   (Zhu	   and	  Kotz,	   2010).	   	   To	  maintain	   the	   growth	   of	   investment,	   China	  must	  sustain	   a	   fairly	  high	   rate	  of	   profit,	   and	   the	   fall	   in	   labor’s	   share	  has	  been	   seen	   as	   a	   crucial	  factor	  to	  sustain	  the	  profitability	  (Bai	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Using	  a	  conventional	  measure	  of	  labor’s	  share—the	   compensation	   of	   employees	   as	   a	   percent	   of	   GDP1—as	   shown	   in	   Figure	   1-­‐1,	  labor’s	  share	  has	  experienced	  a	  major	  decline	  from	  49.7	  percent	  in	  1978	  to	  44.7	  percent	  in	  2007,	  which	   is	  a	  part	  of	  a	   larger	  picture	  of	   the	  decline	   in	   labor’s	  share	  across	  countries	   in	  the	   neoliberal	   era	   of	   capitalism.2	  After	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   and	   economic	  crisis	  in	  2008,	  China’s	  growth	  slowed	  down	  and	  workers’	  struggles	  against	  poor	  living	  and	  working	   conditions	   were	   surging—the	   strike	   at	   the	   Tonghua	   Steel	   Company	   is	   a	   telling	  example.	  3	  Partly	  due	  to	  these	  reasons,	   labor’s	  share	  might	  have	  begun	  to	  recover.	  In	  2012,	  labor’s	  share	  returned	  to	  45.6	  percent.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  measure	   of	   labor’s	   share	   is	   widely	   used	   in	   the	   literature;	   however,	   there	   is	   an	   obvious	  problem	  with	  it:	   if	   the	  ratio	  of	  fixed	  capital	  to	  GDP	  increased	  overtime,	  the	  share	  of	  depreciation	  in	  GDP	  would	  also	  increase	  in	  most	  cases,	  which	  would	  repress	  the	  share	  of	  employees’	  compensation	  in	  GDP	  without	  any	  change	   in	  distribution	  relations.	   In	  Chapter	  2,	   I	  will	  exclude	  deprecation	   in	   the	  conventional	  measure	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  	  
2	  For	  empirical	  studies	  about	  labor’s	  share	  across	  countries,	  see	  Chapter	  4.	  	  
3	  On	  July	  24,	  2009,	  workers	  at	  the	  Tonghua	  Steel	  Company	  launched	  a	  strike	  and	  beat	  the	  general	  manager	   to	   death.	   The	   Tonghua	   Steel	   Company	  was	   a	   state-­‐owned	   enterprise	   that	  was	   privatized	  through	   a	   local	   government-­‐led	  program	  by	   introducing	   a	   “strategic”	   private	   shareholder	   in	   2005.	  After	  privatization,	  the	  company	  laid	  off	  workers,	  constrained	  wage	  growth,	  and	  cut	  benefits	  such	  as	  the	  heating	  subsidy,	  while	  the	  management	  gained	  huge	  bonuses	  through	  privatization.	  This	  struggle	  forced	  the	  local	  government	  (the	  biggest	  shareholder)	  to	  introduce	  another	  state-­‐owned	  enterprise	  to	  replace	  the	  private	  shareholder.	  	  	  
	  	   2	  
What	  are	  the	  determinants	  of	  China’s	  labor	  share?	  This	  is	  the	  question	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	   this	   study.	   Since	  most	   of	   relevant	   studies	   focuses	   on	   labor’s	   share	  measured	  with	   the	  conventional	  approach,4	  I	   also	   take	   this	  measure	  as	   the	  objective	   to	  be	  explained.	   In	  what	  follows,	  “labor’s	  share”	  refers	  to	  the	  one	  measured	  by	  the	  conventional	  approach	  unless	  an	  alternative	  measure	  is	  specified.	  	  
Figure	  1-­‐1	  The	  Compensation	  of	  Employees	  as	  A	  Percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  China,	  1978-­‐2012	  
	  Sources:	  See	  Appendix	  A.	  	  
In	   contrast	   to	   the	   current	   literature,	   I	   follow	   a	   Marxian	   approach	   in	   terms	   of	  methodology	   and	   focus	   on	   how	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   production	   affects	  China’s	  labor	  share	  over	  the	  reform	  era	  (from	  1978	  to	  present).	  I	  argue	  that	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  power	  relation	  that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  transition	  of	  China’s	  economic	  system	  have	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  China’s	  labor	  share.	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1.1 Debunking	  the	  Mainstream	  Story	  
Although	   mainstream	   economists	   have	   widely	   admitted	   that	   there	   was	   a	   downward	  trend	   for	  China’s	   labor	   share,	   they	  explain	   this	   trend	  mainly	  with	  sectoral	   changes,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  decrease	  of	  agriculture	  as	  a	  percent	  of	  GDP	  (Bai	  and	  Qian,	  2009;	  2010a;	  2010b).	  Owing	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   China’s	   agricultural	   production	   is	  mainly	   household-­‐based,	   profits	  and	  wages	  are	  not	  distinguishable	  in	  statistics	  and	  labor’s	  share	  in	  agriculture	  is	  thus	  much	  higher	   than	   that	   in	   other	   sectors.	   So,	   as	   the	   mainstream	   story	   claims,	   sectoral	   changes	  automatically	  cause	   labor’s	  share	  of	   the	  entire	  economy	  to	   fall.	  Since	  sectoral	  changes	  are	  labeled	  with	  “modernization”	  (Brandt	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Song	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  the	  decline	  in	   labor’s	  share	   should	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   inevitable	   result	   of	   “modernization”.	   Mainstream	   economists	  and	   policy	   makers	   believe	   that	   there	   is	   a	   U-­‐shaped	   curve	   relating	   labor’s	   share	   to	   the	  sectoral	   structure,	   because	   they	   believe,	   as	   the	   transfer	   of	   resources	   from	   agriculture	   to	  other	  sectors	   is	   finished	  and	  the	   labor-­‐intensive	  service	  sector	  with	  a	  higher	   labor’s	  share	  becomes	  the	  dominant	  sector	  of	  the	  economy,	  the	  overall	   labor’s	  share	  will	   increase	  (Li	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Mainstream	  economists	  hence	  believe	  promoting	  sectoral	  changes	  is	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  raise	  labor’s	  share	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  	  Does	   the	   decline	   in	   labor’s	   share	   result	   mainly	   from	   sectoral	   changes?	   This	   question	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  power	  relation,	  which	  is	  entirely	  omitted	  by	  the	  mainstream	   story.	   In	   fact,	   during	   China’s	   transition	   from	   the	   state	   socialist	   economic	  system	  to	  a	  capitalism-­‐dominated	  economic	  system,	  sectoral	  changes	  have	  disguised	  class	  conflicts.	  	  Sectoral	   changes	   involve	   the	   redistribution	   of	   labor	   power	   from	   agricultural	   to	   non-­‐agricultural	  sectors	  and	  from	  manufacturing	  to	  services.	  In	  China,	  the	  influx	  of	  the	  migrant	  workers	  into	  the	  urban	  areas	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  responses	  of	  peasants	  to	  the	  urban-­‐rural	   income	   gap	   and	   the	   loosening	   of	   the	   restrictions	   on	   migration,	   because	   the	   urban	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enterprises	  must	  have	  prepared	  certain	  social	  and	  economic	  conditions	  for	  the	  absorption	  of	  migrant	  workers.	  One	  such	  condition	  was	  the	  power	  relation:	  if	  the	  urban	  working	  class	  in	  the	  state-­‐owned	  sector	  was	  sufficiently	  powerful,	  they	  would	  not	  be	  replaced	  by	  migrant	  workers	  who	  received	  much	  lower	  wages.	  	  	  One	  telling	  example	  is	  the	  labor	  outsourcing	  at	  the	  Tonghua	  Steel	  Company.	  From	  1996	  to	   2000,	   this	   company	   laid	   off	   over	   8,000	  workers,	   as	   it	   claimed	   it	   had	   hired	   “too	  many”	  workers.	  During	   the	   same	  period,	   the	   company	  began	   to	  outsource	   some	  work	   to	  outside	  labor—mostly	  migrant	  workers	  from	  the	  rural	  areas	  as	  the	  wage	  of	  a	  migrant	  worker	  was	  on	  average	  only	  half	  that	  of	  the	  company’s	  own	  workers.	  The	  company	  was	  able	  to	  replace	  its	  own	  workers	  with	  migrant	  workers,	   as	  a	   result	  of	  weakening	  workers’	  power	   through	  layoffs.	  5	  The	  massive	   layoffs	   in	  the	  1990s	  resulted	   in	  not	  only	  the	  transfer	  of	  migrant	  workers,	  but	   also	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   service	   sector.	   During	   the	   period	   1996-­‐2003,	   the	   share	   of	  industry	   (mining,	   manufacturing,	   and	   utilities)	   in	   total	   employment	   decreased	   from	   23.5	  percent	   to	   21.6	   percent.	   This	   is	   the	   only	   period	   in	   the	   reform	   era	   that	   witnessed	   the	  decrease	  of	  industry’s	  employment	  share.	  During	  the	  same	  period,	  the	  share	  of	  the	  service	  sector	   in	   total	   employment	   increased	   from	   26.0	   percent	   to	   29.3	   percent.6	  These	   changes	  were	  mainly	   caused	   by	   the	   relocation	   of	   laid-­‐off	  workers.	   The	   China	  Urban	   Labor	   Survey	  recorded	  job	  changes	  due	  to	   layoffs	   for	  a	  sample	  of	  949	  people:	  before	  being	   laid	  off,	  42.1	  percent	   of	   the	   sample	   worked	   in	  manufacturing	   and	   21.5	   percent	   worked	   in	   the	   service	  sector;	   after	   being	   laid	   off,	   only	   14.4	   percent	  worked	   in	  manufacturing	   and	   44.3	   percent	  worked	  in	  the	  service	  sector	  (Cai,	  2004).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This	  example	  is	  from	  my	  interviews	  in	  Tonghua,	  July	  2013.	  	  
6	  Sources:	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  2012.	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These	   examples	   have	   shown	   how	   sectoral	   changes	   intertwined	  with	   the	   dynamics	   of	  class	  struggle	  in	  China.	  The	  decline	  of	  labor’s	  share	  in	  China	  was	  not	  an	  automatic	  result	  of	  sectoral	   changes,	   since	   those	   changes	   actually	   disguised	   the	   underlying	   changes	   in	   the	  power	   relation.	   In	   this	   perspective,	   the	   relationship	   between	   sectoral	   changes	   and	   class	  struggle	  in	  China	  shares	  similarities	  with	  that	  relationship	  in	  the	  history	  of	  world	  capitalism:	  industrialization	   in	   the	   early	   period	  of	   traditional	   capitalist	   countries	   separated	  means	  of	  production	   from	   labor	   and	   forced	   the	   proletarianized	   to	   work	   in	   factories	   as	   free	   labor;	  financialization	  in	  the	  late	  period	  of	  monopoly	  capitalist	  countries	  strengthened	  the	  power	  of	  financial	  capital	  and	  dragged	  the	  whole	  economy	  into	  the	  cycles	  of	  boom	  and	  bust.	  Along	  with	   industrialization	   and	   financialization,	   major	   changes	   took	   place	   in	   distribution,	   but	  those	  changes	  resulted	  from	  class	  struggle,	  not	  from	  the	  sectoral	  changes.	  	  
1.2 Power	  Relation	  and	  Economic	  Transition	  
In	   China,	   labor’s	   share	   is	   closely	   associated	   with	   the	   changing	   power	   relation	   in	   the	  transition	   of	   the	   economic	   system.	   To	   illustrate	   the	   transition,	   we	   can	   start	   with	   the	  incentive	   systems	   on	   the	   shop	   floor,	   and	   we	   discuss,	   when	   the	   incentive	   system	   did	   not	  work	  due	  to	  a	  powerful	  working	  class,	  how	  the	  reserve	  army	  of	  labor	  emerged	  and	  shifted	  the	  power	  relation.	  	  In	  the	  Maoist	  era,	  there	  was	  a	  recurring	  debate	  on	  “material	  incentives”	  and	  “politics	  in	  command”	   during	   the	   transformation	   of	   incentive	   systems.	   A	   Soviet	   wage	   system	   was	  established	  in	  1956;	  however,	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  consensus	  among	  the	  leadership	  on	  how	  to	  operate	  this	  wage	  system.	  	  In	  particular,	  given	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  underscored	  the	  role	  of	  material	  incentives,	  there	  was	  a	  debate	  on	  whether	  material	  incentives	  such	  as	  bonuses	  and	  piece-­‐rate	  wages	  should	  be	  encouraged	  in	  China.	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Mao	   Zedong	   was	   critical	   of	   material	   incentives.	   He	   suggested	   that	   the	   emphasis	   on	  material	  incentives	  was	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  ignorance	  of	  political	  and	  ideological	  work	  (Mao,	  1998).	   Thus	   the	   proponents	   of	   “politics	   in	   command”	   proposed	   an	   entirely	   new	   path	   to	  generate	  work	   incentives.	   As	   I	  will	   discuss	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   the	   key	   of	   the	   new	   path	  was	   to	  make	   workers	   recognize	   that	   they	   themselves	   were	   the	   masters	   of	   factories,	   and	   the	  purpose	   of	   production	   was	   consistent	   with	   the	   long-­‐run	   interests	   of	   the	   working	   class	  (Andors,	   1977).	   To	   this	   end,	  material	   incentives	   that	  merely	   relate	  workers’	   contribution	  with	   their	   short-­‐run	   economic	   benefits	   were	   eliminated,	   workers	   were	   encouraged	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  management	   of	   factories	   in	   various	  ways,	   and	   the	   income	   gap	  between	  workers	   and	   cadres	  was	   controlled	   since	   significant	   inequality	  would	  be	   contradictory	   to	  workers’	  position	  as	  the	  masters	  of	  factories.	  	  With	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Maoist	   era,	   the	   first	   attack	   against	   the	   working	   class	   was	   the	  deprivation	   of	   political	   rights	   that	   workers	   gained	   in	   the	   Maoist	   era.	   With	   the	   loss	   of	  workers’	  political	  rights,	  workers	  could	  no	  longer	  criticize	  cadres.	  Without	  the	  participation	  of	  workers	  in	  management,	  the	  Maoist	  incentive	  system	  lost	  its	  foundation	  and	  the	  material	  incentive	  system	  eventually	  took	  its	  place.	  	  However,	  the	  material	  incentive	  system	  could	  not	  sustain	  itself.	  Capital	  accumulation	  in	  the	   late	   1980s	   and	   the	   early	   1990s	   met	   with	   the	   problem	   of	   profit	   squeeze	   as	   material	  incentives	  were	  abused	  under	  the	  particular	  power	  relation	  between	  the	  state,	  cadres,	  and	  workers,	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  For	  a	  capitalist	  enterprise,	  if	  the	  carrot	  of	  material	   incentives	   does	   not	   work,	   the	   stick	   strategy	  would	   take	   its	   place—capitalists	  would	  reduce	  production	  and	  lay	  off	  some	  workers	  in	  order	  to	  discipline	  others.	  In	  the	  early	  1990s,	   however,	   the	   management	   in	   China’s	   enterprises	   did	   not	   have	   the	   power	   to	   fire	  workers	  unless	  workers	  made	  serious	  mistakes	  such	  as	  crimes.	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If	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  tame	  workers,	  the	  rational	  strategy	  for	  enterprises	  was	  to	  explore	  new	   sources	   of	   labor	   power.	   The	   early	   1990s	   witnessed	   policy	   changes	   that	   reduced	  barriers	  for	  migrant	  workers	  to	  work	  in	  the	  urban	  areas.7	  	  In	  the	  following	  two	  decades	  this	  new	  component	  of	   the	  Chinese	  working	  class	   suffered	   from	   long	  working	  hours	  and	  poor	  working	  conditions.	  A	  2009	  survey	  from	  the	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  has	  shown	  that	  on	  average	   migrant	   workers	   work	   58.4	   hours	   per	   week,	   much	   more	   than	   the	   44	   hours	  stipulated	   in	   China’s	   Labor	   Law.	   Nearly	   60	   percent	   of	   migrant	   workers	   did	   not	   sign	   any	  labor	  contract,	  and	  87	  percent	  of	  migrant	  workers	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  health	  insurance.8	  	  In	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	   China	   launched	   a	  massive	   privatization	   of	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises.	  Along	  with	   this	   privatization,	   about	   30	  million	  workers	  were	   laid	   off.9	  This	  was	   a	   crucial	  turning	   point	   in	   China’s	   economic	   transition	   that	   fundamentally	   altered	   the	   power	   of	   the	  working	   class.	   Workers	   with	   socialist	   experience	   had	   to	   leave	   factories,	   whereas	   young	  workers	  without	   socialist	   experience	   became	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   labor	   force.	   Due	   to	   this	  change,	   institutions	   in	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   began	   to	   converge	   with	   those	   in	   private	  enterprises.	  Short-­‐term	  labor	  contracts	  and	  dispatched	  workers	  became	  the	  routine	  in	  both	  kinds	  of	  enterprises.10	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  In	  the	  1980s,	  the	  government	  strictly	  controlled	  the	  migration	  of	  labor	  forces.	  Migrant	  workers	  were	  called	  “blindly	  floating	  population”.	   In	  the	  1990s,	  most	  of	   the	  constraints	  on	  migrant	  workers	  were	   eliminated,	   whereas	   workers	   were	   still	   facing	   the	   possibility	   of	   being	   repatriated.	   See	   Lü	  (2012).	  
8	  Sources:	   National	   Statistical	   Bureau,	   “Investigation	   Report	   on	   Migrant	   Workers	   2009,”	   (in	  Chinese)	  http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20100319_402628281.htm.	  
9	  The	  number	   is	  estimated	  by	  the	  reduction	   in	   the	  employment	  of	   the	  state-­‐owned	  sector	   from	  1995	  to	  2000.	  Data	  is	  from	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  2012.	  
10	  In	  the	  interviews	  with	  some	  workers	  in	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises,	  I	  found	  that	  new	  workers	  in	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  mostly	  signed	  three-­‐year-­‐long	  labor	  contracts,	  and	  dispatched	  workers,	  who	  were	  hired	  by	  external	  labor	  agencies	  but	  worked	  for	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises,	  were	  quite	  common	  in	  construction	  and	  transportation.	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To	   sum	   up,	   during	   the	   country’s	   transition	   of	   the	   economic	   system,	   as	   the	   bonus-­‐centered	   incentive	   system	   could	   not	   sustain	   itself,	   enterprises	   needs	   a	   reserve	   army	   to	  discipline	   workers.	   A	   continuous	   influx	   of	   migrant	   workers	   and	   the	   30	   million	   laid-­‐off	  workers	   from	  the	  state-­‐owned	  sector	   jointly	  expanded	  the	  reserve	  army	  of	   labor	  within	  a	  few	  years.11	  The	  reserve	  army	  as	  well	  as	  other	  factors	  significantly	  repressed	  the	  power	  of	  the	  working	   class	   as	   a	  whole.	  This	  might	  be	   a	  key	   reason	   for	   the	  major	  decline	  of	   labor’s	  share	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  	  
1.3 Methodology	  and	  Chapter	  Structure	  
In	   this	   study,	   I	   attempt	   to	   follow	   a	   Marxian	   approach	   to	   address	   the	   labor	   share	  question,	  which	  underscores	  the	  relationship	  between	  production	  and	  distribution.	  As	  Marx	  put	   it	   in	   Chapter	   51	  of	  Das	  Kapital,	   volume	  3,	   “the	   specific	   distribution	   relations	   are	   thus	  merely	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  specific	  historical	  production	  relations.”	  (Marx	  1981,	  p.1022)	  	  In	  Marxian	  economics,	   the	  rate	  of	   surplus	  value	   is	  a	   concept	   that	  connects	  production	  and	  distribution,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  an	  entry	  point	  to	  address	  the	  labor	  share	  question.12	  Marxian	  economics	  suggest	  the	  distribution	  between	  the	  value	  of	   labor	  power	  and	  surplus	  value	  is	  the	   fundamental	   distribution	   in	   a	   capitalist	   economy	   and	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  capitalist	  relation	  of	  production.	  In	  Marx’s	  analysis,	  however,	  the	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value	  is	  defined	  under	  certain	  assumptions.	  	  In	  Das	  Kapital,	   volume	  1,	  Marx	   argued	   that	   the	  market	   exchange	  between	   capital	   and	  labor	   cannot	   explain	   the	   secrets	   of	   exploitation	   and	   he	   suggested	  we	   enter	   the	   sphere	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Traditionally	  the	  reserve	  army	  effect	  means	  that	  unemployment	  reduces	  workers’	  bargaining	  power.	   In	   this	   study,	   I	  use	  a	  broad	   interpretation	  of	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  reserve	  army	  effect,	  which	  means	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  reserve	  army	  repressed	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  workers.	  In	  particular,	  as	   firms	   in	   urban	   areas	  were	   able	   to	   hire	  migrant	  workers	   from	   rural	   areas,	   labor	   forces	   in	   rural	  areas	  became	  a	  component	  of	  the	  reserve	  army.	  	  
12	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  connections	  between	  the	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value	  and	  labor’s	  share	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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production	  to	  find	  how	  surplus	  value	  is	  created.	  To	  illustrate	  this	  question,	  Marx	  assumed	  that	   all	   value	   and	   surplus	   value	   is	   realized	   and	  workers	   obtain	   the	   value	   of	   labor	   power.	  These	   assumptions	   simplify	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   surplus	   value	   theory,	   especially	   the	  relationship	   between	   labor	   productivity	   and	   the	   rate	   of	   surplus	   value;	   however,	   they	  abstract	  the	  effects	  of	  value	  realization	  and	  class	  struggle	  on	  the	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value.	  	  Firstly,	  for	  a	  capitalist	  economy,	  surplus	  value	  produced	  can	  be	  equal	  to	  or	  greater	  than	  the	   surplus	   value	   realized.	   The	   value	   realization	   process	   can	   greatly	   affect	   the	   amount	   of	  surplus	  value	  obtained	  by	  capital.	  	  Secondly,	   workers’	   wages	   (in	   value	   terms)	   can	   be	   greater	   or	   lower	   than	   the	   value	   of	  labor	   power	   due	   to	   class	   struggle.	   According	   to	   Marx,	   the	   value	   of	   labor	   power	   is	  determined	  by	   the	   value	  of	   commodities	   that	   are	  necessary	   for	   the	   reproduction	  of	   labor	  power,	   and	   there	   is	   a	   historical	   and	  moral	   element	   determines	  what	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	  reproduction.	  Marx	  argued,	   “In	  a	  given	  country,	  at	  a	  given	  period,	   the	  average	  quantity	  of	  the	  means	  of	  subsistence	  necessary	  for	  the	  laborer	  is	  practically	  known.”(Marx	  1976,	  p.275)	  The	  impact	  of	  class	  struggle	  on	  wages	  occurs	  both	  in	  the	  short	  run	  and	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  In	  the	  short	  run,	  class	  struggle	  can	  make	  workers’	  wages	  temporarily	  deviate	  from	  the	  known	  value	  of	  labor	  power;	  if	  the	  deviation	  lasts	  in	  the	  long	  run	  so	  that	  workers	  get	  used	  to	  a	  new	  buddle	  of	  consumption	  goods,	   then	   it	  would	  change	  the	  value	  of	   labor	  power	  by	  changing	  the	  historical	  and	  moral	  element.	  (Lebowitz	  2003)	  Therefore,	   there	   are	   mainly	   four	   factors	   determining	   the	   rate	   of	   surplus	   value	   “in	   a	  given	  country,	  at	  a	  given	  period”.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  value	  of	  labor	  power.	  If	  one	  focuses	  on	  a	  period,	  the	  value	  of	  labor	  power	  should	   be	   a	   constant	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   period;	   over	   the	   period,	   the	   value	   of	   labor	  power	  may	  change	  due	   to	   class	   struggle.	  Thus,	   I	  will	   consider	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  value	  of	  labor	  power	  as	  an	  endogenous	  factor.	  	  
	  	   10	  
The	   second	   factor	   is	   labor	   productivity.	   The	   growth	   of	   labor	   productivity	   can	   repress	  the	  value	  of	  labor	  power	  by	  reducing	  the	  unit	  value	  of	  consumption	  goods,	  which	  raises	  the	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value.	  	  The	   third	   factor	   is	   realization	   conditions,	   reflected	   by	   business	   cycles.	   Firms	   realize	  most	  of	  the	  surplus	  value	  produced	  in	  booms	  while	  they	  may	  lose	  most	  of	  it	  in	  crises.	  	  The	   last	   factor	   is	   class	   struggle,	   reflected	   by	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	  production.	   This	   power	   relation	   is	   determined	   by	   factors	   in	   the	   production	   process	   and	  factors	  in	  the	  labor	  market:	  the	  former	  refers	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  production	  is	  organized,	  such	  as	  the	  relationship	  between	  workers	  and	  supervisors;	  the	  latter	  refers	  to	  the	  structure	  and	   institutions	  of	   the	   labor	  market,	  such	  as	   the	  relative	  size	  of	   the	  reserve	  army	  of	   labor	  and	  the	  fallback	  position	  of	  workers.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  neoclassical	  approach	  which	  suggest	  that	  labor	  supply	  and	  labor	  demand	  determines	  an	  equilibrium	  wage,	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  argues	   that	   distribution	   is	   not	   determined	   in	   the	   labor	   market	   but	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	  production,	  and	  that	  factors	  in	  the	  labor	  market	  determines	  distribution	  only	  through	  their	  impacts	  on	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production.	  In	   this	   study,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   production	   is	   a	   crucial	  factor	   in	   the	   determination	   of	   China’s	   labor	   share	   over	   the	   reform	   era.	   To	   make	   this	  argument,	  I	  take	  the	  following	  three	  steps.	  	  In	  the	  first	  step,	  I	  describe	  how	  labor’s	  share	  changed	  over	  time.	  Given	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value	  is	  the	  entry	  point,	  I	  measure	  labor’s	  share	  with	  a	  Marxian	  approach	  (which	  is	  a	   transformation	   of	   the	   rate	   of	   surplus	   value).	   Also,	   this	   step	   clarifies	   the	   differences	  between	  the	  Marxian	  measure	  and	  the	  conventional	  measure.	  	  The	  second	  step	   is	  a	  historical	  analysis	  of	   the	  power	  relation	  during	  China’s	  economic	  transition,	  in	  which	  I	  explain	  why	  the	  power	  relation	  shifted	  from	  favorable	  to	  unfavorable	  to	  the	  working	  class	  and	  how	  it	  affected	  distribution.	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In	   the	   third	   step,	   I	   examine	   the	   factors	   for	   the	   conventionally	  measured	   labor’s	   share	  with	  an	  econometric	  analysis.	  I	  will	  take	  into	  account	  two	  groups	  of	  explanatory	  variables:	  one	  group	  is	  the	  determinants	  of	  labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	  the	  Marxian	  approach,	  and	  the	  other	   group	   is	   the	   determinants	   of	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   measures	   of	   labor’s	  share.	  	  This	  process	  of	  analysis	  is	  shown	  Figure	  1-­‐2.	  According	  to	  the	  process,	  the	  main	  part	  of	  this	  study	  is	  organized	  into	  three	  chapters.	  	  
Figure	  1-­‐2	  The	  Process	  of	  Analysis	  
	  
Chapter	   2	   builds	   the	   Marxian	   measure	   of	   labor’s	   share,	   using	   data	   on	   the	   national	  level.13	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  clarify	  the	  differences	  between	  different	  approaches	  and	  provide	  a	  cointegration	   analysis	   for	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Marxian	   measure	   and	   the	  conventional	  Measure.	  The	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  chapter	  include:	  first,	  the	  Marxian	  measure	  changed	   following	   an	   inverse-­‐U	   shape	   over	   the	   reform	   era;	   second,	   there	   is	   a	   long-­‐run	  relationship	  between	  the	  Marxian	  measure	  and	  the	  conventional	  measure.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Due	   to	   data	   availability,	   labor’s	   share	   measured	   by	   the	   Marxian	   approach	   can	   only	   be	  calculated	  on	  the	  national	  level.	  
Value	  of	  Labor	  Power	  Labor	  Productivity	  	  Realization	  Conditions	  Class	  Struggle	  
Labor’s	  Share	  Measured	  by	  the	  Marxian	  Approach	  
Determinants	  of	  the	  Difference	  between	  the	  Marxian	  Measure	  and	  the	  Conventional	  Measure	  
Labor’s	  Share	  Measured	  by	  the	  Conventional	  Approach	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Chapter	  3	  is	  a	  historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  power	  relation	  during	  the	  transition	  process.	  In	  this	   chapter,	   I	   discuss	   why	   the	   power	   relation	   between	   the	   state,	   cadres,	   and	   workers	  changed	  and	  how	   it	   affected	  distribution.	   I	   argue	   that,	   in	   the	   first	   stage	  of	   the	   reform	  era	  (1978	  to	  the	  early	  1990s),	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  power	  relation	  between	  the	  state,	  cadres	  and	  the	   still	   powerful	   workers,	   labor’s	   share	   measured	   by	   the	   Marxian	   approach	   was	  continuously	   increased,	  which	   led	   to	   recurrent	   inflation	   and	   squeezed	   profits.	   To	   resolve	  these	  problems,	  the	  state	  launched	  a	  series	  of	  reforms,	  resulting	  in	  the	  commodification	  of	  labor	  power	  and	  the	  division	  between	  cadres	  and	  workers,	  which	  repressed	   the	  power	  of	  workers	  and	  caused	  labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  to	  fall	   in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era	  (mid-­‐1990s	  to	  2008).	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  also	  find	  the	  determinants	  of	  the	  power	  relation	  so	  as	  to	  lay	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  econometric	  analysis	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  Chapter	  4	  provides	   an	  econometric	   analysis	   of	   the	  determinants	  of	   labor’s	   share	  over	  the	   reform	  era,	   using	  data	   on	   the	   region	   level.	   The	   analysis	   uses	   the	   bonus-­‐wage	   ratio	   to	  reflect	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era	  and	  another	  three	  variables	  to	  reflect	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   second	   stage:	   the	   management-­‐worker	   inequality,	   the	  reserve	  army	  effect,	  and	  the	  fallback	  position.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  data	  on	  the	  region	  level,	   I	  also	   apply	   the	   econometric	   analysis	   to	   enterprise-­‐level	   data.	   Both	   macro	   and	   micro	  evidences	  support	  that	  the	  power	  relation	  is	  a	  crucial	  factor	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  three	  chapters,	  Chapter	  5	  summaries	  this	  study	  and	  discusses	  policy	  implications.	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   CHAPTER	  2 	  LABOR’S	  SHARE	  IN	  THE	  PEOPLE’S	  REPUBLIC	  OF	  CHINA,	  1956-­‐2012	  	  
2.1 Introduction	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   build	   homogeneous	   series	   of	   labor’s	   share	   in	   China	   using	   a	  Marxian	  approach	  which	  measures	  labor’s	  share	  with	  the	  ratio	  of	  variable	  capital	  to	  new	  value.	  The	  Marxian	  measures	   of	   labor’s	   share	   constructed	   in	   this	   chapter	   correspond	   to	   the	   rate	   of	  surplus	   value	   reflecting	   how	   new	   value	   is	   distributed	   between	   productive	   workers	   and	  capitalists.	  Here	  distribution	  is	  analyzed	  at	  the	  point	  when	  new	  value	  is	  distributed	  between	  productive	  workers	   and	   capitalists	   instead	  of	   the	  point	  when	  new	  value	   is	   circulated	   and	  redistributed.	  The	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  affects	  the	  distribution	  of	  new	  value	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production,	  for	  which	  one	  can	  find	  support	  in	  Marx’s	  theory	  of	  surplus	  value,	  the	  labor	  process	  literature	  (Braverman,	  1974;	  Marglin,	  1974;	  Edwards,	  1979;	  Gordon	  et	  al.,	  1982;	  Burawoy,	  1985;	  Gordon,	  1996),	  and	  the	   labor	  discipline	   literature	  (Weisskopf	  et	  al.,	  1983;	  Bowles,	  1985;	  Schor	  and	  Bowles,	  1987).	  The	  Marxian	  measures	  will	  provide	  an	  entry	  point	  to	  analyze	  how	  the	  power	  relation	  affected	  distribution.	  	  The	  approach	  to	  measure	  labor’s	  share	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  also	  used	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  aims	  at	  measuring	   categories	  based	  on	   the	  Marxian	   theory	  of	   labor	  value	   (Moseley	  1985;	  Shaikh	   and	   Tonak	   1994;	   Cronin	   2001;	   Maniatis	   2005;	   Paitaridis	   and	   Tsoulfidis	   2011);	  however,	  it	  is	  different	  from	  another	  two	  approaches	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  One	  approach	  (hereafter,	  conventional	  approach)	  is	  based	  on	  GDP	  accounting,	  which	  is	  widely	   used	   in	   both	   orthodox	   and	   heterodox	   literature	   (for	   example,	   Bentolila	   and	   Saint-­‐
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paul,	   2003;	   Karabarbounis	   and	   Neiman,	   2013;	   Weisskopf,	   1979;	   Onaran	   et	   al.,	   2011).	  Heterodox	   literature	  often	  uses	   the	  conventional	  measure	  as	  a	  proxy	   for	   the	  power	  of	   the	  working	   class.	   However,	   given	   that	   GDP	   accounting	   does	   not	   consider	   the	   transfer	   of	  surplus	   value	   from	   productive	   sectors	   to	   unproductive	   sectors, 14 	  the	   conventionally	  measured	   labor’s	  share	  does	  not	  necessarily	  changes	  consistently	  with	   the	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value	   (or	  a	  Marxian	  measure	  of	   labor’s	   share).	  Moreover,	   given	   that	  GDP	  accounting	  does	  not	  distinguish	  modes	  of	  production	  that	  coexist	   in	  a	  capitalist	  economy,	  the	  conventional	  approach	   tends	   to	   conflate	   changes	   in	   the	   rate	   of	   surplus	   value	   and	   changes	   in	   the	  composition	  of	  modes	  of	  production.15	  	  The	  other	  different	  approach	  is	  also	  a	  Marxian	  approach,	  which	  integrates	  the	  Marxian	  theory	   of	   value	   with	   a	   class	   analysis	   (Mohun	   2005,	   2013).	   This	   approach	   defines	   the	  working	  class	  and	  the	  capitalist	  class	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  Mohun	  (2005;	  2013)	  suggests	   that	  both	  workers	   in	  productive	   sectors	  and	  unproductive	   sectors	  belong	   to	   the	  working	  class	  and	  both	  capital	  owners	  and	  supervisory	  personals	  belong	  to	   the	  capitalist	  class	  and	  then	  calculates	  distributive	  shares	  of	  classes	   in	  new	  value.	  While	   this	  approach	   is	  useful,	  here	  I	  do	   not	   apply	   it	   because	   its	   definition	   of	   the	   working	   class	   has	   exceeded	   the	   sphere	   of	  production	  such	  that	  such	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  affects	  distribution.	  	  This	  chapter	  provides	  Marxian	  measures	  of	  labor’s	  share	  and	  analyzes	  the	  relationship	  between	   the	   Marxian	   measures	   and	   the	   conventional	   measure	   using	   a	   cointegration	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Classical	   economists	   such	   as	   Adam	   Smith,	   David	   Ricardo,	   and	   Thomas	   Malthus	   share	   this	  perspective.	  Furthermore,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	  later,	  it	  is	  inappropriate	  to	  label	  sectors	  with	  “productive”	  and	  “unproductive”;	  here	  “productive	  sectors”	  and	  “unproductive	  sectors”	  are	  used	  only	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity.	  	  
15	  This	   deficiency	   in	   GDP	   accounting	   leads	   to	   biases	   when	   one	   measures	   the	   power	   of	   the	  working	  class,	  especially	  for	  developing	  economies,	  where	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  total	  employment	  is	  in	   agriculture	   (38%	   in	   2010	   for	   low-­‐	   and	   middle-­‐income	   economies)	   and	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	  agriculture	  is	  non-­‐capitalist.	  Data	  sources:	  WDI	  database.	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method.	  This	  chapter	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  current	  literature	  on	  China’s	  labor	  share	  in	  two	  aspects.	  	  First,	   the	  Marxian	  measures	   of	   labor’s	   share	   covers	   the	   long	   period	   of	   contemporary	  China	  from	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  state-­‐socialist	  system	  in	  1956	  to	  2012.	  Few	  studies	  in	  the	  literature	  have	  measured	  Marxian	  categories	  for	  China.	  Zhang	  and	  Zhao	  (2007)	  provide	  series	  of	  China’s	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value	  over	  the	  period	  1978-­‐2004;	  however,	  they	  only	  cover	  manufacturing.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  this	  chapter	  might	  be	  the	  first	  attempt	  to	  build	  series	  of	  China’s	  labor	  share	  with	  a	  Marxian	  method	  for	  such	  a	  long	  period.	  	  Second,	  there	  are	  few	  studies	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Marxian	  measure	  and	  the	  conventional	  measure	   of	   labor’s	   share	   using	   a	   cointegration	  method.	   Piovani	   (2013)	   also	  uses	  the	  cointegration	  method	  to	  find	  a	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  between	  China’s	  wage	  share	  with	   variables	   that	   reflect	   class	   power,	   which	   should	   be	   closest	   to	   my	   study;	   however,	  Piovani	  measures	  wage	   share	  with	   inconsistent	   data16	  and	   only	   focuses	   on	   the	   industrial	  sector	  (mining,	  manufacturing,	  and	  utilities)	  such	  that	  no	  redistribution	  of	  surplus	  value	  is	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  The	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  chapter	  are	  as	  follows:	  first,	  labor’s	  share	  of	  the	  Maoist	  era	  was	  on	   average	   higher	   and	  more	   counter-­‐cyclical	   than	   that	   of	   the	   reform	   era;	   second,	   labor’s	  share	   in	  Marxian	  measures	   changed	   following	   an	   inverse-­‐U	   shape	   over	   the	   period	   1978-­‐2008	  and	  began	   to	   recover	  after	  2008;	   third,	  over	   the	   reform	  era,	   a	   long-­‐run	  relationship	  exists	  between	  the	  Marxian	  measures	  and	  the	  conventional	  measure	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  	  In	  what	   follows,	   this	  chapter	   is	  organized	   into	   four	  sections.	  Section	  2	   introduces	  data	  and	  methodology	   for	   constructing	   the	  measures	   of	   labor’s	   share.	   Section	   3	   discusses	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  wage	  share	  in	  Piovani	  (2013)	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  ratio	  of	  total	  wages	  in	  the	  industrial	  sector	  and	  value	  added	  of	   the	   industrial	   sector;	  however,	   the	  value	  added	  data	   corresponds	   to	   the	  whole	  industrial	  sector,	  while	  the	  total	  wages	  data	  only	  corresponds	  to	  wages	  of	  “workers	  and	  staff”	  which	  does	  not	  include	  workers	  of	  private	  enterprises.	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trends	  of	   labor’s	  share.	  Section	  4	   is	   the	  cointegration	  analysis	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Marxian	  measures	  and	  the	  conventional	  measure	  of	   labor’s	  share.	  Section	  5	  concludes	  the	  chapter.	  	  
2.2 Data	  and	  Methodology	  
I	  provide	  four	  measures	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  The	  first	  measure,	  LS1,	  is	  a	  measure	  with	  the	  conventional	  approach.	  The	  second	  measure,	  LS2,	  is	  a	  measure	  with	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  following	   Shaikh	   &	   Tonak	   (1994).	   The	   last	   two	   measures,	   LS3	   and	   LS4,	   are	   Marxian	  measures	   that	   improve	   LS2	   in	   different	   ways.	   This	   section	   discusses	   the	   data	   and	  methodology.	  Appendix	  A	  provides	  details	  of	  data	  sources	  and	  estimation	  methods.	  	  
2.2.1 Conventional	  Measure:	  LS1	  
For	  LS1,	   labor’s	   share	   is	  defined	  as	   the	   ratio	  of	   the	  compensation	  of	  employees	   to	   the	  net	  domestic	  product,	  i.e.	  GDP	  subtracting	  the	  depreciation	  of	  fixed	  capital.	  The	  definition	  is	  shown	  in	  Equation	  (2.1).	  	  	   𝐿𝑆1 = 𝐶𝐸/(𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 𝐷)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.1)	  	  
CE:	  Compensation	  of	  employees	  
GDP:	  Gross	  domestic	  products	  𝐷:	  Depreciation	  In	  Equation	  (2.1),	   the	  numerator	   is	  the	  compensation	  of	  employees.	   In	  China’s	  current	  statistical	   system,	   following	   the	   United	   Nations	   System	   of	   National	   Accounts	   (hereafter,	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SNA),	   the	   compensation	   of	   employees	   includes	   all	   income	   in	   the	   form	   of	   wages, 17	  agricultural	  income	  of	  rural	  households,	  and	  proprietors’	  income	  of	  self-­‐employment	  units,	  where	   one	   can	   see	   the	   deficiency	   of	   GDP	   accounting	   from	   conflating	   different	   modes	   of	  production.	  	  The	   denominator	   in	   Equation	   (2.1)	   is	   the	   net	   domestic	   product.	   I	   use	   net	   domestic	  product	   instead	   of	   gross	   domestic	   product	   because	   depreciation	   is	   determined	   not	   by	  relations	  of	  distribution	  but	  by	  technology,	  the	  amount	  of	  means	  of	  production,	  accounting	  rules,	   and	   tax	   policies.	   Although	   enterprises	   may	   hide	   profits	   by	   artificially	   raising	  depreciation,	   it	   is	   unclear	   how	   this	   practice	  may	   affect	   the	   changes	   in	   distributive	   shares	  over	   time.	   Moreover,	   using	   net	   domestic	   product	   or	   gross	   domestic	   product	   leads	   to	   no	  major	  difference	  in	  the	  trends	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  	  With	   respect	   to	   data	   sources,	   Hsueh	   &	   Li	   (1999),	   NBS	   (2007),	   and	   various	   issues	   of	  China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  provide	  relevant	  data	  over	  the	  period	  1978-­‐2012.	  For	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1977,	  I	  make	  reasonable	  estimations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  official	  statistical	  data.	  Figure	  2-­‐1	  plots	  LS1.	  	  
2.2.2 Marxian	  Measure:	  LS2	  
As	   a	   Marxian	  measure,	   LS2	   overcomes	   the	   deficiencies	   of	   LS1	   by	   excluding	   the	   non-­‐capitalist	  components	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and	  by	  taking	  account	  of	  the	  division	  between	  productive	  and	  unproductive	  labor.	  LS2	  is	  defined	  by	  Equation	  (2.2).	  	  	   𝐿𝑆2 = 𝑉𝐶 𝑉𝐶 + 𝑆𝑉 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.2)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  In	  this	  study,	  wages	  refer	  to	  all	  kinds	  of	  wage	  income,	  including	  wages,	  salaries,	  bonuses,	  and	  benefits.	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VC:	  Variable	  capital	  
SV:	  Surplus	  value	  In	  Equation	  (2.2),	   the	  numerator	  is	  variable	  capital	  and	  the	  denominator	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  variable	  capital	  and	  surplus	  value,	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  new	  value.	  Equation	  (2.2)	  immediately	  raises	  two	  questions.	  	  The	   first	   question	   is	  what	   are	   the	  non-­‐capitalist	   components	  of	   the	  Chinese	   economy.	  For	  the	  Maoist	  era	  and	  the	  early	  period	  of	  the	  reform	  era	  when	  the	  state-­‐socialist	  economic	  system	  still	  dominated,	  do	  we	  also	  exclude	   the	  non-­‐capitalist	   components?	  Section	  2.2.2.1	  will	  address	  this	  question.	  	  
Figure	  2-­‐1	  Labor’s	  Share	  Measured	  by	  LS1,	  1956-­‐2012	  
	  Sources:	  See	  Appendix	  A.	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another	  way:	   what	   is	   productive	   labor	   and	  what	   is	   unproductive	   labor	   for	   the	   economy.	  Section	  2.2.2.2	  will	  address	  this	  question.	  	  Due	  to	  data	  availability,	  LS2	  cannot	  rigorously	  follow	  the	  Marxian	  approach,	  thus	  some	  assumptions	   have	   to	   be	   imposed	   on	   the	   calculation	   of	   LS2.	   Section	   2.2.3	  will	   discuss	   the	  potential	  biases	  caused	  by	  the	  assumptions	  and	  propose	  improved	  measures,	  LS3	  and	  LS4,	  with	  limited	  data.	  	  	  
2.2.2.1 Capitalist	  (Socialist)	  Components	  vs.	  Non-­‐Capitalist	  (Non-­‐Socialist)	  Components	  
China	  established	  a	  state-­‐socialist	  economic	  system	  in	  1956	  when	  China	  completed	  the	  socialist	   transformation	   of	   the	   economy.	   China	   experienced	   the	   transition	   towards	   a	  capitalism-­‐dominated	   economic	   system	   that	   started	   in	   1978	   and	   accelerated	   after	   1992.	  Given	   these	   facts,	   capitalist	   components	   did	   not	   exist	   before	   1978	   and	   did	   not	   play	   an	  important	   role	   until	   1992.	   Since	   capitalist	   components	   emerged	   only	   in	   the	   recent	   two	  decades,	   the	   analysis	   here	  will	   focus	  on	   the	  dominant	  part	   of	   the	   economy	   instead	  of	   the	  capitalist	  part.	  	  I	   define	   the	   dominant	   part	   as	   the	   enterprise	   sector	   of	   the	   economy.	   Specifically,	   it	  includes	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises,	   state-­‐holding	   enterprises,	   collective	   enterprises,	   and	  private	   enterprises.	   Thus,	   during	   different	   periods,	   the	   dominant	   part	   had	   different	  meanings:	   it	   refers	   to	   the	   socialist	   components	   over	   the	   period	   1956-­‐1977	   and	   the	  transitioning	   socialist	   components	   as	   well	   as	   the	   rising	   capitalist	   components	   over	   the	  period	   1978-­‐2012.	   This	   definition	   of	   the	   dominant	   part	   does	   not	   ignore	   the	   differences	  between	   capitalist	   and	   socialist	   components.	   The	   aim	   of	   this	   definition	   is	   to	   obtain	   a	  comparable	  measure	  of	   labor’s	  share	   for	  the	  entire	  economy.	  Neither	   focusing	  on	  socialist	  components	  nor	  focusing	  on	  capitalist	  components	  can	  achieve	  this	  aim.	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In	   addition,	   I	   treat	   the	   state	   sector,	   i.e.	   public	   administration,	   the	   legal	   system,	   the	  military,	   etc.,	   as	   the	   dominant	   part	   because	   the	   value	   obtained	   by	   this	   sector	   is	  mainly	   a	  transfer	  of	  surplus	  value	  from	  productive	  sectors	  of	  the	  dominant	  part.18	  	  The	  dominant	  part	  excludes	  three	  sectors	  in	  the	  economy:	  agriculture,	  self-­‐employment	  units,	   and	   non-­‐profit	   institutions	   for	   scientific	   research,	   education,	   culture,	   and	   medical	  services	  (hereafter,	  non-­‐profit	  institutions).	  	  Agriculture	   was	   organized	   collectively	   over	   the	   most	   years	   of	   the	   Maoist	   era	   and	  organized	   by	   rural	   households	   after	   the	   de-­‐collectivization	   reform	   in	   the	   early	   1980s.	  Throughout	  the	  whole	  period,	  agriculture	  was	  not	  organized	  in	  the	  form	  of	  enterprises	  and	  it	   was	   different	   from	   enterprises	   in	  many	   aspects	   such	   as	   organization,	   distribution,	   and	  employment.	  This	  practice	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Luo	  (1990)	  who	  also	  suggests	  that	  agriculture	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  dominant	  part	  of	  China’s	  socialist	  economy.	  	  Next	   is	   the	   self-­‐employment	   sector.	   In	   the	  Maoist	   era,	   self-­‐employment	   units	  were	   so	  few	  that	  one	  can	  safely	  ignore	  them,	  and	  even	  in	  the	  1980s,	  self-­‐employment	  accounted	  for	  a	  small	  part	  of	  total	  employment.	  The	  self-­‐employment	  sector	  expanded	  after	  1992,	  which	  was	   mainly	   based	   on	   household	   labor	   and	   a	   small	   proportion	   of	   wage	   labor.	   Some	   self-­‐employment	  units	  might	  be	  as	   large	  as	   small	  private	   enterprises	   in	   terms	  of	   employment	  but	   they	   are	  not	   registered	   as	   enterprises;	   however,	   there	   is	   no	  data	   to	  distinguish	   those	  enterprises	  from	  real	  self-­‐employment	  units.	  Therefore,	   I	  assume	  that	  all	  self-­‐employment	  units	  belong	  to	  the	  non-­‐dominant	  part	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  The	   last	   sector	   is	  non-­‐profit	   institutions.	  Over	   the	  period	  1956-­‐2012,	   the	   state	  mostly	  funded	   these	   institutions.	   Shaikh	   &	   Tonak	   (1994)	   treat	   public-­‐funded	   institutions	   of	  education	  and	  medical	  services	  in	  the	  U.S.	  as	  government	  enterprises,	  and	  they	  suggest	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  transfer	  of	  surplus	  value	  from	  productive	  sectors	  to	  non-­‐productive	  sectors	  in	  Section	  2.2.2.2.	   In	   fact,	  part	  of	   the	  value	  obtained	  by	   the	  state	  sector	   is	  a	   transfer	   from	  the	  non-­‐dominant	  part,	  such	  as	  agricultural	  tax.	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government	  enterprises	  in	  the	  U.S.	  are	  essentially	  capitalist	  enterprises	  but	  this	  need	  not	  be	  the	  case	  in	  other	  countries.	  For	  China,	  these	  institutions	  are	  not	  any	  kind	  of	  enterprises	  in	  that	  they	  aim	  at	  fulfilling	  certain	  needs	  of	  the	  society,	  rather	  than	  economic	  objectives	  such	  as	   output	   and	   profits.	   Thus,	   these	   institutions	   belong	   to	   the	   non-­‐dominant	   part	   of	   the	  economy.	  	  Note	   that	   the	   non-­‐dominant	   part	   of	   the	   economy	   is	   productive	   but	   meanwhile	  unproductive	   of	   capital.	   This	   relates	   to	   the	   general	   distinction	   between	   productive	   and	  unproductive	   labor	  and	   the	  concrete	  distinction	  within	   the	  dominant	  part	  of	  an	  economy.	  For	   instance,	   in	   a	   typical	   capitalist	   economy,	   household-­‐based	   agriculture	   is	   productive	  according	  to	  the	  general	  distinction	  because	  it	  produces	  products	  that	  satisfy	  certain	  needs	  of	  people’s	   living;	  however,	   it	   is	  unproductive	  of	   capital	  based	  on	   the	  concrete	  distinction	  because	   it	   does	   not	   produce	   surplus	   value	   for	   capital.	   Both	   Luo	   (1990)	   and	   Shaikh	   and	  Tonak	  (1994)	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  general	  and	  concrete	  distinctions	  between	  productive	  and	  unproductive	  labor.	  	  	  
2.2.2.2 Productive	  Labor	  vs.	  Unproductive	  Labor	  
After	  excluding	  the	  non-­‐dominant	  part	  of	  the	  economy,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  division	  between	  productive	   and	   unproductive	   labor	   within	   the	   dominant	   part	   of	   the	   economy.	   In	   the	  Marxian	  literature,	  for	  a	  typical	  capitalist	  economy,	  only	  productive	  labor	  produces	  surplus	  value	   for	   capital,	   thus	   only	   the	  wages	   paid	   to	   productive	  workers	   are	   variable	   capital.	   In	  general,	  there	  are	  three	  kinds	  of	  unproductive	  labor	  in	  a	  typical	  capitalist	  economy.	  First,	  on	  the	  micro	  level,	  supervisory	  labor	  within	  enterprises	  used	  for	  promoting	  the	  production	  of	  surplus	   value	   is	   unproductive.	   Second,	   labor	   used	   for	   trading	   activities	   is	   unproductive.	  Shaikh	  &	  Tonak	  (1994)	  define	  the	  redistribution	  of	  surplus	  value	  between	  production	  and	  trade	   as	   “primary	   flows”.	   Third,	   labor	   used	   for	   finance	   and	   social	  maintenance	   (the	   state	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sector)	  is	  unproductive.	  Shaikh	  &	  Tonak	  (1994)	  define	  the	  surplus	  value	  paid	  by	  production	  and	   trade	   sectors	   to	   the	   financial	   and	   state	   sectors	   as	   “royalty	  payments”	  which	   refers	   to	  payments	   in	   the	   forms	   of	   interest,	   ground	   rent,	   fees,	   and	   taxes,	   and	   define	   this	  redistribution	  of	  surplus	  value	  as	  “secondary	  flows”.	  	  Although	   it	   is	   theoretically	   inconsistent	   to	   apply	   Marxian	   conceptions	   designed	   for	   a	  typical	  capitalist	  economy	  (e.g.	  surplus	  value,	  variable	  capital)	   to	  the	  state-­‐socialist	  period	  of	   the	   Chinese	   economy,	   there	   were	   counterparts	   of	   these	   conceptions	   under	   the	   state-­‐socialist	   system.	   The	   contradiction	   between	   promoting	   industrialization	   (mainly	   through	  accumulation)	   and	   enhancing	   the	   living	   standards	   of	   the	   people	   (mainly	   through	   raising	  wages)	  did	   exist	   under	  China’s	   state-­‐socialist	   system	   (Mao,	   1977);	   thus,	   it	  was	   crucial	   for	  China	   to	   determine	   the	   distribution	   between	   economic	   surplus,	   using	   Baran’s	   conception	  (Baran,	   1957),	   and	  wages,	  which	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   state-­‐socialist	   counterparts	   of	   surplus	  value	   and	  variable	   capital,	   respectively.19	  For	   the	   sake	  of	   simplicity,	   in	   the	   following	   I	   use	  Marxian	   conceptions	   for	   the	   entire	   period	   without	   pointing	   out	   that	   in	   some	   cases	   they	  actually	  refer	  to	  the	  state-­‐socialist	  counterparts.	  	  In	  the	  Chinese	  literature,	  there	  were	  continuous	  debates	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  early	   1990s	   on	   what	   is	   productive	   labor	   and	   what	   is	   unproductive	   labor	   in	   the	   socialist	  economy.	   These	   debates	   to	   some	   extent	   promoted	   the	   transition	   of	   the	   statistical	   system	  from	  the	  Material	  Product	  System	  (hereafter,	  MPS)	   to	   the	  SNA.	  These	  debates	  brought	  up	  three	   different	   viewpoints:	   the	   first	   viewpoint,	   close	   to	   the	   SNA,	   treats	   both	   labor	   in	  material	   production	   and	   labor	   in	   the	   trade	   and	   service	   sectors	   as	   productive	   labor	   (Yu,	  1981);	   the	   second	   viewpoint,	   close	   to	   the	   MPS,	   treats	   only	   labor	   used	   for	   material	  production	  as	  productive	  labor	  (Sun,	  1981;	  Wei,	  1981);	  the	  third	  viewpoint	  takes	  a	  middle	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  This	  contradiction	  to	  a	   large	  extent	  reflects	  the	  contradiction	  between	  the	  working	  class	  and	  the	  elites	  under	  China’s	  state-­‐socialist	  system.	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  social	  contradictions	  in	  the	  Maoist	  era,	  see	  Wang	  (1990).	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position,	  suggesting	  that	   labor	   in	  material	  production	  and	  some	  services	   is	  productive	  but	  labor	  in	  the	  trade,	  finance,	  and	  state	  sectors	  is	  unproductive	  (Luo,	  1990).	  	  The	  third	  viewpoint	  shares	  many	  similarities	  with	  Shaikh	  &	  Tonak	  (1994):	  first,	  labor	  in	  the	  trade,	  finance,	  and	  state	  sectors	  is	  unproductive,	  so	  the	  value	  gained	  by	  these	  sectors	  is	  a	  transfer	  of	  surplus	  value;	  second,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  material	  production	  defined	  by	  the	  MPS,	  some	   services	   (for	   example,	   post	   services,	   telecommunications,	   food	   and	   hotel	   services,	  services	   to	   households)	   are	   also	   productive	   labor.	   Nevertheless,	   different	   from	   Shaikh	   &	  Tonak	   (1994),	   the	   third	   viewpoint	   in	   the	   Chinese	   literature	   does	   not	   treats	   supervisory	  labor	   as	   unproductive	   labor.	   Since	   supervisory	   labor	   is	   mainly	   aimed	   at	   promoting	   the	  production	  of	  surplus	  value,	  I	  treat	  supervisory	  labor	  as	  unproductive	  labor.	  	  
2.2.2.3 Definitions	  of	  Variable	  Capital	  and	  Surplus	  Value	  
According	   to	   the	   analysis	   in	   Section	   2.2.2.1	   and	   2.2.2.2,	   the	   whole	   economy	   is	  restructured,	  by	  the	  division	  between	  the	  dominant	  part	  and	  the	  non-­‐dominant	  part	  in	  the	  first	   place,	   and	   further	   by	   the	   division	   between	   productive	   labor	   and	   unproductive	   labor	  within	  the	  dominant	  part,	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  2-­‐1.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity,	  in	  the	  following	  I	  call	   sectors	   in	   the	  dominant	  part	   “productive	  sectors”	  or	   “unproductive	  sectors”,	  although	  supervisory	  labor	  of	  “productive	  sectors”	  is	  unproductive.	  	  Therefore,	  variable	  capital	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  total	  wages	  of	  productive	  sectors	  within	  the	  dominant	  part	  subtracting	  wages	  of	  supervisory	  labor,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  following	  equation.	  	  	   𝑉𝐶 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑊!	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.3)	  	  𝑊!:	  Total	  wages	  of	  productive	  sectors	  𝛼:	  Share	  of	  wages	  of	  supervisory	  labor	  in	  𝑊!	  




















































































































	  Surplus	  value	  is	  composed	  of	  three	  parts:	  first,	  net	  value	  added20	  of	  productive	  sectors	  subtracting	   variable	   capital,	   which	   is	   the	   sum	   of	   supervisory	  wages,	   profits,	   and	   indirect	  taxes	  of	  productive	   sectors;	   second,	   total	  output	  of	   commerce	   (the	   trade	  sector),	  which	   is	  the	   sum	   of	   intermediate	   inputs,	   depreciation	   of	   fixed	   capital,	   wages,	   profits,	   and	   indirect	  taxes	  of	  commerce;	  third,	  royalty	  payments	  paid	  by	  productive	  sectors	  and	  commerce	  to	  the	  finance	  sector.	  Thus,	  surplus	  value	  is	  defined	  as	  follows.	  	  	   𝑆𝑉 = 𝑁𝑉! − 𝑉𝐶 + 𝑇𝑂! + 𝑅𝑌! + 𝑅𝑌! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.4)	  
	  𝑁𝑉!:	   Net	   value	   added	   of	   productive	   sectors,	   which	   is	   the	   sum	   of	   wages,	   profits,	   and	  indirect	  taxes	  of	  productive	  sectors.	  	  𝑇𝑂!:	  Total	  output	  of	  commerce,	  which	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  intermediate	  inputs,	  depreciation	  of	  fixed	  capital,	  wages,	  profits,	  and	  indirect	  taxes	  of	  commerce.	  	  𝑅𝑌!:	  Royalty	  payments	  paid	  by	  productive	  sectors	  to	  the	  finance	  sector.	  	  𝑅𝑌!:	  Royalty	  payments	  paid	  by	  commerce	  to	  the	  finance	  sector.	  	  With	   Equation	   (2.3)	   and	   (2.4),	   we	   can	   calculate	   LS2.	   A	   rigorous	   calculation	   of	   LS2	  requires	  input-­‐output	  tables.	  Although	  China	  began	  to	  compile	  input-­‐output	  tables	  as	  early	  as	   1973,	   the	   first	   input-­‐output	   table	   that	   corresponds	   to	   the	   SNA	  was	   complied	   in	   1992	  while	  the	  earlier	  tables	  only	  contain	  material	  production	  sectors	  under	  the	  MPS;	  since	  1992,	  input-­‐output	   tables	   have	   been	   published	   every	   two	   or	   three	   years,	   thus	   there	   is	   no	  continuous	  input-­‐output	  data	  for	  the	  whole	  economy.	  Therefore,	  I	  use	  official	  statistical	  data	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Note	   “value	   added”	   is	   different	   from	   the	   Marxian	   concept	   “new	   value”.	   Value	   added	   is	   a	  concept	  from	  GDP	  accounting,	  which	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  compensation	  of	  employees,	  profits,	   indirect	  taxes,	  and	  depreciation	  of	   fixed	  capital.	  Net	  value	  added	   is	  value	  added	  subtracting	  depreciation	  of	  fixed	  capital.	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under	  the	  MPS	  and	  the	  SNA	  to	  replace	  the	  data	  that	  should	  be	  obtained	  from	  input-­‐output	  tables.	  The	  result	  of	  LS2	  is	  given	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐2.	  	  
Figure	  2-­‐2	  Labor’s	  Share	  Measured	  by	  LS2,	  1956-­‐2012	  
	  Data	  Sources:	  See	  Appendix	  A.	  	  
2.2.3 Marxian	  Measures:	  LS3	  and	  LS4	  
2.2.3.1 Assumptions	  Imposed	  on	  LS2	  and	  Potential	  Biases	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overestimate	   LS2,	   and	   since	   royalty	   payments	   increased	   as	   the	   economic	   transition	  proceeded,	  the	  overestimation	  of	  LS2	  will	  be	  worse	  in	  later	  years	  than	  in	  earlier	  years.	  	  Assumption	  2:	  the	  wage	  share	  of	  supervisory	  labor	  in	  productive	  sectors	  is	  zero,	  i.e.	  𝛼	  is	  zero.	  This	  obviously	  unrealistic	  assumption	  will	  also	  overestimate	  LS2.	  	  Assumption	  3:	  the	  different	  definitions	  of	  net	  value	  added	  under	  the	  MPS	  and	  the	  SNA	  do	  not	  affect	  LS2.	  In	  fact,	  since	  the	  MPS	  only	  focus	  on	  material	  production	  sectors,	  there	  is	  a	  discrepancy	   between	   the	   definitions	   of	   net	   value	   added	   under	   the	  MPS	   and	   the	   SNA.	   For	  instance,	   a	   manufacturing	   enterprise	   purchases	   services	   from	   the	   food	   and	   hotel	   service	  sector.	  This	  purchase	  is	  counted	  as	  intermediate	  inputs	  of	  the	  enterprise	  under	  the	  SNA	  but	  net	   value	   added	  under	   the	  MPS,	   thus	   a	   part	   of	   the	   net	   value	   added	   of	   the	   food	   and	  hotel	  service	  sector	  is	  double	  counted,	  which	  implies	  that	  LS2	  using	  MPS	  data	  is	  underestimated.	  Since	   MPS	   data	   is	   used	   only	   for	   the	   period	   1956-­‐1977,	   this	   assumption	   will	   only	  underestimate	  LS2	  of	  the	  Maoist	  era.	  	  Assumption	  4:	  the	  redistribution	  of	  surplus	  value	  only	  takes	  place	  within	  the	  country.	  In	  reality,	  surplus	  value	  produced	  by	  China’s	  productive	  sectors	  can	  be	  distributed	  to	  a	  foreign	  trade	  sector,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  For	  instance,	  Wal-­‐Mart	  in	  the	  U.S.	  who	  sells	  products	  imported	  from	   China	   may	   obtain	   surplus	   value	   created	   by	   the	   manufacturing	   exporter	   located	   in	  China.	   This	   transfer	   of	   surplus	   value	   cannot	   be	   estimated	   without	   detailed	   export	   and	  import	  data.	  Since	  export	  surplus	  became	  increasingly	  large	  in	  the	  reform	  era,	  the	  transfer	  of	  surplus	  value	   from	  China	  to	   foreign	  countries	  might	  be	  considerable,	  which	  means	  that	  this	  assumption	  will	  overestimate	  LS2	  in	  later	  years	  relative	  to	  that	  in	  earlier	  years.	  	  Assumption	   5:	   the	   commerce	   sector	   does	   not	   include	   trade	   of	   real	   estate.	   This	  assumption	  will	   overestimate	   LS2	   in	   that	   the	   surplus	   value	   distributed	   to	   the	   real	   estate	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sector	   for	   its	   trading	   activities	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   zero.21	  Since	   the	   trade	   of	   real	   estate	  expanded	  mainly	  after	  the	  housing	  reform	  initiated	   in	  1998,	   the	  overestimation	  should	  be	  worse	  in	  later	  years	  than	  in	  earlier	  years.	  	  All	   the	   five	  assumptions	  above	  except	  Assumption	  2	  will	  underestimate	  LS2	   in	  earlier	  years	   or	   overestimate	   it	   in	   later	   years.	   In	   what	   follows,	   with	   limited	   data,	   I	   first	   relax	  Assumption	  1	  in	  Section	  2.2.3.2	  and	  then	  both	  Assumption	  1	  and	  2	  in	  Section	  2.2.3.3.	  Due	  to	  data	  availability,	  I	  have	  to	  leave	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  assumptions	  for	  future	  research.	  	  
2.2.3.2 Royalty	  Payments	  as	  Costs	  and	  LS3	  
Equation	  (2.5)	  is	  used	  to	  estimate	  𝑅𝑌! + 𝑅𝑌! .	  	  	   𝑅𝑌! + 𝑅𝑌! = 𝛽 𝑁𝑉! + 𝑁𝑉! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.5)	  	  𝑁𝑉!:	  Net	  value	  added	  of	  commerce,	  which	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  wages,	  profits,	  and	  indirect	  taxes	  of	  commerce.	  	  𝛽:	  The	  estimated	  ratio	  of	  royalty	  payments	  counted	  as	  costs	  of	  productive	  sectors	  and	  commerce	  to	  the	  net	  value	  added	  of	  productive	  sectors	  and	  commerce.	  	  The	  result	  of	  LS3	   is	  given	   in	  Figure	  2-­‐3.	  The	  comparison	   in	  Figure	  2-­‐3	  shows	  that	  LS2	  and	  LS3	  have	  similar	  trends.	  	  
2.2.3.3 Supervisory	  Labor	  and	  LS4	  
The	  wage	  share	  of	  supervisory	  labor	  in	  productive	  sectors,	  i.e.	  𝛼,	   is	  determined	  by	  two	  factors.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Note	  that	  this	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  surplus	  value	  paid	  to	  the	  real	  estate	  sector	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ground	  rent.	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The	   first	   factor	   is	   the	   employment	   share	   of	   supervisory	   employees	   in	   productive	  sectors.	  Different	  data	  sources	  show	  different	   information	  about	  this	   factor.	  The	  statistical	  bureau	   published	   data	   about	   the	   composition	   of	   mining,	   manufacturing,	   utilities,	   and	  construction	  employees	  according	  to	  their	  positions	  in	  enterprises	  for	  the	  years	  1980-­‐1987,	  1990,	  1993-­‐1997.	  This	  data	  shows	  that	  the	  employment	  share	  of	  supervisory	  employees	  in	  productive	   sectors	  varied	  within	  a	  narrow	  range	   from	  9.8	  percent	   to	  11	  percent.	  Another	  data	  source,	   the	  worker	  and	  staff	   surveys	  conducted	  by	   the	  All-­‐China	  Federation	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  (hereafter,	  ACFTU)	  every	  five	  years	  since	  1992,	  shows	  that	  this	  share	  grew	  from	  20	  percent	  in	  1992	  to	  32	  percent	  in	  1997,	  then	  dropped	  to	  24	  percent	  in	  2002	  and	  further	  fell	  to	  around	  20	  percent	  in	  2007	  and	  2012.22	  	  
Figure	  2-­‐3	  The	  Comparison	  of	  LS2	  and	  LS3,	  1978-­‐2012	  
	  Data	  Sources:	  See	  Appendix	  A.	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The	  statistical	  bureau	  data	  were	  directly	   reported	  by	  all	  enterprises.	  Compared	   to	   the	  statistical	  bureau	  data,	  the	  ACFTU	  surveys	  might	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  sampling	  methods.23	  Also,	  the	   ACFTU	   surveys	   mix	   up	   productive	   sectors	   and	   unproductive	   sectors.	   Furthermore,	  micro-­‐level	  data	  also	  suggests	   that	  supervisory	  share	  of	   total	  employment	  was	  around	  10	  percent	   before	   1990.24	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   statistical	   bureau	   data	   suggests	   that	   this	  share	  was	   stable	   but	   the	   same	   data	   is	   not	   available	   for	   the	   years	   after	   1997.	   Although	   it	  seems	   unreasonable,	   I	   assume	   that	   the	   supervisory	   share	   of	   total	   employment	   was	   10	  percent	  over	  the	  period	  1978-­‐2012.25	  	  The	  second	  factor	  that	  determines	  𝛼	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  average	  wage	  level	  of	  supervisory	  employees	  to	  that	  of	  all	  employees	  in	  productive	  sectors.	  This	  ratio	  also	  measures	  the	  wage	  inequality	  between	  supervisory	  employees	  and	  productive	  workers.	   In	   the	  next	   chapter,	   I	  will	  discuss	  in	  detail	  how	  this	  wage	  inequality	  reflects	  changes	  in	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production.	  I	  use	  the	  wage	  data	  from	  the	  ACFTU	  surveys	  and	  the	  smaller	  surveys	  conducted	  by	  the	  Statistical	  Bureau	  to	  calculate	  this	  ratio	  and	  extrapolate	  the	  missing	  data.	  Although	  the	  sampling	  methods	  might	  cause	  biases	   in	   the	  composition	  of	  employees,	   they	  should	  have	  a	  much	  smaller	   impact	  on	  wage	   inequality	  because	   the	  power	  relation	   in	   the	  sphere	  of	  production	  affected	  wage	  inequality	  in	  similar	  ways	  across	  enterprises.	  	  Figure	   2-­‐4	   gives	   LS4.	   Compared	   to	   LS3,	   LS4	   is	   smaller	   than	   LS3,	   and	   the	   difference	  between	   LS3	   and	   LS4	   became	   slightly	   greater	   after	   1997	   and	   then	   slightly	   smaller	   after	  2007.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  For	   instance,	   the	   1997	   ACFTU	   survey	   selected	   the	   same	   amount	   of	   enterprises	   from	   each	  subsector	  of	  manufacturing,	  which	  obviously	  cannot	  reflect	  the	  actual	  composition	  of	  employees	  for	  the	  whole	  manufacturing	  sector.	  	  
24	  The	   micro-­‐level	   data	   comes	   from	   materials	   of	   the	   mining	   industry	   in	   Henan	   Province,	  Zhengzhou	  No.	  5	  Cotton	  Textile	  Factory,	  Guangxi	  No.	  1	  Machinery	  Manufacturing	  Factory,	  Changzhou	  Machinery	  Manufacturing	  Factory,	  and	  Luoyang	  Glass	  Group.	  	  
25	  Mohun	   (2013)	   shows	   that	   the	   supervisory	   share	   of	   total	   employment	   in	   the	   U.S.	   was	   also	  relatively	  stable	  over	  the	  period	  1964-­‐2010.	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2.3 Trends	  of	  Labor’s	  Share	  
2.3.1 Maoist	  Era	  vs.	  Reform	  Era	  
LS2	  shows	  that	   labor’s	  share	   in	   the	  Maoist	  era	  was	  on	  average	  higher	   than	  that	   in	   the	  reform	  era.	  What	  does	  this	  result	  imply?	  Does	  it	  imply	  that	  the	  power	  of	  the	  working	  class	  was	  greater	  in	  the	  Maoist	  era?	  	  
Figure	  2-­‐4	  The	  Comparison	  of	  LS3	  and	  LS4,	  1978-­‐2012	  
	  Data	  Sources:	  See	  Appendix	  A.	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two	   eras.	   In	   the	   capitalism-­‐dominated	   system,	   surplus	   value	   is	   accumulated	   for	   the	  production	   of	   more	   surplus	   value;	   while	   in	   the	   state-­‐socialist	   system,	   surplus	   value	   was	  accumulated	   for	   industrialization,	   which	   was	   relevant	   to	   the	   long-­‐run	   interests	   of	   the	  working	  class.	  This	  difference	  suggests	  that	  there	  was	  a	  systematic	  break	  between	  the	  two	  eras	  such	  that	  changes	  in	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  between	  the	  two	  eras	  cannot	  be	  directly	  reflected	  by	  labor’s	  share.	  	  However,	   one	   can	   still	   see	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   eras	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	   accumulation	   and	   distribution.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   the	   economic	   contractions	   in	   the	  1960s	  led	  to	  a	  fall	  in	  the	  new	  value,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  necessarily	  led	  to	  higher	  labor’s	  share	  because	   variable	   capital	   could	   decrease	   as	  well.	   Higher	   labor’s	   share	   during	   contractions	  implies	  that	  there	  were	  more	  wage	  and	  job	  securities	  in	  the	  Maoist	  era,	  thus	  fluctuations	  of	  accumulation	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  affect	  workers’	  living	  conditions;	  while	  as	  the	  transition	  proceeded,	   fluctuations	   of	   accumulation	   was	   increasingly	   relevant,	   initially	   to	   wage	  security,	  and	  later	  to	  both	  wage	  and	  job	  securities.	  	  This	   difference	   can	   be	   seen	   from	   changes	   in	   the	   counter-­‐cyclical	   behaviors	   of	   labor’s	  share.	  While	   labor’s	   share	  was	   counter-­‐cyclical	   throughout	   the	  entire	  period,	   it	  was	  more	  counter-­‐cyclical	   in	   the	  Maoist	   era	   than	   in	   the	   reform	   era.	   Table	   2-­‐2	   gives	   the	   correlation	  coefficients	  between	  real	  GDP	  growth	  and	  labor’s	  share	  and	  those	  between	  real	  GDP	  growth	  and	   the	   growth	  of	   labor’s	   share.	  Both	   the	   coefficients	   in	   the	   reform	  era	  were	  higher	   than	  those	  in	  the	  Maoist	  era.	  	  	  
2.3.2 Inverse-­‐U	  Shape	  and	  the	  Recovery	  of	  Labor’s	  Share	  
Labor’s	   share	   measured	   with	   the	   Marxian	   approach	   show	   an	   inverse-­‐U	   shape	   in	   the	  reform	   era	   before	   2009,	   which	   had	   a	   rising	   trend	   over	   the	   period	   1978-­‐1990	   and	   kept	  growing	  more	   slowly	  over	   the	  period	  1991-­‐1998,	   then	  entered	  a	   falling	   trend	  until	   2008.	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This	   inverse-­‐U	   shape	   of	   labor’s	   share	   took	   place	   along	   with	   fast	   economic	   growth	   and	  development	  over	  the	  reform	  era.	  If	  we	  consider	  labor’s	  share	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  inequality,	  this	  inverse-­‐U	   shape	   of	   labor’s	   share	   contradicts	   the	   Kuznets	   curve	   that	   depicts	   an	   inverse-­‐U	  shape	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	   inequality	  and	  economic	  development	   (Kuznets,	  1955).	  Using	   top	   income	   ratios	   and	   labor’s	   share	   measured	   with	   the	   conventional	   approach,	  Piketty	  (2014)	  shows	  that	  the	  Kuznets	  curve	  is	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  experiences	  of	  leading	  capitalist	   economies.	   Here	   we	   see	   that	   using	   labor’s	   share	   measured	   with	   the	   Marxian	  approach,	  China’s	  experience	  does	  not	  support	  the	  Kuznets	  curve	  either.	  	  
Table	  2-­‐2	  Correlations	  between	  GDP	  Growth	  and	  the	  Growth	  of	  Labor’s	  Share	  	   (1)	   (2)	  
Periods	  	   Correlation	  between	  real	  GDP	  growth	  and	  LS2	  
Correlation	  between	  real	  GDP	  growth	  and	  LS2	  growth	  1956-­‐1977	   -­‐0.557	   -­‐0.819	  1978-­‐2012	   -­‐0.098	   -­‐0.225	  Sources:	  NBS	  (2009)	  and	  the	  author’s	  calculation.	  	  
This	  inverse-­‐U	  shape	  of	  labor’s	  share	  differs	  from	  the	  US	  experience.	  Converting	  labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	  LS4	   into	   the	   rate	  of	   surplus	   value	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   comparison,	  China’s	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value	  fell	  from	  2.8	  in	  1978	  to	  1.9	  in	  1997	  and	  then	  increased	  to	  3.2	  in	  2008.	  	  The	   rate	   of	   surplus	   value	   estimated	  with	   similar	  methods	   for	   the	   U.S.	  was	   generally	   in	   a	  rising	  trend	  in	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  period	  except	  the	  period	  1964-­‐1974	  (Paitaridis	  and	  Tsoulfidis	  2011;	  Shaikh	  and	  Tonak	  1994).	  Over	  China’s	  reform	  era,	  the	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value	  in	  the	  US	  increased	  from	  2.2	  in	  1978	  to	  3.1	  in	  1997	  and	  3.5	  in	  2007	  (Paitaridis	  and	  Tsoulfidis	  2011).	  China’s	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value	  increased	  much	  faster	  than	  the	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  while	   it	   was	   lower	   over	   the	   period	   1997-­‐2007.	   Right	   before	   the	   crisis,	   China’s	   rate	   of	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surplus	   value	   was	   not	   as	   high	   as	   that	   in	   the	   U.S.,	   which	   brings	   up	   interesting	   questions	  whether	  a	  high	  the	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  crisis	  tendencies.	  	  This	  inverse-­‐U	  shape	  of	  labor’s	  share	  in	  China	  may	  imply	  that	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  changed	   following	  an	   inverse-­‐U	  shape	  as	  well.	   In	   the	  next	   chapter,	   I	  will	  discuss	  this	  issue	  in	  detail.	  	  The	   trends	   of	   labor’s	   share	   coincide	  with	   the	   expansion	   and	   contraction	   of	   the	   state-­‐owned	  sector.	  Labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	  LS4	  reached	  the	  peak	  in	  1997,	  when	  the	  Fifteenth	  Conference	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   China	   accelerated	   the	   reform	   on	   the	   state-­‐owned	  sector,	  featured	  by	  laying	  off	  workers,	  privatizing	  small-­‐scale	  enterprises,	  and	  transforming	  large-­‐scale	   enterprises	   into	   share-­‐holding	   companies.	   Employment	   of	   state-­‐owned	   and	  state-­‐holding	   industrial	   enterprises	   dropped	   by	   6	   percent	   in	   1997,	   by	   7	   percent	   in	   1998,	  and	  by	  about	  10	  percent	  each	  year	  from	  1999	  to	  2003.	  	  Labor’s	   share	  might	   have	   begun	   to	   recover	   after	   2008.	   A	   series	   of	   events	   took	   place	  along	  with	   this	  recovery.	  First	  of	  all,	   the	   financial	  and	  economic	  crisis	   that	   initiated	   in	   the	  U.S.	   led	   to	   a	   recession	   for	   leading	   capitalist	   economies,	   which	   also	   affected	   the	   Chinese	  economy	   through	   the	   contraction	   of	   the	   demand	   for	   China’s	   exports.	   China’s	   economic	  growth	  fell	  behind	  the	  growth	  of	  wages,	  leading	  to	  the	  recovery	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  Secondly,	  as	   the	   long-­‐lasting	   decline	   of	   labor’s	   share	   constrained	   workers’	   capacity	   to	   satisfy	   their	  needs	   for	   the	   reproduction	  of	   labor	  power,	   struggles	   of	  workers	   for	   a	   living	  wage	   surged	  against	   this	   background	   (Li	   and	   Qi,	   2014).	   Third,	   the	   recovery	   of	   labor’s	   share	   was	   also	  triggered	   by	   the	   reduction	   in	   the	   reserve	   army	   of	   labor	   which	   enhancing	   the	   bargaining	  power	  of	  workers.	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2.4 A	  Cointegration	  Analysis	  of	  Labor’s	  Share	  	  
In	   the	   analysis	   above,	   I	   show	   that	   there	   are	   mainly	   two	   differences	   between	   labor’s	  shares	   measured	   by	   the	   Marxian	   approach	   and	   the	   conventional	   approach.	   First,	   the	  conventional	  approach	   includes	  both	  the	  dominant	  part	  and	  the	  non-­‐dominant	  part	  of	   the	  economy,	   while	   the	   Marxian	   approach	   only	   focuses	   on	   the	   dominant	   part.	   Second,	   the	  Marxian	  approach	  takes	  the	  transfer	  of	  value	  into	  account,	  while	  the	  conventional	  approach	  does	  not.	  	  Since	   the	   Marxian	   measure	   reflects	   the	   relationship	   between	   production	   and	  distribution,	   it	   should	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   conventionally	   measured	   labor’s	   share.	   In	   the	  following	  I	  examine	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  measures.	  	  	  This	   long-­‐run	   relationship,	   if	   it	   exists,	   should	   be	   related	  with	   another	   two	   variables:	  first,	  the	  share	  of	  the	  dominant	  part	  in	  the	  new	  value	  of	  the	  economy	  (𝐷𝑆);	  second,	  the	  share	  of	  surplus	  value	  distributed	  to	  unproductive	  labor	  as	  wages	  (𝑈𝑃).	  Figure	  2-­‐5	  and	  Figure	  2-­‐6	  plot	  𝐷𝑆	  and	  𝑈𝑃,	  respectively.	  Thus,	  the	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  is	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  	   𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑆1! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑆! + 𝛼!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑆! + 𝛼!𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑃! + 𝜇!	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.6)	  	  In	  Equation	   (2.6),	  𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑆1!	  is	   the	   logarithm	  of	   labor’s	   share	  measured	  by	   LS1,	  𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑆!	  is	  the	  logarithm	  of	  labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	  one	  of	  the	  Marxian	  measures	  (LS2,	  LS3,	  or	  LS4),	  𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑆!	  is	   the	   logarithm	  of	  the	  share	  of	  the	  dominant	  part	   in	  the	  new	  value	  of	  the	  economy,	  𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑃!	  is	   the	   logarithm	   of	   the	   share	   of	   surplus	   value	   distributed	   to	   unproductive	   labor	   as	  wages,	  and	  𝜇!	  is	   the	  error	   term.	  The	  subscript	  𝑡	  indicates	   that	   the	  regression	   is	  using	   time	  series	  data.	  As	  argued	  earlier,	  there	  were	  systematic	  differences	  between	  the	  Maoist	  era	  and	  the	  reform	  era,	  thus	  the	  time	  series	  analysis	  here	  only	  focuses	  on	  the	  reform	  era.	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Figure	  2-­‐5	  Share	  of	  the	  Dominant	  Sector	  in	  New	  Value,	  1978-­‐2012	  
	  Sources:	  See	  Appendix	  A.	  	  
Figure	  2-­‐6	  Share	  of	  Surplus	  Value	  Distributed	  to	  Unproductive	  Labor,	  1978-­‐2012	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To	   avoid	   spurious	   regressions,	   all	   variables	   need	   to	   be	   stationary	   in	   levels,	   or	   all	  variables	  are	  non-­‐stationary	  in	  their	  levels	  but	  stationary	  in	  first	  differences	  and	  meanwhile	  they	  are	  cointegrated.	  Thus,	   the	  first	  step	  of	  the	  analysis	   is	  unit	  root	  tests.	  Table	  2-­‐3	  gives	  the	  results	  of	  the	  augmented	  Dickey-­‐Fuller	  test	  and	  the	  Pillips-­‐Perron	  test.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  all	  variables	  except	  𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑆!	  are	  non-­‐stationary	  in	  levels	  and	  stationary	  in	  first	  differences;	  in	   other	   words,	   all	   variables	   except	  𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑆! 	  are	  𝐼 1 	  variables.	   For	  𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑆! ,	   the	   augmented	  Dickey-­‐Fuller	  test	  suggests	  that	   it	   is	  𝐼 1 	  but	  the	  Pillips-­‐Perron	  test	  suggests	  that	   it	   is	  𝐼 0 .	  Since	   unit	   root	   tests	   do	   not	   completely	   support	   that	  𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑆! 	  is	  𝐼 1 ,	   the	   autoregressive-­‐distributed	   lag	   (ARDL)	   approach	   to	   cointegration	   developed	   by	   Pesaran	   et	   al.	   (2001)	   is	  applied	  here.	  This	  approach	  uses	  bounds	  test	  to	  examine	  whether	  a	  cointegration	  relation	  exists	  among	  a	  group	  of	  variables	  that	  are	  either	  𝐼 0 	  or	  𝐼 1 ,	  which	  is	  widely	  used	  in	  recent	  empirical	  studies	  (for	  example,	  Halicioglu,	  2012;	  Yavuz	  et	  al,	  2013;	  Onafowora	  and	  Owoye,	  2014).	  	  According	   to	   this	   approach,	   Equation	   (2.6)	   should	   incorporate	   short-­‐run	   adjustment	  process,	  thus	  we	  have:	  	  
Δ𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑆1! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!Δ𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑆1!!!!!!! + 𝛽!Δ𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑆!!!!!! + 𝛽!Δ𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑆!!!!!! + 𝛽!Δ𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑃!!!!!! 	  +𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑆!!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑆!!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑃!!! + 𝛽!𝑌98 + 𝑣!	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.7)	  	  In	   Equation	   (2.7),	   the	  Δ	  sign	   means	   first	   differences.	  𝑝	  and	  𝑞! 	  are	   lag	   lengths,	  𝛽! 	  are	  coefficients,	   and	  𝑣!	  is	   the	   error	   term.	  To	   take	   into	   account	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   reform	  on	   the	  state-­‐owned	   sector,	   I	   include	   a	   dummy	   variable	   for	   the	   period	   from	   1998	   to	   2003.27	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Pesaran	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  suggest	  that	  the	  critical	  values	  must	  be	  modified	  when	  dummy	  variables	  are	   incorportated.	   However,	   in	   an	   application	   of	   the	   ARDL	   approach,	   Pesaran	   et	   al.	   (2001)	   also	  includes	   time	  dummies	   and	   the	   fraction	   of	   observations	  where	   one	   of	   the	   dummies	   is	   non-­‐zero	   is	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bounds	  test	  uses	  the	  OLS	  result	  of	  Equation	  (2.7)	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  𝛽! = 𝛽! = 𝛽! = 0	  by	  comparing	  the	  F-­‐statistic	  with	  the	  lower	  bound	  and	  the	  upper	  bound	  of	  critical	  values.	  If	  the	  F-­‐statistic	  is	  smaller	  than	  the	  lower	  bound,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  between	  levels	  of	  the	  variables;	  if	  the	  F-­‐statistic	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  lower	  bound	  but	  smaller	  than	  the	  upper	   bound,	   then	   the	   result	   is	   inconclusive;	   if	   the	   F-­‐statistic	   is	   greater	   than	   the	   upper	  bound,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  between	  levels	  of	  the	  variables.	  
Table	  2-­‐3	  Unit	  Root	  Tests	  
	   Augmented	  Dickey-­‐Fuller	  Test	  	  	   Intercept	   Intercept	  and	  trend	  Variables	   Level	   First	  difference	   Level	   First	  difference	  lnLS1t	   	   	   -­‐2.925	   -­‐5.075*	  lnLS2t	   -­‐1.914	   -­‐5.962*	   	   	  lnLS3t	   	   -­‐5.251*	   -­‐1.744	   	  lnLS4t	   	   -­‐5.087*	   -­‐1.174	   	  lnDSt	   	   -­‐4.210*	   -­‐3.162	   	  lnUPt	   -­‐1.372	   -­‐5.498*	   	   	  	   Pillips-­‐Perron	  Test	  	  	   Intercept	   Intercept	  and	  trend	  Variables	   Level	   First	  difference	   Level	   First	  difference	  lnLS1t	   	   -­‐5.424*	   -­‐2.947	   	  lnLS2t	   -­‐2.056	   -­‐6.008*	   	   	  lnLS3t	   	   -­‐5.381*	   -­‐1.863	   	  lnLS4t	   	   -­‐5.237*	   -­‐1.897	   	  lnDSt	   	   -­‐6.441*	   -­‐6.301*	   	  lnUPt	   -­‐1.418	   -­‐5.676*	   	   	  Notes:	  *	  denotes	  rejection	  of	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  a	  unit	  root	  at	  1	  percent	  significance	  level.	  
According	  to	  the	  Bayesian	  information	  criterion,	  lag	  lengths	  (1,	  1,	  0,	  1)	  are	  selected	  for	  𝑝, 𝑞!, 𝑞!, 𝑞! .	   A	   key	   assumption	   of	   the	   bounds	   test	   is	   that	   the	   residuals	   of	   Equation	   (2.7)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.2%,	  and	  they	  suggest	  this	  dummy	  has	  limited	  impact	  on	  critical	  values.	  Here	  the	  non-­‐zero	  fraction	  is	  17.1%.	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must	  be	  serially	  independent.	  With	  these	  lag	  lengths	  (1,	  1,	  0,	  1),	  there	  is	  no	  serial	  correlation	  in	  the	  residuals.28	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  bounds	  test	  in	  Table	  2-­‐4	  support	  that	  there	  is	  a	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  between	  levels	  of	  the	  variables,	  no	  matter	  which	  Marxian	  measure	  is	  used	  for	  𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑆! .	   Thus,	   next	   I	   run	   the	   regression	   with	   Equation	   (2.6)	   to	   obtain	   the	   long-­‐run	  results.	  	  
Table	  2-­‐4	  ARDL	  Bounds	  Test	  Result	  for	  Cointegration	  Which	  Marxian	  measure	  is	  used	  for	  MLSt	   F-­‐statistic	  LS2t	   6.27**	  LS3t	   9.09***	  LS4t	   9.55***	  Critical	  Values	   I(0)	   I(1)	  1%	  	   5.198	   6.845	  5%	  	   3.615	   4.913	  10%	  	   2.958	   4.100	  Notes:	   **	   and	   ***	   denotes	   5%	   and	   10%	   significance	   levels,	  respectively.	   Critical	   values	   are	   from	   the	   appendix	   of	   Narayan	  (2005).	  
Table	  2-­‐5	  gives	  the	  long-­‐run	  coefficients.	  The	  long-­‐run	  results	  show	  that	  coefficients	  of	  labor’s	   share	  measured	  by	   the	  Marxian	   approach	   are	   positive	   and	   statistically	   significant,	  which	  confirms	  that	  there	  is	  a	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  between	  the	  Marxian	  measure	  and	  the	  conventional	   measure	   of	   labor’s	   share.	   Taken	   LS4t	   as	   an	   example.	   The	   long-­‐run	   results	  suggest	  that,	  for	  each	  one	  percent	  increase	  in	  LS4t,	  LS1t	  will	  rise	  by	  0.17	  percent.	  Over	  the	  period	  1998-­‐2012,	  LS4t	  dropped	  by	  22	  percent,	  which	  corresponds	  to	  4	  percent	  decrease	  in	  LS1t,	  or	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  decrease	  in	  LS1t	  over	  this	  period.	  The	  coefficients	  of	   lnDSt	  are	  negative	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  Since	   the	  majority	  of	  the	   non-­‐dominant	   part	   is	   household-­‐based	   agriculture	   where	   profits	   do	   not	   exist,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	  p	  value	  of	  LM	  test	  is	  0.196.	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negative	   coefficients	   of	   lnDSt	  are	   reasonable.	   This	   result	   seems	   to	   be	   consistent	   with	   the	  mainstream	  story	  that	  I	  criticize	  in	  Section	  1.1;	  however,	  the	  cointegration	  analysis	  does	  not	  prove	   that	   there	   is	  a	  causal	   relationship	  between	   the	  sectoral	   structure	  and	   labor’s	   share.	  Moreover,	   in	  Chapter	  4,	   I	  will	   show	  that	  even	   the	  statistical	   relationship	  between	  sectoral	  structure	  and	  labor’s	  share	  is	  insignificant	  in	  a	  panel	  analysis	  for	  the	  period	  1999-­‐2010.	  	  
Table	  2-­‐5	  Long-­‐Run	  Results	  	   Dependent	  variable:	  lnLS1t	  	   (1)	  Using	  lnLS2t	  for	  lnMLSt	   (2)	  Using	  lnLS3t	  for	  lnMLSt	   (3)	  Using	  lnLS4t	  for	  lnMLSt	  lnMLSt	   0.228***	   0.187***	   0.174***	  	   (3.814)	  	  	  	   (4.259)	  	  	  	   (4.024)	  	  	  	  lnDSt	   -­‐0.397***	   -­‐0.383***	   -­‐0.375***	  	   (-­‐6.590)	  	  	  	   (-­‐6.615)	  	  	  	   (-­‐6.046)	  	  	  	  lnUPt	   0.004	  	  	  	   0.014	  	  	  	   0.018	  	  	  	  	   (0.242)	  	  	  	   (0.969)	  	  	  	   (1.204)	  	  	  	  Constant	   -­‐0.485***	   -­‐0.490***	   -­‐0.474***	  	   (-­‐8.138)	  	  	  	   (-­‐9.315)	  	  	  	   (-­‐7.975)	  	  	  	  Notes:	   ***	   denotes	   1%	   significance	   level.	   The	   t-­‐statistics	  are	  in	  parentheses.	  
The	  coefficients	  of	  lnUPt	  are	  statistically	  insignificant.	  A	  possible	  reason	  is	  that	  wages	  of	  unproductive	   labor	   is	  mainly	   used	   to	   facilitate	   the	   realization	   of	   surplus	   value,	   thus	   they	  cannot	  rise	  to	  a	  level	  that	  squeezes	  the	  surplus	  value	  retained	  by	  enterprises.	  	  After	   the	   long-­‐run	   regression	  of	  Equation	   (2.6),	  we	  obtain	   the	   residuals	   that	   compose	  the	  error	  correction	  term	  in	  the	  following	  error	  correction	  expression:	  	  	  
Δ𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑆1! = 𝛿! + 𝛿!Δ𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑆1!!!!!!! + 𝛿!Δ𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑆!!!!!! + 𝛿!Δ𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑆!!!!!! + 𝛿!Δ𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑃!!!!!! 	  +𝛾!𝐸𝐶!!! + 𝛾!𝑌98 + 𝜔!	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.8)	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Equation	   (2.8)	   is	   same	   as	   Equation	   (2.7)	   except	   it	   replaces	   the	   level	   variables	   in	  Equation	   (2.7)	   with	   the	   error	   correction	   term	  𝐸𝐶!!!.	   The	   coefficient	  𝛾!	  in	   Equation	   (2.8)	  should	  be	  negative,	  which	  means	   that	  𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑆1!	  will	   respond	   to	   the	  deviation	   from	   the	   long-­‐run	  relationship	  by	  offsetting	  the	  deviation.	  Thus,	  a	  negative	  𝛾!	  will	  support	  that	  there	  is	  a	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  between	  levels	  of	  the	  variables.	  	  Table	  2-­‐6	  gives	   the	  OLS	  regression	  results	  of	  Equation	  (2.8),	  which	   indicates	   that	  𝛾!	  is	  negative	  and	  its	  absolute	  value	  is	  smaller	  than	  one.	  This	  result	  confirms	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  long-­‐run	  relationship.	  Furthermore,	  the	  regression	  results	  have	  passed	  diagnostic	  tests	  for	  misspecification,	  serial	  correlation,	  normality,	  and	  heteroskedasticity.	  	  
2.5 Conclusion	  
This	   chapter	   has	   constructed	   homogenous	   series	   of	   labor’s	   share	   using	   a	   Marxian	  approach,	   and	   analyzed	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Marxian	   measure	   and	   the	  conventional	  measure	  of	   labor’s	  share.	  Changes	   in	   labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	   the	  Marxian	  approach	  may	  result	  from	  changes	  in	  the	  power	  relation,	  which	  lays	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  next	  two	  chapters	  to	  analyze	  institutional	  factors	  that	  caused	  changes	  in	  the	  power	  relation.	  The	  main	   findings	   of	   this	   chapter	   have	   indicated	   that,	   over	   the	   reform	   era,	   labor’s	   share	  measured	  by	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  increased	  from	  1978	  to	  the	  early	  1990s,	  declined	  over	  the	   period	   from	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   to	   2008,	   and	   then	   increased	   again	   after	   2008.	   The	  cointegration	   analysis	   has	   indicated	   that	   there	   is	   a	   long-­‐run	   relationship	   between	   the	  Marxian	  measure	  and	  the	  conventional	  measure	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  More	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  determinants	  of	  labor’s	  share	  is	  left	  to	  the	  next	  two	  chapters.	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Table	  2-­‐6	  Error-­‐correction	  representation	  results	  	   Dependent	  variable:  ∆lnLS1t	  	   (1)	  Using	  LS2t	  for	  MLSt	   (2)	  Using	  LS3t	  for	  MLSt	   (3)	  Using	  LS4t	  for	  MLSt	  ∆lnLS1t-­‐1	   0.476***	   0.493***	   0.509***	  	   (4.788)	  	  	  	   (5.035)	  	  	  	   (5.296)	  	  	  	  ∆lnMLSt	   -­‐0.049	  	  	  	   -­‐0.060	  	  	  	   -­‐0.071	  	  	  	  	   (-­‐1.059)	  	  	  	   (-­‐1.417)	  	  	  	   (-­‐1.701)	  	  	  	  ∆lnMLSt-­‐1	   -­‐0.134**	  	   -­‐0.118**	  	   -­‐0.128***	  	   (-­‐2.706)	  	  	  	   (-­‐2.635)	  	  	  	   (-­‐2.869)	  	  	  	  ∆lnDSt	   -­‐0.390***	   -­‐0.399***	   -­‐0.403***	  	   (-­‐6.621)	  	  	  	   (-­‐6.848)	  	  	  	   (-­‐7.092)	  	  	  	  ∆lnUPt	   0.110***	   0.111***	   0.115***	  	   (4.715)	  	  	  	   (4.985)	  	  	  	   (5.268)	  	  	  	  ∆lnUPt-­‐1	   -­‐0.096***	   -­‐0.107***	   -­‐0.104***	  	   (-­‐3.567)	  	  	  	   (-­‐4.075)	  	  	  	   (-­‐4.045)	  	  	  	  Year98-­‐03	   0.000	  	  	  	   -­‐0.002	  	  	  	   -­‐0.002	  	  	  	  	   (0.099)	  	  	  	   (-­‐0.613)	  	  	  	   (-­‐0.596)	  	  	  	  ECt-­‐1	   -­‐0.451***	   -­‐0.469***	   -­‐0.491***	  	   (-­‐4.300)	  	  	  	   (-­‐4.619)	  	  	  	   (-­‐4.872)	  	  	  	  Constant	   0.001	  	  	  	   0.002	  	  	  	   0.001	  	  	  	  	   (0.525)	  	  	  	   (0.785)	  	  	  	   (0.652)	  	  	  	  Adjusted	  R2	   0.898	   0.903	   0.908	  DW	   1.958	   1.764	   1.793	  RESET	   0.550	   0.600	   0.650	  𝜒!"! 	   0.002	   0.361	   0.240	  𝜒!"! 	   0.324	   0.749	   0.764	  𝜒!"#$! 	   0.259	   0.090	   0.037	  Notes:	   The	   lag	   lengths	   of	   regressors	   are	   selected	  according	   to	   Schwarz	   criterion.	   The	   t-­‐statistics	   are	   in	  parentheses.	   DW	   is	   Durbin-­‐Watson	   statistic.	   RESET	   is	  Ramsey	   F-­‐statistic	   for	   omitted	   variables.	  χ!"! ,	  χ!"! ,	   and	  χ!"#$! 	  are	   statistics	   used	   for	   Breusch-­‐Godfrey	   serial	  correlation	   test,	   Jarque-­‐Bera	   normality	   test,	   and	  autoregressive	   conditional	   heteroskedasticity	   test,	  respectively.	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CHAPTER	  3 	  DISTRIBUTION	  ACCORDING	  TO	  WORK:	  ECONOMIC	  TRANSITION,	  THE	  POWER	  RELATION,	  AND	  LABOR’S	  SHARE	  	  
3.1 Introduction	  
In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  China’s	  labor	  share	  in	  the	  reform	  era,	  measured	  with	  a	  Marxian	  approach,	  had	  a	  rising	  tendency	  from	  1978	  to	  the	  early	  1990s	  followed	  by	  a	  falling	  tendency	   from	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	   to	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   global	   crisis	   in	   2008.	   Based	   on	   this	  observation,	  I	  divide	  the	  entire	  period	  1978-­‐2007	  into	  two	  stages:	  the	  first	  stage	  from	  1978	  to	  the	  early	  1990s	  and	  the	  second	  stage	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  to	  2008.29	  From	  a	  perspective	  of	  economic	  transition,	  why	  did	  the	  labor	  share	  change	  in	  such	  an	  inverted-­‐U	  manner?	  This	  is	  the	  question	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  Economic	  transition	  in	  this	  chapter	  (as	  well	  as	  in	  other	  chapters	  of	  this	  study)	  refers	  to	  the	   transition	   from	  a	  state	   socialist	  economic	  system	  to	  a	   capitalism-­‐dominated	  economic	  system	   that	   took	   place	   in	   China	   throughout	   the	   reform	   era.	   This	   chapter,	   in	   particular,	  focuses	  on	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  the	  transition,	  i.e.	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  power	  relation	  between	  the	  state,	  cadres,	  and	  workers.30	  I	  suggest	  that,	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era,	  workers	  were	  still	  powerful,	  cadres	  and	  workers	  were	  close	  in	  economic	  conditions,	  and	  cadres	  tried	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  This	   periodization	   does	   not	   take	   the	   peak	   year	   of	   labor’s	   share	  measured	  with	   the	  Marxian	  approach	  (1998)	  as	  the	  boundary	  because	  Deng	  Xiaoping’s	  southern	  tour	  in	  1992	  greatly	  accelerated	  the	   economic	   transition	   and	   the	   reform	   on	   the	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   already	   took	   place	   a	   few	  years	   before	   1998.	   The	   period	   from	   the	   early	   1990s	   to	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	   should	   be	   considered	   as	   a	  transition	  between	  the	  two	  stages	  of	  the	  reform	  era.	  	  
30	  Before	  the	  reform	  on	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  that	  started	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  “cadres”	  in	  China	  referred	   to	  both	  officials	   in	  governments	  and	  managers	   in	   factories	  or	  enterprises.	   In	   this	   chapter,	  “cadres”	  only	  refers	  to	  managers	  in	  factories	  or	  enterprises.	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to	  increase	  wages	  for	  all	  workers	  and	  themselves;	  as	  a	  result,	  labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	  the	  Marxian	   approach	   was	   continuously	   increased.	   This	   power	   structure,	   however,	   led	   to	  recurrent	  inflation	  and	  squeezed	  profits,	  which	  threatened	  accumulation	  in	  the	  first	  stage.31	  To	   resolve	   these	   problems,	   the	   state	   launched	   a	   series	   of	   reforms,	   resulting	   in	   the	  commodification	   of	   labor	   power	   and	   the	   division	   between	   cadres	   and	   workers,	   which	  repressed	   the	   power	   of	   workers	   and	   caused	   labor’s	   share	   measured	   by	   the	   Marxian	  approach	  to	  decline	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era.	  	  This	   chapter	   may	   contribute	   to	   the	   current	   literature	   on	   the	   causality	   between	  economic	   transition	  and	  distribution.	  A	  big	   literature	  has	   confirmed	   the	   rise	  of	   inequality	  for	  countries	  that	  experienced	  the	  economic	  transition	  from	  a	  central-­‐planned	  economy	  to	  a	  market	   economy	   (Ferreira	   1997;	  Milanovic	   1998;	   Riskin,	   Zhao,	   and	   Li	   2001;	   Giammatteo	  2006;	  Ivanova	  2007;	  Milanovic	  and	  Ersado	  2010;	  Aristei	  and	  Perugini	  2012).	  Different	  from	  the	   literature	   that	   uses	   Gini	   coefficients	   or	   income	   shares	   (for	   example,	   decile	   shares)	   to	  measure	   inequality,	   this	   chapter	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   study	   using	   labor’s	   share	   to	   measure	  inequality	  between	  two	  classes,	  capital	  and	  labor.	  I	  argue	  that	  decreasing	  power	  of	  labor	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  has	  been	  a	  crucial	  cause	  of	  a	  declining	  labor’s	  share.32	  In	  terms	  of	  the	   causality	   between	   economic	   transition	   and	   inequality,	   Mitra	   and	   Yemtsov	   (2006)	  reviews	   the	   existing	   literature	   and	   summarizes	   six	   drivers	   of	   inequality	   in	   transition;33	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  This	   chapter	   uses	   “accumulation”	   and	   “capital	   accumulation”	   in	   different	   cases:	   “capital	  accumulation”	  is	  used	  only	  after	  capitalist	  relation	  of	  production	  emerged	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era;	  “accumulation”	  is	  used	  for	  the	  Maoist	  era	  and	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era.	  	  
32	  Piketty	   (2014)	   has	   shown	   that,	   in	   major	   capitalist	   countries	   over	   long	   history	   periods,	   the	  profit	  share	  in	  the	  national	  income	  has	  a	  positive	  relationship	  with	  the	  inequality	  measured	  by	  Gini	  coefficients	   and	   income	   shares.	   Furthermore,	   the	  measure	   of	   profit	   share	   (or	   labor	   share)	   has	   an	  obvious	  advantage	  compared	  to	  other	  measures	  of	   inequality:	   the	  profit	  share	   is	  based	  on	  primary	  distribution,	  thus	  it	  does	  not	  miss	  the	  retained	  profits	  of	  enterprises	  that	  Gini	  coefficients	  and	  income	  shares	  usually	  miss.	  	  
33	  These	  drivers	  are:	  (1)	  wage	  decompression	  and	  growth	  of	  the	  private	  sector;	  (2)	  restructuring	  and	   unemployment,	   reverting	   to	   subsistence	   economy;	   (3)	   fiscal	   adjustment	   affecting	   government	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however,	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   research	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   changing	   power	   relation	   in	  economic	   transition	   on	   inequality.	   Moreover,	   many	   studies	   suggest	   that	   inequality	   in	  transition	  was	  caused	  by	  the	  rising	  wage	  inequalities	  and	  diminishing	  social	  transfers	  (for	  example,	  Milanovic,	  1998;	  Riskin	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Mitra	  and	  Yemtsov,	  2006;	  Ivanova,	  2007),	  but	  they	   did	   not	   further	   explore	   how	   the	   power	   relation	   interacts	   with	   wage	   inequalities	  (especially,	   management-­‐worker	  wage	   inequality)	   or	   social	   transfers.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  there	  are	  studies	  arguing	  that	  class	  struggles	  led	  to	  income	  polarization	  in	  China’s	  economic	  transition	  (for	  example,	  Li	  1994;	  Hart-­‐Landsberg	  and	  Burkett	  2005);	  nevertheless,	  they	  did	  not	  explore	  how	  class	  struggles	  caused	  labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  to	  change	  in	  an	  inverted-­‐U	  manner.	  	  In	   what	   follows,	   this	   chapter	   is	   organized	   into	   four	   sections.	   Section	   2	   provides	   an	  overview	  of	   the	  historical	   background	  of	   the	   economic	   transition.	   Section	  3	  discusses	   the	  power	   relation	   in	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	   reform	   era	   and	   its	   impacts	   on	   distribution	   and	  accumulation,	  followed	  by	  Section	  4	  which	  discusses	  the	  reforms	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  aimed	  at	  dealing	  with	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  first	  stage	  and	  their	  impacts	  on	  distribution.	  Section	  5	  concludes	  the	  chapter.	  	  
3.2 Historical	  Background:	  The	  Maoist	  Factory	  Regime	  and	  Its	  Foundation34	  
After	   establishing	   the	   public	   ownership	   of	   means	   of	   production,	   China	   attempted	   to	  build	   up	   the	   socialist	   relation	   of	   production	   through	   the	   Maoist	   factory	   regime,	   which	  emphasized	   the	   role	   of	   politics	   in	   promoting	   workers’	   enthusiasm	   in	   production.	   As	   the	  slogan	  “politics	  in	  command”	  expressed,	  the	  regime	  suggested	  that,	  if	  workers	  realized	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  expenditure	  and	  taxation,	  corruption;	  (4)	  price	  liberalization,	  inflation	  and	  arrears;	  (5)	  asset	  transfer,	  growth	  of	  property	  income;	  (6)	  technological	  change,	  increased	  mobility	  and	  globalization.	  
34	  I	   follow	  Burawoy	   (1985)	   to	  use	   the	   concept	   “factory	   regime”	   to	  describe	   the	   set	  of	   relations	  and	  institutions	  in	  the	  workplace	  of	  a	  particular	  period.	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the	  development	  of	  production	  contributed	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  interests	  of	  the	  entire	  working	  class,	   they	   would	   voluntarily	   contribute	   more	   efforts	   in	   production	   (Bettelheim	   1974;	  Andors	  1977).	  	  	  The	   dialectics	   between	   short-­‐term	   and	   long-­‐term	   interests	   of	   the	   working	   class	   was	  crucial	  for	  the	  development	  of	  China’s	  underdeveloped	  economy.	  In	  practice,	  this	  dichotomy	  of	   short-­‐term	   and	   long-­‐term	   interests	   corresponded	   to	   the	   division	   between	   wages	   (or	  consumption)	  and	  profits	  (or	  accumulation).	  To	  realize	  both	  objectives	  of	  industrialization	  (which	   further	   relied	   on	   accumulation)	   and	   the	   improvements	   of	   the	   people’s	   living	  conditions,	  the	  state	  had	  to	  choose	  a	  reasonable	  proportion	  to	  divide	  the	  total	  income	  into	  wages	  and	  profits.	  If	  workers	  agreed	  that	  they	  could	  improve	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  long	  run	  by	   consuming	   less	   in	   the	   short	   run,	   then	   industrialization	   could	   speed	   up.	   Therefore,	  resulted	  from	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime,	  China	  established	  a	  low-­‐wage	  distribution	  system	  for	  both	  workers	  and	  cadres.35	  	  Obviously,	   it	  was	   impossible	   for	   the	   state	   to	   force	  workers	   to	   contribute	  more	   and	   to	  consume	  less.36	  Therefore,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  establish	  the	  institutional	  foundation	  for	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime.	  	  First	   of	   all,	   material	   incentives,	   such	   as	   bonuses	   and	   piece-­‐rate	   wages,	   were	   not	  encouraged	   by	   the	   state	   because	   they	   tended	   to	   undermine	   the	   incentives	   generated	   by	  “politics	  in	  command”.	  	  In	   1958,	   after	   a	   few	   years	   of	   the	   first-­‐five-­‐year	   plan	   period,	   Mao	   Zedong	   (1998)	  criticized	  the	  Soviet	  textbook	  of	  political	  economy	  for	  over-­‐emphasizing	  the	  role	  of	  material	  incentives:	  “(The	  textbook)	  does	  not	  say	  that,	   if	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  the	  people	  are	  realized,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Low	   wages	   for	   workers	   were	   also	   aimed	   at	   promoting	   the	   unity	   of	   workers	   and	   peasants	  because	  the	  income	  of	  peasants	  was	  even	  lower	  than	  workers’	  wages.	  See	  Ma	  (1959).	  	  	  
36	  It	  is	  not	  an	  effective	  approach	  for	  a	  state	  to	  workers	  to	  consumer	  less	  and	  to	  contribute	  more	  through	  repression.	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then	  the	  interests	  of	  individuals	  can	  also	  be	  realized;	  the	  material	  interests	  emphasized	  by	  the	  textbook	  are	  in	  fact	  the	  most	  short-­‐sighted	  individualism.”	  “From	  each	  according	  to	  his	  ability,	  to	  each	  according	  to	  his	  work:	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  sentence	  means	  people	  should	  try	  all	  their	  best	  in	  production.	  Why	  do	  people	  understand	  this	  sentence	  without	  the	  first	  part	  and	  always	  emphasize	  material	  incentives?”	  	  Not	  encouraging	  material	  incentives	  did	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime	  must	  exclude	  bonuses	  and	  piece-­‐rate	  wages.	  For	  example,	  Ma	  Wenrui,	  the	  Minster	  of	  Labor,	  said	  in	  1959,	  “How	  do	  we	  encourage	  workers’	  enthusiasm	  in	  production?	  We	  should	  mainly	  rely	  on	   ideological	   work.	   Of	   course,	   we	   cannot	   omit	   the	   role	   of	  material	   encouragement.”(Ma	  1959)	  In	  addition,	  Xu	  (1979)	  suggests	  that	  bonuses	  can	  be	  used	  to	  limit	  the	  bourgeois	  rights	  in	   distribution.	   Nevertheless,	   to	  what	   extent	   could	   a	   socialist	   factory	   regime	  make	   use	   of	  “material	  encouragement”	  was	  always	  controversial	  during	  the	  Maoist	  era.37	  	  Secondly,	   a	   high-­‐benefit	   system	   was	   established	   as	   a	   complement	   to	   the	   low-­‐wage	  system	   since	   the	   living	   conditions	   of	   workers	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   maintaining	  workers’	  enthusiasm	  in	  production.	  The	  state	  improved	  the	  living	  conditions	  of	  workers	  by	  providing	   various	   benefits	   instead	   of	   raising	   wages.	   Due	   to	   the	   economy	   of	   scale	   in	   the	  provision	  of	  benefits,	  it	  was	  more	  rational	  to	  provide	  benefits	  (such	  as	  housing,	  retirement	  pensions,	  medical	  services,	  and	  education)	  by	  a	  single	  supplier.	  	  Thirdly,	  factories	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  fire	  workers	  because	  job	  security	  was	  a	  necessary	  condition	   for	   workers	   to	   voluntarily	   contribute	   efforts	   in	   production.	   If	   the	   future	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Bonuses	  and	  piece-­‐rate	  wages	  were	  widely	  used	  before	  1958.	  During	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  movement	   (1958-­‐1960),	   workers’	   enthusiasm	   in	   production	  was	   so	   high	   that	   the	   state	   suggested	  bonuses	  and	  piece-­‐rate	  wages	  not	  be	  used.	  However,	   in	   the	  period	  of	  economic	  adjustment	   (1961-­‐1965),	  the	  state	  allowed	  factories	  to	  use	  bonuses	  and	  piece-­‐rate	  wages	  for	  economic	  recovery.	  During	  the	   Cultural	   Revolution	   (1966-­‐1976),	   bonuses	   and	   piece-­‐rate	  wages	  were	   abandoned	   by	   the	   state	  again.	  The	  changes	  in	  the	  attitude	  toward	  bonuses	  and	  piece-­‐rate	  wages	  reflected	  the	  debates	  among	  the	  leadership	  and	  conflicts	  between	  different	  attitudes	  of	  the	  leadership	  toward	  what	  is	  and	  how	  to	  build	  the	  socialist	  relation	  of	  production.	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uncertain	  to	  workers	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  job	  security,	  how	  could	  workers	  care	  about	  the	  long-­‐term	  interests	  of	  the	  working	  class?	  	  Fourthly,	   the	   state	  made	  workers	   the	  masters	  of	   their	   factories.	  To	   this	   end,	   the	   state	  strictly	   restricted	   the	   economic	   inequality	   between	   cadres	   and	   workers.38	  Also,	   the	   state	  weakened	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  through	  workers’	  participation	  in	  management	  and	  cadres’	  participation	   in	   manual	   labor.	   More	   importantly,	   workers	   had	   political	   rights	   to	   publicly	  criticize	  cadres	  in	  a	  democratic	  way.39	  	  	  “Politics	   in	   command”,	   the	   low-­‐wage	   and	   high-­‐benefit	   systems,	   job	   security,	   and	  “masters	  of	  factories”	  were	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime.	  Different	  from	   the	   Soviet	   factory	   regime	   that	  widely	   used	  material	   incentives	   and	  underscored	   the	  authority	   of	   management,	   the	   Maoist	   factory	   regime	   was	   an	   innovative	   way	   to	   promote	  both	  the	  development	  of	  productive	  forces	  and	  the	  relation	  of	  production.	  The	  distribution	  under	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  power	  relation	  between	  the	  state,	  cadres	   and	   workers:	   the	   state	   endorsed	   the	   power	   of	   workers	   by	   launching	   political	  movements	   and	   establishing	   key	   institutions	   for	   the	   foundation	   of	   the	   factory	   regime;	  cadres’	  power	  was	  repressed	  by	  both	  the	  state	  and	  workers.	  	  Distribution	   under	   the	   Maoist	   factory	   regime	   was	   determined	   by	   the	   dialectical	  relationship	  between	  the	  long-­‐term	  and	  short-­‐term	  interests	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  In	  1959,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Although	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  the	  data	  about	  the	  average	  wages	  of	  cadres,	  there	  is	  data	  about	  wage	  standards.	  The	  1963	  standards	  show	  that	  a	  17-­‐grade	  cadre	  (almost	  the	  highest	  grade	  in	  enterprises)	  of	   Baotou	   Steel	   Company	   could	   earn	   77	   Yuan	   per	  month,	  while	   a	  medium	   skilled	   smelter	  worker	  (grade	  4)	   could	   earn	  61.76	  Yuan	  per	  month	   (Data	   sources:	   Compilation	   of	  Wage	   Standards,	   Labor	  Bureau	   of	   Hebei	   Revolution	   Committee,	   1973).	   Since	   all	   the	   country	   implemented	   a	   complex	   but	  unified	   system	   of	   wage	   standards	   during	   the	   Maoist	   era,	   the	   data	   of	   one	   enterprise	   can	   to	   some	  extent	  reflect	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  whole	  country.	  In	  addition,	  during	  the	  Maoist	  era,	  the	  state	  reduced	  cadres’	  standard	  salaries	  for	  three	  times.	  See	  Zhang	  (1998).	  	  
39	  In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  documents	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  “The	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China:	  Ten	  Points	  on	  Grasping	  Revolution	  and	  Promoting	  Production”,	  it	  was	  clearly	  said	  that,	  “Leaders	  of	  factories	  shall	  not	  retaliate	  against	  workers,	  reduce	  workers’	  wages,	  or	  dismiss	  workers	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  workers	  raise	  critiques	  and	  uncover	  facts.”	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Ma	  Wenrui	  said,	  “Workers’	  material	  and	  cultural	  conditions	  shall	  be	  improved	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  development	  of	  production	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  labor	  productivity.	  Wages	  and	  benefits	  must	  be	  increased,	  but	  they	  cannot	  be	  increased	  too	  much.”40	  (Ma,	  1959)	  Thus,	  the	  growth	  of	   labor	   productivity	  was	   a	   limit	   of	   the	   growth	   of	  wages;	   the	   growth	   of	  wages	   should	   be	  slower	  than	  the	  growth	  of	  labor	  productivity,	  but	  faster	  than	  the	  price	  level	  (Yuan	  1978).	  	  It	   is	   undeniable	   that	   the	   state	   (rather	   than	   individual	   workers)	   played	   the	   most	  important	   role	   in	   legitimizing	   a	   particular	   division	   between	   long-­‐term	   and	   short-­‐term	  interests;	   however,	   it	   is	   also	  undeniable	   that	  no	   cadre	   could	  occupy	   any	  profit	   as	   his/her	  own	  interests	  and	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  profits	  were	  accumulated	  for	  industrialization.	  In	  terms	  of	  time	  span,	   the	  Maoist	   factory	  regime	  lasted	  for	   less	  than	  two	  decades.41	  As	  an	   innovative	   factory	  regime,	   it	  did	  not	  manage	  to	   fix	   its	  deficiencies	  before	   it	  was	  denied	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Maoist	  era.	  One	  of	  those	  deficiencies	  was	  the	  stagnation	  of	  wages.42	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3-­‐1,	  the	  real	  wage	  in	  the	  Maoist	  era	  was	  almost	  stagnant,	  compared	  to	  the	  real	  wage	   in	   the	  reform	  era.	  After	  China	  established	  the	  wage	  system	  following	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  1956	  wage	  reform,	  workers’	  wages	  were	  raised	  for	  only	  twice	  (1963	  and	  1971)	  before	  Mao	  passed	  away.	  Due	  to	  the	  stagnation	  of	  wages,	  workers	  had	  few	  opportunities	  to	  have	  their	  wages	  adjusted	  as	  their	  work	  experience	  accumulated;	  as	  a	  result,	  workers	  with	  different	  work	  experience	  might	  be	  paid	  the	  same	  wages,	  which	  might	  undermine	  the	  unity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Also,	  it	  was	  clearly	  said	  in	  “State	  Council’s	  Decision	  on	  the	  Wage	  Reform”	  in	  1956.	  Moreover,	  in	  1956,	   Premier	   Zhou	   said	   in	   a	  meeting	  with	   officials	   from	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Labor,	   “I	   feel	   guilty	   and	  deserve	   punishment.	   In	   recent	   years,	   labor	   productivity	   has	   been	   increased	   substantially,	   but	  workers’	  wages	  has	  not	  been	  increased.”	  See	  Wang	  (1998).	  
41	  If	  we	  consider	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  movement	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  and	  1978	  as	  the	  end,	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime	  lasted	  for	  18	  years.	  	  
42	  From	   1958	   to	   1976,	   the	   average	   wage	   (adjusted	   by	   urban	   consumers’	   price	   index)	   for	   all	  workers	  and	  cadres	  was	  decreased	  by	  4	  percent.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  fact	  is	  not	  contradictory	  with	  the	  improvements	  of	  the	  living	  conditions	  of	  workers	  and	  cadres	  because,	  as	  the	  labor	  participation	  rate	  was	  growing,	  the	  average	  (price-­‐adjusted)	  wage	  per	  household	  was	  increased	  substantially.	  See	  Chen	  (1982,	  p.282).	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of	   workers.	   In	   fact,	   these	   deficiencies	   became	   the	   entry	   point	   for	   the	   reformers	   to	  undermine	  and	  overthrow	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime.	  	  	  
Figure	  3-­‐1	  Average	  Annual	  Real	  Wage	  of	  Workers	  in	  the	  Formal	  Sector	  
	  Sources:	  NBS	  (2009)	  and	  China	  Statistical	  Yearbook,	  various	  issues.	  Notes:	   The	   formal	   sector	   refers	   to	   the	   urban	   unit	   sector,	   which	   does	   not	  include	  private	  enterprises	  and	  self-­‐employment.	  The	   real	  wage	   is	   in	  1952	  price	   level.	  The	  price	   index	  used	  here	   is	   the	  urban	  consumers’	  price	   index.	  The	   annual	   real	   wage	   does	   not	   consider	   the	   actual	   working	   hours	   of	  workers.	   Since	   working	   hours	   increased	   in	   recent	   years,	   the	   hourly	   real	  wage	  might	  grow	  more	  slowly	  than	  the	  annual	  real	  wage.	  	  
3.3 Rising	  Wages,	  Profit	  Squeeze	  and	  Powerful	  Workers	  in	  the	  First	  Stage	  of	  the	  Reform	  Era	  
3.3.1 1977	  Conferences	  on	  the	  Principle	  of	  “Distribution	  according	  to	  Work”	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conferences	  in	  1977	  to	  discuss	  the	  principle	  of	  “distribution	  according	  to	  work”	  and	  criticize	  the	   distribution	   system	   during	   the	   Cultural	   Revolution	   (in	   fact,	   the	   Maoist	   distribution	  system),	  which	  was	  labeled	  with	  “egalitarianism”,	  “big	  pot	  rice”,43	  and	  “doing	  more	  work	  is	  the	  same	  as	  doing	  less	  work”.	  Interestingly,	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  critiques	  also	  took	  place	  in	  the	  period	   of	   economic	   adjustment	   (1961-­‐1965)	   after	  material	   incentives	  were	   attacked	   and	  abolished	  in	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  movement	  (1958-­‐1960).	  	  Although	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  1977	  conferences	  were	  academic	  discussions,	  few	  debates	  took	   place	   among	   the	   participants.	   However,	   there	   was	   one	   debate	   between	   Xu	   He,	   Su	  Shaozhi,	  and	  Feng	  Lanrui	  on	  whether	  the	  principle	  of	  “distribution	  according	  to	  work”	  is	  the	  economic	  foundation	  for	  the	  generation	  of	  capitalists	  and	  capitalism	  in	  a	  socialist	  society.44	  	  This	  debate	  was	  derived	  from	  Mao’s	  talk	  in	  1974,	  in	  which	  he	  said,	  “China	  is	  a	  socialist	  country.	  Before	   liberalization,	  China	  was	  almost	   capitalism.	  Now	  China	   still	   has	   the	  eight-­‐grade	  wage	   system,	   ‘distribution	   according	   to	  work’,	   and	  money	   exchange,	  which	   are	   not	  very	   different	   from	   the	   old	   society	   (the	   capitalist	   society	   before	   liberalization).	   The	  difference	  is	  that	  the	  ownership	  has	  changed.”	  45	  According	  to	  Mao’s	  talk,	  Xu	  argued	  that	  the	  economic	   relations	   reflected	   by	   the	   principle	   of	   “distribution	   according	   to	   work”	   are	  internally	   related	  with	   the	   economic	   relations	   of	   capitalism,	   thus	   the	   distribution	   system	  can	  be	   transformed	   into	  capitalism	  under	  certain	  conditions.	   So,	  Xu	  suggested	  China	   limit	  “distribution	   according	   to	   work”	   in	   the	   distribution.	   Su	   and	   Feng	   disagreed	   with	   Xu	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Another	  similar	  expression	  is	  “iron	  rice	  bowl”,	  which	  refers	  to	  high	  job	  security,	  while	  “big	  pot	  rice”	  refers	  to	  egalitarianism	  in	  distribution.	  	  
44	  This	  debate	  was	  closely	  related	  with	  the	  1975	  article,	  “The	  Bourgeois	  Rights	  Are	  the	  Economic	  Foundation	   for	   the	   generation	   of	   capitalists	   and	   capitalism	   in	   a	   socialist	   society”,	   written	   by	   Yao	  Wenyuan,	   a	   member	   of	   the	   “Gang	   of	   Four”.	   Xu’s	   article,	   written	   before	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cultural	  Revolution,	   was	   to	   criticize	   Yao’s	   article.	   In	   Xu’s	   opinion,	   the	   bourgeois	   rights	   should	   belong	   to	  superstructure	  rather	  than	  economic	  foundation.	  	  
45	  This	  talk	  can	  be	  related	  to	  Marx’s	  critique	  of	  the	  Gotha	  Program	  where	  Marx	  suggested	  that	  in	  the	   early	   stage	   of	   the	   communist	   society	   the	   equal	   right	   (the	   exchange	   of	   equal	   values)	   is	   still	  constrained	  by	  bourgeois	  limitations.	  See	  Marx	  (1875).	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supported	  the	  principle	  of	  “distribution	  according	  to	  work”;	  however,	  the	  only	  reason	  they	  raised	  was	  what	  Mao	  said,	  “The	  difference	  is	  that	  the	  ownership	  has	  changed.”	  Su	  and	  Feng	  (and	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   economists	   in	   the	   1977	   conferences)	   believed	   that	   China	   could	  never	  generate	  capitalism	  because	  China	  had	  established	  the	  public	  ownership	  of	  means	  of	  production	  (Su	  and	  Feng,	  1978).	  Two	  features	  of	  the	  1977	  conferences	  as	  well	  as	  the	  debate	  should	  be	  mentioned	  here.	  	  First,	   compared	   to	   the	   economists	   in	   the	   1960s	  who	  were	   critical	   to	   the	   distribution	  system	  established	  in	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  movement,	  the	  majority	  of	  economists	  in	  the	  1977	  conferences	  had	  a	  much	  narrower	  understanding	  of	  “distribution	  according	  to	  work”.	  In	  1962,	   Luo	   (1978)	   suggested	   that	   “distribution	  according	   to	  work”	   in	   a	   socialist	   society	  was	  different	  in	  nature	  from	  that	  in	  a	  capitalist	  society,	  in	  four	  aspects:	  the	  right	  of	  work—everyone	   who	   has	   labor	   power	   can	   participate	   in	   distribution	   under	   socialism;	   no	  exploitation—anyone	   who	   do	   not	   work	   cannot	   get	   paid	   under	   socialism;	   the	   more	   one	  produces,	  the	  more	  one	  gets—wages	  should	  be	  increased	  as	  labor	  productivity	  grows	  under	  socialism;	   equal	   pay	   for	   equal	   work—managers	   should	   not	   be	   paid	   more	   than	   manual	  workers	   under	   socialism.	   The	  majority	   of	   economists	   in	   the	   1977	   conferences,	   however,	  only	  focus	  on	  the	  topic	  that	  workers	  should	  be	  paid	  differently	  for	  different	  contribution	  of	  efforts.	  	  Second,	   the	   majority	   of	   economists	   in	   the	   1977	   conferences	   believed	   that	   the	   public	  ownership	   guaranteed	   that	   China	   was	   a	   socialist	   country;	   thus	   encouraging	   material	  incentives	  would	  never	  change	  the	  socialist	  nature	  of	  the	  society.	  This	  belief,	  however,	  did	  not	  see	  that	  “politics	  in	  command”	  was	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime.	  Encouraging	  material	  incentives	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  minor	  change	  on	  the	  distribution	  system	  but	  a	  major	  destruction	  of	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime.	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3.3.2 Undermining	  the	  Foundation	  of	  the	  Maoist	  Factory	  regime	  
After	  the	  1977	  conferences,	  a	  series	  of	  changes	  took	  place	  that	  fundamentally	  destroyed	  the	   foundation	  of	   the	  Maoist	   factory	   regime.	   In	  1978,	   the	   state	   encouraged	  enterprises	   to	  use	   bonuses	   and	   piece-­‐rate	   wages	   in	   distribution.46	  As	   Figure	   3-­‐2	   shows,	   the	   share	   of	  bonuses	   and	   piece-­‐rate	   wages	   out	   of	   total	   wages	   was	   increased	   substantially	   in	   the	   first	  stage.	   At	   the	   beginning,	   the	   state	   still	   advocated	   the	   integration	   of	   “politics	   in	   command”	  and	   material	   incentives,	   but	   a	   few	   years	   later,	   “politics	   in	   command”	   was	   replaced	   with	  “socialist	   spiritual	   civilization”	   in	   the	   official	   discourse,	   which	   had	   entirely	   different	  meaning	   and	   much	   less	   importance.47	  In	   1981,	   the	   state	   defined	   the	   congress	   of	   worker	  representatives	   as	   the	   basic	   institution	   for	   workers’	   participation	   in	   management.	   In	  contrast	  to	  the	  daily	  participation	  in	  management,	   the	  congress	  of	  worker	  representatives	  that	  held	  at	  most	  twice	  each	  year	  greatly	  limited	  the	  degree	  of	  participation.48	  In	  1982	  (and	  a	   few	   years	   followed),	   the	   state	   punished	   radical	   workers	   and	   cadres	   in	   the	   Cultural	  Revolution	  (Gao,	  2013).	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  the	  state	  eliminated	  the	  “Four	  Great	  Rights”—the	  right	  to	  speak	  out	  freely,	  to	  air	  one's	  views	  fully,	  to	  write	  big-­‐character	  posters,	  and	  to	  hold	  great	   debates—and	   the	   right	   to	   launch	   strikes	   in	   the	   amendment	   of	   the	   Constitution	   (Li,	  1994;	  Hart-­‐Landsberg	  and	  Burkett,	  2005).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  See	   Bureau	   of	   Labor	   of	   Sichuan	   Province,	   “Selected	   Documents	   on	   Labor	   Issues	   from	   April	  1978	  to	  August	  1980”.	  
47	  See	   “Notice	  of	  Activating	  Wage	  Distribution	  of	  Enterprises”	  by	  Wage	  Reform	  Office,	  Guangxi,	  March	  23,	  1987,	  in	  “Complied	  Documents	  on	  the	  Reform	  of	  the	  Wage	  System,	  1985-­‐1990”.	  
48	  I	  found	  this	  change	  in	  my	  interviews	  in	  Tonggang.	  See	  Tonggang	  History	  1958-­‐1985.	  The	  law	  on	   the	   congress	   of	   worker	   representatives	   can	   be	   found	   in	  http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/4162/64165/67447/67827/4586371.html.	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Figure	  3-­‐2	  Share	  of	  Bonuses	  and	  Piece-­‐rate	  Wages	  out	  of	  Total	  Wages	  in	  the	  State-­‐Owned	  Sector	  
	  Sources:	  China	  Statistical	  Yearbook,	  various	  issues.	  	  	  
To	   see	   the	   consequences	  of	  undermining	   the	   foundation	  of	   the	  Maoist	   factory	   regime,	  one	  telling	  example	  is	  the	  abuse	  of	  bonuses	  right	  after	  the	  state	  allowed	  enterprises	  to	  use	  bonuses	  in	  1978.	  By	  the	  abuse	  of	  bonuses,	  I	  mean	  bonuses	  are	  not	  distributed	  as	  rewards	  to	  extra	   contribution	   of	   efforts	   but	   the	   distribution	   of	   bonuses	   are	   subject	   to	   the	   power	  relation	  between	  workers	  and	  cadres.	  In	  1979,	  the	  State	  Council	  issued	  an	  emergent	  notice	  criticizing	   that	   “some	   enterprises”	   followed	   higher	   standards	   of	   other	   enterprises	   in	   the	  distribution	   of	   bonuses—similar	   to	   the	   “conspicuous	   consumption”	  mechanism	   by	  which	  consumers	   follow	   higher	   consumption	   standards	   of	   other	   consumers—regardless	   of	   the	  contribution	  of	  efforts.49	  Interestingly,	  the	  same	  problem	  of	  abusing	  bonuses	  also	  took	  place	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in	  1962	  when	  the	  state	  allowed	  enterprises	  to	  use	  bonuses	  for	  economic	  recovery	  after	  the	  Great	   Leap	   Forward	  movement.	   In	   the	   1962	   case,	   cadres	   distributed	   bonuses	   to	  workers	  with	  poor	  living	  conditions	  regardless	  of	  the	  contribution	  of	  efforts.50	  These	  examples	  show	  how	   necessary	   “politics	   in	   command”	   was	   for	   the	   Maoist	   factory	   regime;	   one	   could	   not	  undermine	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  regime	  without	  creating	  new	  problems.	  	  The	   remaining	   institutions,	   as	   socialist	   legacies	   from	   the	  Maoist	   factory	   regime,	  were	  only	  the	  high-­‐benefit	  system	  and	  job	  security.	  The	  question	  is,	  given	  that	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime	  was	  destroyed,	  what	  regime	  replaced	  it?	  Put	  the	  question	  differently:	  did	  the	  reform	  era	   create	   a	   factory	   regime	   that	   successfully	   promotes	   industrialization	   and	   the	   living	  conditions	   of	   the	  mass?	   Did	   the	   regime	   successfully	   coordinate	   the	   long-­‐term	   and	   short-­‐term	  interests	  of	  the	  working	  class?	  	  
3.3.3 Contradictions	  of	  the	  Factory	  regime	  in	  the	  First	  Stage	  
History	   gives	  negative	   answers	   to	   these	  questions.	  As	  we	  have	   seen,	   the	   continuously	  increasing	   labor	   share	   marked	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	   reform	   era.	   In	   fact,	   the	   profit	   share	  (measured	  with	  the	  conventional	  approach)	  declined	  substantially	  over	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	   era,	   as	   shown	   in	   Figure	   3-­‐3.	   A	   typical	   profit	   squeeze	   took	   place.	   In	   addition,	   the	  1980s	  and	   the	  early	  1990s	  witnessed	   several	   rounds	  of	   inflation,	   as	   shown	   in	  Figure	  3-­‐4.	  The	   literature	   suggests	   that	   one	   of	   main	   reasons	   for	   the	   inflation	   of	   this	   period	  was	   the	  rising	  wages	  (for	  example,	  Song	  1989;	  Dai	  and	  Li	  1989;	  Fan	  1990;	  X.	  Li	  1994;	  Liu	  1989;	  Xie	  1994).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1980	  to	  1982,	  which	  shows	  that	  this	  problem	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  short-­‐term	  problem.	  Tang	  (1982)	  and	  Wang	  (1998)	  also	  confirmed	  that	  the	  abuse	  of	  bonuses	  was	  especially	  serious.	  	  
50	  See	  Bureau	  of	  Labor	  of	  Hebei	  Province,	  “Compiled	  Documents	  on	  Labor	  Issues”.	  
56	  	  
According	   to	   the	   logic	  of	   the	   reformers,	  material	   incentives	   can	  encourage	  workers	   to	  contribute	  more	  efforts	  in	  production	  and	  thus	  promote	  the	  growth	  of	  labor	  productivity.	  If	  material	   incentives	   were	   well	   designed,	   then	   the	   growth	   of	   labor	   productivity	   (and	   the	  growth	   of	   profits)	   should	   be	   faster	   than	   the	   growth	   of	   wages.	   How	   could	   profit	   squeeze	  happen?	  	  
Figure	  3-­‐3	  Profit	  Share	  in	  the	  State-­‐owned	  Industry,	  1980-­‐2011	  
	  Sources:	   Profits	   and	   taxes	   data	   of	   is	   from	   Statistical	   Yearbook	   of	   China’s	  Industrial	   Economy	   1998	   for	   the	   period	   1980-­‐1997	   and	   China	   Statistical	  Yearbook	  various	  issues	  for	  the	  period	  1998-­‐2011.	  Value	  added	  data	  is	  from	  China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  various	   issues.	  Value	  added	  data	   is	  not	  available	  for	  some	  years.	  So,	  I	  estimate	  the	  value	  added	  data	  based	  on	  net	  output	  data	  for	   the	  period	  1980-­‐1991	  and	  gross	  output	  data	   for	   the	  period	  2008-­‐2011.	  The	   net	   and	   gross	   output	   data	   is	   from	   China	   Statistical	   Yearbook	   various	  issues.	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at	   that	   time.	   The	   reform	   deprived	   workers	   of	   political	   rights	   and	   strengthened	   the	  management	   rights	   of	   cadres,	   but	   workers	   and	   cadres	   were	   still	   close	   in	   economic	  conditions.	  Cadres	  tended	  to	   increase	  the	   interests	  of	  both	  workers	  and	  themselves	   in	  the	  enterprise.51	  In	   other	  words,	  workers	   and	   cadres	   cooperated	   to	   raise	   their	   total	   interests.	  Faced	   the	   cooperation	   of	   workers	   and	   cadres,	   the	   state	   tried	   to	   improve	   the	   design	   of	  material	  incentives	  in	  order	  to	  repress	  the	  growth	  of	  wages	  relative	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  profits;	  however,	  all	  the	  improvements	  ended	  with	  a	  failure.	  52	  
Figure	  3-­‐4	  Urban	  CPI,	  1978-­‐1994	  (%)	  
	  Sources:	   National	   Bureau	   of	   Statistics,	   China	   Statistical	   Yearbook	   various	  issues.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  As	  Walder	  (1991)	  puts	   it,	  cadres	  became	  “representatives	  of	   the	   interests	  of	   their	  enterprise	  including,	   to	   a	   considerable	   extent,	   the	   interests	  of	   their	   employees.”	  Walder	   (1987)	  also	  observes	  that	  in	  the	  1980s	  workers’	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  wage	  bill	  was	  increased,	  and	  he	  suggests	  that	  “low	  wage	  productivity	  and	  lax	  work	  discipline	  remained	  major	  problems	  in	  state	  industry”.	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To	  demonstrate	  this	  point,	  we	  can	  consider	  the	  following	  evidence.	  	  
3.3.3.1 Restricted	  Economic	  Inequality	  between	  Cadres	  and	  Workers	  
In	   the	   early	   1980s,	   economic	   inequality	   between	   cadres	   and	   workers	   was	   still	  restricted,	  although	  the	  power	  relation	  began	  to	  be	  favorable	  to	  cadres.	  	  A	   survey	   conducted	   by	   the	   All-­‐China	   Federation	   of	   Trade	   Unions	   (ACFTU)	   in	   1983	  showed	  that	  the	  living	  conditions	  of	  workers’	  households	  were	  not	  far	  away	  from	  those	  of	  cadres’	  households,	   as	   shown	   in	  Table	  3-­‐1.	  Looking	  at	   the	   rows	  of	  Table	  3-­‐1,	   one	   can	   see	  controlling	  work	  experience	  how	  living	  conditions	  were	  related	  with	  positions53:	  (1)	  for	  the	  “relatively	  rich”	  and	  the	  “just	  fine”	  categories,	  workers’	  and	  cadres’	  proportions	  were	  close	  if	  they	  began	  to	  work	  after	  1957;	  (2)	  for	  the	  “medium”	  category	  and	  the	  “relatively	  difficult”	  category,	  differences	  between	  the	  workers’	  and	  cadres’	  proportions	  were	  considerable,	  but	  the	  proportions	  were	  still	  comparable	  (ACFTU,	  1983).54	  	  Table	  3-­‐2	  compares	  the	  housing	  conditions	  of	  workers	  and	  cadres,	  which	  shows	  that	  the	  housing	  differences	  were	  even	  smaller	  than	  income	  differences	  (ACFTU,	  1983).	  	  The	   small	   gap	   in	   economic	   conditions	   did	   not	   imply	   that	   there	   was	   no	   contradiction	  between	  cadres	  and	  workers.	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  the	  1983	  survey,	  43	  percent	  of	  workers	  suggested	   that	   the	  main	   problem	   at	   that	   time	  was	   the	   special	   benefits	   enjoyed	   by	   cadres	  (ACFTU,	  1983).	  	  In	  1991,	  ACFTU	  conducted	  another	   survey	   similar	   to	   the	  1983	  one,	  which	   shows	   that	  the	   gap	   between	  workers	   and	   cadres	  was	   still	   small	   at	   that	   time,	   as	   shown	   in	   Table	   3-­‐3.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  	  Similarly,	   looking	  at	   the	  columns	  of	  Table	  3-­‐1,	  one	  can	  see	  how	   living	  conditions	  are	  related	  with	  work	  experience	  controlling	  positions.	  An	  important	  dimension	  that	  affects	  living	  conditions	  is	  not	  considered	  in	  the	  survey,	  i.e.	  the	  size	  of	  households.	  This	  is	  probably	  why	  after	  1965	  workers	  and	  cadres	  with	  less	  work	  experience	  had	  better	  living	  conditions.	  	  
54	  Another	  example:	  Zhang	  (1998)	  suggests	  that	  in	  Xinjiang	  before	  1985	  a	  cadre’s	  wage	  might	  be	  lower	  than	  the	  wage	  of	  a	  worker	  with	  the	  same	  work	  experience.	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Nevertheless,	   46	   percent	   of	   workers	   and	   51	   percent	   of	   cadres	   suggested	   that	   the	  relationship	  between	  cadres	  and	  workers	  became	  worse	  than	  1984.	  The	  1991	  survey	  also	  reflected	   that	   cadres	   had	   controlled	   almost	   all	   the	   power	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   bonuses,	  houses,	  and	  opportunities	  for	  promotions	  (Feng	  and	  Xu,	  1993).	  	  
Table	  3-­‐1	  Living	  conditions	  of	  Workers’	  households	  and	  Cadres’	  households	  in	  1983	  
Income	  levels	   Relatively	  rich	   Medium	   Just	  Fine	   Relatively	  difficult	  Time	  begin	  to	  work	   Workers	   Cadres	   Workers	   Cadres	   Workers	   Cadres	   Workers	   Cadres	  Before	  1949	   0.27	   0.48	   0.40	   0.38	   0.25	   0.11	   0.08	   0.02	  1949-­‐1956	   0.15	   0.24	   0.35	   0.42	   0.34	   0.27	   0.16	   0.06	  1957-­‐1965	   0.06	   0.07	   0.25	   0.35	   0.41	   0.44	   0.28	   0.13	  1966-­‐1976	   0.13	   0.15	   0.39	   0.47	   0.35	   0.33	   0.13	   0.06	  1977-­‐1982	   0.26	   0.25	   0.42	   0.48	   0.25	   0.23	   0.08	   0.03	  Sources:	  ACFTU	  (1983).	  Notes:	   This	   is	   the	  how	   the	   original	   data	   is	   framed.	  To	  understand	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	  numbers,	   for	   example,	   the	   first	   number	   (0.27)	  means	   that	   27	   percent	   of	   the	  workers	  who	  began	  to	  work	  before	  1949	  were	  relatively	  rich.	  The	  investigators	  considered	  the	  price	  levels	  of	  different	  places	  to	  classify	  the	  income	  levels.	  	  	  
Table	  3-­‐2	  Housing	  Conditions	  of	  Workers	  and	  Cadres	  in	  1983	  
Housing	  conditions	   Over	  5	  m2	  per	  person	   3-­‐5	  m2	  per	  person	   Less	  than	  3	  m2	  per	  person	  Time	  begin	  to	  work	   Workers	   Cadres	   Workers	   Cadres	   Workers	   Cadres	  Before	  1949	   0.38	   0.40	   0.43	   0.47	   0.18	   0.13	  1949-­‐1956	   0.20	   0.24	   0.55	   0.58	   0.25	   0.17	  1957-­‐1965	   0.23	   0.24	   0.53	   0.59	   0.24	   0.17	  1966-­‐1976	   0.19	   0.18	   0.49	   0.56	   0.33	   0.26	  1977-­‐1982	   0.26	   0.21	   0.45	   0.44	   0.29	   0.35	  Sources:	  ACFTU	  (1983).	  Notes:	   To	   understand	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   numbers,	   for	   example,	   the	   first	  number	   (0.38)	   means	   that,	   workers	   whose	   housing	   conditions	   were	   over	   5	  square	  meters	  per	  person	  accounted	  for	  38	  percent	  of	  the	  workers	  who	  began	  to	  work	  before	  1949.	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3.3.3.2 The	  High-­‐Benefit	  System	  and	  Job	  Security	  
Workers	   still	   enjoyed	   the	   high-­‐benefit	   system	   and	   job	   security,	   which	   implies	   that	  workers	   did	   not	   have	   to	   respond	   to	  material	   incentives	   with	   efforts	   that	   were	   sufficient	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  cadres.	  	  Workers’	  benefits	  were	  provided	  by	  enterprises	  through	  two	  channels:	  one	  was	  annual	  expenditure	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   benefits	   (including	   pensions,	   medical	   services,	   education,	  subsidies	   for	   foods,	   heating,	   housing	   maintenance,	   cultural	   services,	   dining	   services,	   and	  assisting	  poor	  households,	   etc.);	   another	  was	   the	  unproductive	   investment	   carried	  out	  by	  the	   state	   or	   enterprises,	   used	   for	   building	   workers’	   houses	   and	   other	   facilities	   for	   the	  provision	  of	  benefits.	  In	  terms	  of	  these	  two	  channels,	  workers	  enjoyed	  even	  better	  benefits	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era	  than	  in	  the	  Maoist	  era.	  Over	  the	  period	  1978-­‐1990,	  the	  ratio	  of	  annual	  expenditure	  on	  benefits	  to	  total	  wages55	  was	  raised	  from	  0.14	  to	  0.32;	  then	  it	  reached	  its	  peak	  of	  the	  reform	  era	  in	  1993	  (0.34).	  The	  share	  of	  unproductive	  investment	  out	  of	   total	   investment	  was	   raised	   from	  21	   percent	   in	   1978	   to	   46	   percent	   in	   1982,	   and	   then	  gradually	  fell	  to	  26	  percent	  in	  1990.	  	  
Table	  3-­‐3	  Income	  and	  Housing	  Conditions	  of	  Workers	  and	  Cadres	  in	  1991	  
	   Annual	  income	   Housing	  conditions	  Cadres	   1.12	   1.04	  Workers	   1.00	   1.00	  	   Sources:	  Feng	  and	  Xu	  (1993).	  Notes:	  The	  average	  annual	  income	  and	  the	  average	  housing	  condition	  of	  workers	  (measured	  by	  living	  area	  per	  capita	  of	  the	  household)	  are	  both	  standardized	  as	  unity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Data	   sources:	   China	   Labor	   Statistical	   Yearbook	   1999.	   Note	   that,	   here,	   “total	   wages”	   is	   a	  category	  used	   in	   the	  data	  sources,	  which	  does	  not	   include	  enterprises’	  expenditure	  on	  benefits.	  All	  the	  measures	  of	  labor’s	  share	  in	  this	  dissertation	  have	  include	  enterprises’	  expenditure	  on	  benefits	  in	  labor’s	  income.	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In	   terms	   of	   job	   security,	   although	   the	   state	   tried	   to	   expand	   the	   number	   of	   temporary	  workers	   relative	   to	   permanent	   workers,	   the	   latter	   still	   accounted	   for	   the	   majority	   of	  workers	   by	   1990.56	  The	   state	   considered	   full	   employment	   as	   one	   of	   its	   objectives.	   At	   the	  beginning	   of	   the	   reform	   era,	   the	   unemployment	   problem	   became	   serious	   since	   the	   state	  allowed	  the	  school	  graduates	  who	  moved	  to	  the	  countryside	  in	  the	  Maoist	  era	  to	  return	  to	  cities.	   The	   state	   carried	   out	   a	   variety	   of	   policies	   to	   increase	   employment,	   such	   as	  encouraging	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  to	  establish	  affiliated	  collective	  enterprises,	  allowing	  children	  to	  take	  their	  retired	  parents’	  positions;	  as	  a	  result,	  unemployment	  quickly	  dropped	  from	  5.3	  million	  in	  1978	  to	  2.4	  million	  in	  1984.57	  	  
3.3.3.3 Workers’	  Responses	  toward	  National	  Wage	  Adjustments	  
The	   principle	   of	   “distribution	   according	   to	  work”	  was	   hardly	   realized	   in	   the	   national	  wage	   adjustments	   during	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   reform	  era	   because	   the	   state	   had	   to	   take	  account	  of	  workers’	  responses	  toward	  how	  to	  carry	  out	  these	  adjustments,	  which	  to	  some	  extent	  reflected	  the	  power	  relation	  between	  workers	  and	  the	  state.	  	  	  In	   1977,	   concerned	   about	   the	   conflicts	   among	   workers,	   the	   state	   adopted	   work	  experience	  as	  the	  standard	  to	  decide	  which	  workers	  to	  obtain	  wage	  increases;	  this	  standard,	  however,	  was	  unable	   to	   reflect	  workers’	   contribution	  of	  efforts	   in	  production	   (Huang	  and	  Shu,	  1991).	  	  In	   1978,	   the	   state	   decided	   to	   raise	  wages	   for	  workers	  who	   “had	   a	   good	  performance,	  made	  a	  great	  contribution,	  and	  got	  low	  wages”;	  however,	  many	  enterprises	  used	  this	  round	  of	  wage	  adjustment	  to	  compensate	  for	  workers	  who	  did	  not	  obtain	  wage	  increases	  in	  1977	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  The	  share	  of	  permanent	  workers	  out	  of	  total	  workers	  was	  87	  percent	  in	  1990.	  	  
57	  Data	  sources:	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics,	  China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  various	  issues.	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(Huang	  and	  Shu,	  1991).	  Again,	  the	  principle	  of	  “distribution	  according	  to	  work”	  did	  not	  play	  its	  role.	  	  In	   the	   1979	  wage	   adjustment,	   the	   state	   was	  more	   determined	   and	   claimed	   that	   only	  workers	  who	  contributed	  great	  efforts	   in	   their	  work	  could	  obtain	  wage	   increases.	   In	  each	  enterprise,	  a	  committee	  composed	  of	  cadres	  and	  workers	  evaluated	  workers’	  contribution	  of	  efforts.	  58	  However,	  more	  than	  ten	  workers	  across	  the	  country	  committed	  suicide	  for	  not	  getting	   wage	   increases.	   Partly	   due	   to	   the	   suicides,	   the	   state	   chose	   to	   generally	   increase	  workers’	   wages	   in	   the	   1982	   wage	   adjustment,	   regardless	   the	   principle	   of	   “distribution	  according	   to	  work”	   (Wang,	   1998).	  After	   1982,	   the	   state	  no	   longer	   initiated	  national	  wage	  adjustments	  but	  relied	  on	  enterprises	  to	  reform	  the	  distribution	  system.	  	  	  These	   examples	   in	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   reform	   era	   show	   the	   particular	   system	   of	  distribution	  chosen	  by	  the	  state	  depended	  on	  workers’	  responses	  but	  not	  on	  the	  preference	  of	  the	  state	  or	  cadres.	  	  
3.3.3.4 State’s	  Improvements	  of	  the	  Distribution	  System	  
The	  state	   tried	   to	   improve	   the	  design	  of	   the	  distribution	  system	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	  but	  ended	  with	  a	  failure	  because	  cadres	  had	  a	  variety	  of	  methods	  to	  increase	  wages	  and	  benefits	  for	  workers	  and	  themselves.	  	  Abandoning	   national	  wage	   adjustments,	   the	   state	   established	   a	   double-­‐level	   incentive	  system:	   on	   the	   macro	   level,	   for	   some	   enterprises,	   the	   state	   fixed	   the	   proportion	   of	   the	  growth	  of	  total	  wages	  relative	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  profits	  (or	  the	  sum	  of	  profits	  and	  taxes);	  for	  other	   enterprises,	   the	   state	   allowed	   them	   to	   retain	   a	   fixed	   proportion	   of	   profits	   for	  reproduction,	  technical	  innovation,	  benefits,	  and	  bonuses;	  on	  the	  micro	  level,	  an	  enterprise	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  See	   Bureau	   of	   Labor	   of	   Sichuan	   Province,	   “Selected	   Documents	   on	   Labor	   Issues	   from	   April	  1978	  to	  August	  1980”.	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had	   the	   autonomy	   to	   determine	  how	   to	   distribute	   the	   total	   bonuses	   (or	   total	  wages)	   and	  benefits.59	  This	  attempt	  failed	  for	  two	  reasons.	  	  One	  reason	  was	  that	  the	  fixed	  proportions	  used	  on	  the	  macro	  level	  of	  distribution	  were	  in	   practice	   flexible	   because	   cadres	   could	   negotiate	  with	   the	   state	   over	   these	   proportions.	  For	  example,	   if	   the	   living	  conditions	  of	  workers	  and	  cadres	  were	  undermined	  by	   inflation,	  cadres	  could	  easily	  legitimate	  their	  bargain	  for	  a	  higher	  proportion	  (Huang	  and	  Shu,	  1991).	  Figure	   3-­‐5	   shows	   the	   share	   of	   retained	   profits	   out	   of	   total	   profits	   for	   North	   China	  Pharmaceutical	   Factory	  over	   the	  period	  1979-­‐1990;	  one	   can	   see	   that	   this	   share	  had	  been	  increasing	  over	  time.	  	  	  
Figure	  3-­‐5	  Share	  of	  Retained	  Profits	  out	  of	  Total	  Profits,	  North	  China	  Pharmaceutical	  Factory,	  1979-­‐1990	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Another	   reason	   lied	   in	   the	   high-­‐benefit	   system	   in	   which	   benefits	   were	   distributed	  mainly	  according	  to	  needs.	  The	  state	  set	  up	  the	  ratio	  of	  retained	  profits	  to	  total	  profits	  but	  did	  not	  regulate	  how	  many	  retained	  profits	  were	  used	  as	  benefits;	  thus	  benefits	  distributed	  also	  took	  an	  increasingly	  large	  share	  out	  of	  retained	  profits,	  through	  which	  the	  total	  profits	  obtained	   the	   state	   and	   enterprises	   (after	   benefits	   distributed)	  was	   increasingly	   smaller.60	  The	  state	  met	  with	  difficulties	  in	  sustaining	  a	  favorable	  profit	  share	  since	  cadres	  distributed	  increasingly	  more	  benefits	  for	  both	  workers	  and	  themselves.	  	  	  He	  Ping,	  a	  former	  official	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labor,	  said	  “there	  is	  a	  phenomena	  called	  ‘two	   faces’,	   which	   means	   the	   state’s	   regulation	   on	   total	   wages	   mismatches	   the	   actual	  situation	  of	  enterprises.	  An	  example	   is	   that,	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  year,	  enterprises	  obey	  the	   state,	  but	   at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  year,	   the	   state	  has	   to	  obey	  enterprises.”	   “In	   the	  past	  more	  than	   ten	   years,	   total	   wages	   stipulated	   in	   the	   state’s	   plan	   were	   surpassed	   by	   the	   actually	  distributed	  wages	  by	  nearly	  100	  billion	  Yuan.”	  (He	  1993)	  The	  difficulties	   confronted	  by	   the	   state	   in	   fact	   resulted	   from	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   factory	  regime	  after	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime.	  This	  regime	  heavily	  relied	  on	  the	  carrot	  strategy	  of	  material	  incentives.	  As	  He	  Ping	  put	  it,	  “Wages	  have	  to	  be	  raised;	  otherwise	  the	   production	   has	   to	   be	   paralyzed.”(He	   1993)	   However,	   continuous	   material	   incentives	  were	   only	   able	   to	   bring	   short-­‐run	   effect	   on	   production.	   Wang	   Rong,	   an	   official	   who	  personally	   participated	   in	   several	   rounds	   of	   wage	   adjustment,	   said,	   “A	   round	   of	   wage	  adjustment	  is	  only	  effective	  (for	  promoting	  production)	  for	  half	  a	  year—from	  the	  time	  when	  the	   wage	   adjustment	   is	   announced	   to	   begin,	   to	   the	   time	   when	   the	   adjustment	   is	  finished.”(Wang,	  1998)	  As	  a	  result	  the	  growth	  of	  wages	  was	  faster	  than	  the	  growth	  of	  labor	  productivity,	   which	  means	   that	  wages	  were	   growing	   faster	   than	   profits	   (the	   profit	   share	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  For	   example,	   Li	   (1993)	   suggests	   that	  workers’	  wage	   income	  was	   regulated	   by	   the	   state	   but	  their	  non-­‐wage	  income	  was	  out	  of	  control.	  The	  non-­‐wage	  income	  here	  mainly	  refers	  to	  benefits.	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falls).	   In	  1989,	   Jiang	  Zemin,	  General	   Secretary	  of	   the	  Communist	   Party	   of	   China,	   repeated	  what	   was	   proposed	   in	   the	   1950s	   that	   “the	   growth	   of	   wages	   should	   be	   slower	   than	   the	  growth	  of	  labor	  productivity”	  (Xu	  1989),	  which	  implies	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  wages	  and	  labor	  productivity	  was	  not	  well-­‐handled	  at	  all.	  	  In	   addition,	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	   reform	  era	  witnessed	   recurring	   inflation.	  One	   of	   the	  reasons	   for	   inflation	   lied	   in	   the	   particular	   power	   relation.	   Given	   the	   limited	   production	  capability	  of	  consumption	  goods	  in	  the	  1980s,	  if	  total	  wages	  surpassed	  the	  state’s	  plan,	  then	  prices	  of	  consumption	  goods	  would	  go	  up.	  As	  a	   response	   to	   the	  rise	  of	  prices,	  enterprises	  distributed	   more	   wages	   and	   benefits	   to	   workers	   and	   cadres,	   which	   further	   imposed	  pressures	  on	  the	  supply	  of	  consumption	  goods.	  The	  spiral	  inflation	  was	  relieved	  only	  when	  the	  state	  was	  determined	  to	  control	  total	  wages	  and	  benefits	  by	  reducing	  the	  banking	  loans	  distributed	  to	  enterprises.	  	  Interestingly,	  Dong	  and	  Putterman	  (2001;	  2003)	  find	  that	  hardening	  budget	  constraints,	  without	  at	  the	  same	  time	  relieving	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  from	  their	  social	  burdens,	  was	  a	  major	  proximate	  cause	  of	  redundant	  labor	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  	  
3.4 Class	  Division	  and	  the	  Commodification	  of	  Labor	  Power	  in	  the	  Second	  Stage	  of	  the	  Reform	  Era	  
Over	   the	   past	   three	   decades,	   the	   economic	   system	   in	   China	   became	   a	   capitalism-­‐dominated	  system.	  Here	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  transition	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  from	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  factory	  regime	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era.	  The	  problems	  with	  this	  regime	  led	  to	  a	  series	   of	   reforms	   aimed	   at	   reshaping	   the	   power	   relation	   between	   the	   state,	   cadres,	   and	  workers.	   Cadres	   became	   capitalist	   managers	   and	   no	   longer	   pursue	   wage	   increases	   for	  workers;	  workers	  were	  deprived	  of	  high	  benefits	  and	  job	  security,	  and	  thus	  they	  had	  to	  be	  more	  obedient	   to	  managers;	   the	   state	   supported	   this	   transition	  with	   reforms	   favorable	   to	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the	   emerging	   capitalist	   managers.	   In	   this	   historical	   process,	   each	   reform	   reshaped	   the	  power	  relation	  between	  the	  state,	  managers,	  and	  workers.	  	  
3.4.1 Commodification	  of	  Labor	  Power	  
In	   the	  Maoist	   era,	  workers	  were	   the	  masters	   of	   factories	   thanks	   to	  workers’	   political	  rights.	   In	  the	  first	  stage	  of	   the	  reform	  era,	  workers	  were	  deprived	  of	  those	  rights	  but	  they	  were	  still	  different	  from	  workers	  under	  capitalism	  because	  of	  job	  security	  and	  access	  to	  the	  high-­‐benefit	   system.	   In	   1992,	   the	   Fourteenth	   Congress	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   China	  proposed	  to	  establish	  a	  socialist	  market	  economy,	  which	  also	  initiated	  the	  commodification	  of	  labor	  power.	  	  In	  a	  conference	  held	  in	  1993,	  Li	  Weiyi,	  a	  former	  official	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labor	  and	  Personnel,	  said,	  “At	  present,	  the	  state	  determines	  the	  amount	  and	  increases	  of	  total	  wages,	  and	   with	   this	   limit,	   enterprises	   carry	   out	   distribution	   autonomously.	   Does	   this	   fit	   the	  requirements	  of	  a	  market	  economy?	  I	  think	  we	  need	  do	  some	  research	  on	  it.	  Some	  people	  suggest	   that	   wages	   should	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   market	   in	   the	   socialist	   market	  economy.”(Li,	   1993)	   In	   the	   same	   conference,	  Dong	  Guoying,	   a	   professor	   from	   the	   Central	  Party	   School,	   argued	   that,	   if	   labor	   power	   is	   not	   a	   commodity	   under	   the	   socialist	   market	  economy,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  improve	  the	  allocation	  of	  labor	  forces	  and	  impossible	  to	  form	  the	  values	  of	  other	  commodities	  (Dong,	  1993).	  	  These	   examples	   show	   that	   the	   state	   began	   to	   prepare	   theoretical	   foundation	   for	   the	  commodification	   of	   labor	   power.	   The	   commodification,	   however,	   cannot	   be	   resolved	   in	  theory;	  it	  requires	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  high-­‐benefit	  system	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  reserve	  army	   of	   labor.	   In	   a	   typical	   capitalist	   enterprise,	   both	   the	   carrot	   strategy	   of	   material	  incentives	   and	   the	   stick	   strategy	   of	   unemployment	   are	   used	   to	   discipline	   workers.	   Since	  workers	  would	   ask	   for	  more	   bonuses	   for	   less	   contribution	   of	   efforts,	  material	   incentives	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cannot	  work	   in	   the	   long	   run	  without	   the	   stick	   of	   unemployment.	   The	   commodification	   of	  labor	  power,	  through	  which	  enterprises	  could	  hire	  and	  fire	  workers	  in	  the	  market,	  actually	  gave	  enterprises	  the	  stick	  of	  unemployment	  in	  production.	  	  
3.4.2 Destruction	  of	  the	  High-­‐benefit	  System	  
In	  the	  high-­‐benefit	  system,	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  basically	  depended	  on	  workers’	  needs	  instead	  of	  their	  wages.	  If	  benefits	  are	  linked	  with	  wages,	  and	  wages	  are	  further	  linked	  with	   whether	   the	   worker	   can	   keep	   his/her	   job	   and	  whether	   the	   enterprise	   is	   profitable,	  then	  the	  role	  of	  benefits	  as	  workers’	  fallback	  position	  would	  be	  severely	  undermined.	  	  The	  most	  important	  benefit	  for	  workers	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  stage	  was	  housing.	  Under	  the	   public	   housing	   system	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   stage,	   the	   state	   and	   enterprises	   were	  responsible	   for	   the	   investments	   in	   the	   construction	  of	  public-­‐owned	  houses,	   and	  workers	  only	  paid	  minimum	  rents	  for	  these	  houses.	  The	  public	  housing	  system	  distributed	  houses	  to	  workers	  and	  cadres	  according	  to	  work	  experience,	  positions,	  the	  size	  of	  families,	  and	  age	  of	  children.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  housing	  subsidies	  had	  become	  a	  heavy	  burden	  for	  the	  state	  and	  enterprises.	   In	   1988,	   the	   state	   decided	   to	   raise	   rents	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   encouraging	  workers	   and	   cadres	   to	   privatize	   public-­‐owned	   houses.	   This	   attempt,	   however,	   failed	   to	  threaten	   the	   domination	   of	   the	   public	   housing	   system	   because	   paying	   rents	   was	   still	  cheaper	   than	   buying	   houses.	   In	   1994,	   the	   state	   further	   raised	   rents,	   encouraged	   the	  privatization	   of	   houses,	   and	   established	   a	   housing	   provident	   fund	   system	   through	  which	  workers	   had	   to	   share	   the	   costs	   of	   purchasing	   (construction	   investments	   included)	   and	  maintaining	   houses.	   The	   public	   housing	   system	  was	   not	   formally	   terminated	   by	   the	   state	  until	  1998.	  Since	  then,	  all	  workers	  had	  to	  purchase	  houses	  with	  their	  own	  savings,	  montage	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loans,	   and	   the	   housing	  provident	   fund,	   all	   of	  which	  depended	  on	   the	  wages	   that	  workers	  could	  earn	  (Chen	  2012).	  	  Like	  housing,	  retirement	  pensions	  and	  medical	  services	  were	  also	  entirely	  provided	  by	  the	   state	   and	   enterprises	   in	   the	   first	   stage;	  whereas	   in	   the	   1990s	   (retirement	   pension	   in	  1991	   and	   medical	   services	   in	   1998),	   these	   benefits	   were	   transformed	   into	   insurances	  funded	  by	  both	  enterprises	  and	  workers	  themselves.	  The	  insurances	  that	  workers	  obtained	  also	  depended	  on	  the	  wages	  they	  received.	  	  With	  all	   the	  key	  benefits	  being	   linked	  with	  wages,	  workers	  had	  to	  confront	  difficulties	  with	   survivals	  when	   housing	   prices	   boomed	   and	   costs	   related	   to	   retirement	   and	  medical	  services	  became	  increasingly	  high	  relative	  to	  wages.	  The	  reform	  transferred	  the	  burden	  of	  providing	  benefits	   from	   the	   state	  and	  enterprises	   to	  workers	   themselves.	  Workers	  had	   to	  work	  harder	  and	  be	  more	  obedient	  to	  mangers	   in	  order	  to	   increase	  their	  wages	  and	  meet	  the	  necessary	  expenditures	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  labor	  power.	  	  
3.4.3 Formation	  of	  the	  Reserve	  Army	  of	  Labor	  
There	  were	  two	  main	  sources	  of	  the	  reserve	  army	  of	  labor:	  migrant	  workers	  from	  rural	  areas	  and	  laid-­‐off	  urban	  workers.	  In	  the	  Maoist	  era	  and	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era,	  only	  with	  the	  state’s	  permission	  could	  factories	  hire	  labor	  forces	  from	  the	  countryside.	  The	  de-­‐collectivization	   of	   rural	   economy	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   reform	   era	   brought	   peasants	  with	   fast	   growing	   income;	   however,	   this	   growth	   did	   not	   continue	   after	   1985.	   The	   slow	  growth	  of	  agricultural	  income	  and	  the	  rising	  living	  costs	  forced	  peasants	  to	  look	  for	  jobs	  in	  urban	   areas	   (Pun	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   Since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   the	   state	   gradually	   released	   the	  constraints	   on	   migrant	   workers	   (Lü	   2012).	   Nevertheless,	   migrant	   workers	   were	   mainly	  hired	  by	  private-­‐owned	  enterprises	  at	  the	  beginning.	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In	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   began	   to	   replace	   urban	   workers	   with	  migrant	   workers.	   One	   example	   is	   the	   labor	   outsourcing	   at	   Tonghua	   Steel	   Company,	  Tonghua,	   Jilin	   Province	   (hereafter	   referred	   to	   as	   Tonggang).	   In	   1996,	   Tonggang	   began	   to	  outsource	  work	  to	  migrant	  workers.	  The	  wage	  of	  a	  migrant	  worker	  was	  on	  average	  only	  a	  half	  of	   the	  wage	  of	  an	  urban	  worker.	  Also,	  Tonggang	  could	   fire	  migrant	  workers	   freely.	   In	  that	  year,	  Tonggang	  paid	  13	  million	  Yuan	  to	  migrant	  workers,	  which	  saved	  9	  percent	  of	  total	  wage	  expenditure	  for	  the	  company.61	  	  In	  1997,	  the	  15th	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China	  launched	  a	  drastic	  reform	  on	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises;	  one	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  this	  reform	  was	  “increasing	  efficiency	  by	  reducing	  employment”.	  In	  fact,	  workers	  began	  to	  be	  laid	  off	  even	  earlier.	  Over	  the	  period	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  to	  the	  early	  2000s,	  more	  than	  30	  million	  workers	  were	  laid	  off	  by	  state-­‐owned	   enterprises,	  which	   not	   only	   substantially	   expanded	   the	   reserve	   army	   of	   labor	   but	  also	  merged	  the	  two	  sources	  of	  the	  army	  into	  one.	  	  The	   creation	   of	   the	   reserve	   army	   was	   not	   only	   a	   policy	   consequence	   but	   also	   an	  intentional	   action	   of	   enterprises	   to	   restore	   profitability.	   To	   this	   end,	   enterprises	   even	  manipulated	   the	   labor	   contract	   system.	   Take	   Tonggang	   as	   an	   example.	   In	   1996,	   the	   chief	  manager	   of	   Tonggang	   announced,	   “What	   laws	   and	   the	   government’s	   documents	   stipulate	  about	  wages	  and	  benefits	  could	  be	  realized	  only	  when	  Tonggang	  is	  able	  to	  do	  so.	  So	  many	  enterprises	  nowadays	  cannot	  pay	  any	  wage	  to	  their	  workers.	  Tonggang	  cannot	  realize	  wage	  increases	   for	   ever.”	   	   In	   the	   following	   five	   years,	   8,000	   workers	   (22	   percent	   of	   total	  employment)	  were	  laid	  off	  at	  Tonggang.	  In	  1995,	  the	  labor	  contract	  system	  covered	  all	  the	  workers	   at	   Tonggang	   with	   long-­‐term	   contracts,	   which,	   according	   to	   the	   Labor	   Law,	  prevented	  Tonggang	  from	  freely	  laying	  off	  workers.	  	  In	  2000,	  the	  management	  of	  Tonggang	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  These	   examples	   about	  Tonggang	   are	   all	   from	  my	   fieldwork	   in	  Tonghua,	   Jilin	   Province,	   2012	  and	  2013.	  Data	  sources:	  Tonggang	  History	  1958-­‐1985,	  Tonggang	  History	  1986-­‐1996,	  and	  Tonggang	  Yearbook	  various	  issues.	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claimed	  that	  the	  contract	  system	  established	  in	  1995	  was	  “too	  outdated	  to	  be	  effective”.	  	  To	  overcome	  this	  unpleasant	  trouble,	  the	  management	  required	  workers	  to	  replace	  their	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  with	  three-­‐year-­‐long	  contracts.	  Sacrificing	  the	   interests	  of	   laid-­‐off	  workers,	  the	  profitability	  of	  Tonggang	  did	  recover	  in	  the	  2000s.	  Total	  profits	  of	  Tonggang	  increased	  from	  105	  million	  Yuan	  in	  2002	  to	  852	  million	  Yuan	  in	  2004.	  Another	  example	  is	  Liuye,	  a	  construction	  company	  founded	  in	  1963	  in	  Luoyang,	  Henan	  Province.	   Since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   most	   of	   the	   production	   workers	   were	   laid	   off.	   Liuye	  established	  a	  construction	  team	  for	  each	  project;	  each	  construction	  team	  had	  a	  manager	  and	  some	  skilled	  workers	   from	  Liuye,	  while	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  workers	  were	  all	  migrant	  workers.	  With	   this	   regime,	   Liuye	   could	   make	   full	   use	   of	   the	   low	   wages	   and	   flexibility	   of	   migrant	  workers,	   which	   was	   impossible	   before	   the	   layoffs	   took	   place.	  62	  In	   fact,	   the	   management	  made	   use	   of	   the	  massive	   layoffs	   in	   the	   1990s	   to	   replace	   the	  workers	  who	  worked	   in	   the	  socialist	  era	  with	  migrant	  workers	  who	  were	  not	  only	  cheaper	  but	  also	  easily	  disciplined.	  In	  the	  following	  two	  decades	  this	  new	  component	  of	  the	  Chinese	  working	  class	  suffered	  from	  long	  working	  hours	  and	  poor	  working	  conditions.	  A	  2009	  survey	  from	  the	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  has	  shown	  that	  on	  average	  migrant	  workers	  work	  58.4	  hours	  per	  week,	  much	  more	   than	   the	   44	   hours	   stipulated	   in	   China’s	   Labor	   Law.	   Nearly	   60	   percent	   of	   migrant	  workers	  did	  not	   sign	  any	   labor	  contract,	   and	  87	  percent	  of	  migrant	  workers	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  health	  insurance.63	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  This	  example	  is	  from	  my	  fieldwork	  in	  Luoyang,	  Henan	  Province,	  2012.	  	  
63	  Sources:	   National	   Statistical	   Bureau,	   “Investigation	   Report	   on	   Migrant	   Workers	   2009,”	   (in	  Chinese)	  http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20100319_402628281.htm.	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3.4.4 Division	  between	  Workers	  and	  Managers	  
In	   a	   typical	   capitalist	   enterprise,	   capitalists	   try	   to	   make	   the	   managers	   serve	   for	   the	  interests	  of	  the	  shareholders,	  usually	  with	  considerable	  compensation	  that	  tended	  to	  divide	  managers	  and	  workers	  and	  recruit	  mangers	  into	  the	  capitalist	  class.	  In	  China,	  to	  overcome	  the	  problems	   in	   the	   first	   stage	  of	   the	  reform	  era,	   the	   factory	  regime	  must	  be	  reformed	  by	  transforming	   cadres	   into	   capitalist	  mangers	  who	   have	   their	   own	   interests	   to	   pursue	   and	  who	  are	  separated	  from	  workers	  in	  economic	  conditions.	  Economic	   inequality	   within	   enterprises	   was	   expanded	   after	   the	   reform	   underscored	  that	  distribution	  should	  reflect	  the	  contribution	  of	  managers.	  In	  an	  official	  document	  issued	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labor	  in	  1992,	  it	  was	  clearly	  said,	  “the	  income	  gap	  between	  managers	  and	  workers	  should	  be	  properly	  enlarged”.64	  In	  1993,	  Li	  Weiyi,	  the	  official	  mentioned	  in	  Section	  3.4.1,	  quoted	  an	  article	  from	  a	  right-­‐wing	  newspaper,	  saying	  that	  “the	  article	  argues	  that	  we	  have	   never	   carried	   out	   the	   principle	   of	   ‘distribution	   according	   to	   work’	   and	   thus	   this	  principle	  is	  the	  Emperor’s	  new	  clothes	  to	  us.”	  “The	  article	  suggests	  that	  distribution	  follow	  the	  contribution	  of	  different	  factors	  of	  production	  and	  that	  enterprises	  pay	  compensation	  to	  the	  owners	  of	  these	  factors.”	  (Li,	  1993)	  After	   the	   drastic	   reform	   that	   initiated	   in	   1997,	   the	   income	   gap	   between	  workers	   and	  managers	   was	   openly	   discussed.	   In	   1999,	   Tonggang	   carried	   out	   a	   reform	   on	   wages,	  emphasizing	  distribution	  should	  reflect	   the	  contribution	  of	  managers,	  which	  prepared	   the	  legitimacy	   for	   huge	   bonuses	   to	   managers.	   In	   2004,	   a	   low-­‐level	   manager	   at	   Tonggang	  received	  an	  annual	  bonus	  of	  15,000	  Yuan,	  which	  was	  60	  percent	  higher	   than	   the	  average	  wage	   (including	   bonuses)	   for	   all	   employees	   in	   2003.	   In	   2005,	   Tonggang	   established	   an	  annual-­‐basis	   salary	   system	   for	  middle-­‐level	  managers,	   according	   to	  which	   a	  middle-­‐level	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  See	  Bureau	  of	  Labor	  of	  Shandong	  Province,	  “Selected	  Documents	  on	  Wages	  from	  July	  1987	  to	  March	  1993”.	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manager	   would	   be	   paid	   a	   salary	   equivalent	   to	   six	   times	   of	   the	   average	   wage	   for	   all	  employees.65	  	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  in	  order	  to	  reward	  the	  efforts	  in	  promoting	  the	  privatization	  of	  state-­‐owned	  assets,	   the	   top	  managers	   received	   shares	  of	   the	   joint-­‐stock	   company	  equivalent	   to	  100	  million	   Yuan.66	  	   Through	   privatization,	   top	  managers	   of	   the	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	  became	   shareholders	   of	   the	   enterprise.	   One	   worker	   I	   interviewed	   called	   Tonggang’s	   top	  managers	   “new	   capitalists”	   because	   they	   accumulated	   capital	   from	   privatizing	   the	   state-­‐owned	  assets,	  different	  from	  “traditional	  capitalists”	  who	  started	  with	  their	  own	  money.	  	  From	  the	  data	  of	  the	  companies	  listed	  in	  China’s	  domestic	  stock	  markets,	  one	  can	  clearly	  observe	   the	   division	   between	  workers	   and	  managers.	  We	   compare	   the	   average	   salary	   of	  managers,	  including	  board	  members,	  supervisors,	  and	  executives,	  with	  the	  average	  wage	  of	  urban	   employees	   in	   the	   formal	   sector.67	  As	   shown	   in	   Figure	   3-­‐4,	   from	   1999	   to	   2009,	   the	  ratio	  of	  the	  managers’	  average	  salary	  to	  the	  urban	  average	  wage	  increased	  from	  4.2	  to	  6.7,	  or	  increased	  by	  60	  percent.	  	  To	   sum	   up,	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	   high-­‐benefit	   system,	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   reserve	  army,	  and	  the	  division	  between	  workers	  and	  managers	  together	  relieve	  the	  contradictions	  of	   the	   factory	   regime	   in	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	   reform	   era	   by	   substantially	   repressing	   the	  power	  of	  workers,	  which	  explains	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  labor	  share	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Data	  sources:	  Tonggang	  History	  1958-­‐1985,	  unpublished	  book,	  in	  the	  Tonghua	  City	  Library.	  	  
66	  The	  Jilin	  provincial	  government	  initiated	  this	  privatization	  program	  and	  made	  the	  decision	  on	  distributing	  bonuses	  to	  the	  top	  mangers.	  	  
67	  The	   sample	   is	   from	   CSMAR	   database,	   which	   provides	   the	   information	   about	   the	   salaries	   of	  about	   30,000	   board	   members,	   supervisors,	   and	   executives	   in	   the	   listed	   companies	   in	   China.	   The	  formal	  sector	  includes	  state-­‐owned	  units,	  collective-­‐owned	  units,	  cooperative	  units,	  joint-­‐ownership	  units,	  limited	  liability	  corporations,	  share-­‐holding	  corporations,	  foreign-­‐funded	  units,	  and	  units	  with	  funds	  from	  Hong	  Kong,	  Macao	  and	  Taiwan.	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Figure	  3-­‐6	  Managers’	  Average	  Salary	  and	  the	  Urban	  Average	  Wage,	  1999-­‐2009	  
	  Sources:	   Data	   of	  managers’	   salaries	   are	   from	   CSMAR	  Database.	   The	   urban	  average	  wage	  is	  from	  China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  2012.	  
3.5 Conclusion	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result,	  workers	   became	   the	   owners	   of	   the	   commodity	   of	   labor	   power	   and	   cadres	   became	  capitalist	  managers.	  The	  experience	  of	   the	  Chinese	  working	  class	  recalls	   the	  question	  what	   is	   “distribution	  according	  to	  work”.	  As	  Luo	  (1978)	  suggests,	  “distribution	  according	  to	  work”	  in	  a	  socialist	  society	   requires	   that	  wages	   grow	   as	   labor	   productivity	   grows—in	   other	  words,	   the	   labor	  share	  should	  not	  substantially	  decline.	  The	  narrow	  perception	  of	  “distribution	  according	  to	  work”	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   reform	   era	   helped	   overthrow	   the	   Maoist	   innovations	   in	  coordinating	   the	   long-­‐term	  and	   short-­‐term	   interests	   of	   the	  working	   class.	  Workers	   under	  material	  incentives	  were	  increasingly	  weak,	  which	  finally	  led	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  power	  through	  a	  series	  of	  reforms.	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   CHAPTER	  4 	  THE	  POWER	  RELATION	  AND	  LABOR’S	  SHARE	  IN	  CHINA:	  MACRO	  AND	  MICRO	  EVIDENCES	  	  
4.1 Introduction	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  explain	  labor’s	  share	  in	  China	  over	  the	  reform	  era	  from	  a	  perspective	  of	  the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   production.	   This	   perspective	   follows	   the	   Marxian	  approach	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  production	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  distribution.	  I	  will	  argue	   that	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   production	   is	   a	   crucial	   factor	   for	   China’s	  conventionally	  measured	  labor	  share.	  To	  make	  this	  argument,	  I	  will	  provide	  both	  macro	  and	  micro	  evidences.	  	  The	  Marxian	  approach	  that	  I	  follow	  does	  not	  mean	  distribution	  is	  determined	  solely	  by	  factors	   associated	   with	   production.	   As	   I	   have	   discussed	   in	   Section	   1.3,	   there	   are	   other	  factors,	  such	  as	  value	  realization	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  surplus	  value,	  which	  also	  affect	  the	  conventionally	   measured	   labor’s	   share.	   Moreover,	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	  production	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  importance	  of	  factors	  in	  the	  labor	  market.	  I	  argue	  that	  factors	   in	  the	   labor	  market	  can	  affect	  distribution	  only	  through	  their	   impact	  on	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production.	  	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	   Marxian	   approach,	   the	   neoclassical	   approach	   to	   the	   labor	   share	  question	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   production.	  Generally	  speaking,	  the	  neoclassical	  approach	  reduces	  the	  labor	  share	  question	  into	  a	  micro	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issue,	  and	  then	  applies	  the	  neoclassical	  production	  theory	  to	  explain	  the	  distributive	  shares	  within	  enterprises.	  In	  the	  1950s,	  Solow	  (1958)	  expresses	  skeptical	  opinions	  on	  “the	  relative	  stability	  of	  distributive	  shares	  in	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  over	  the	  last	  100	  years	  or	   so”	   pointed	   out	   by	   Kaldor	   (1956)	   and	   argues	   that	   the	   relative	   stability	   of	   distributive	  shares	  does	  not	  require	  a	  specifically	  macroeconomic	  explanation.	  Solow’s	  1958	  article	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  neoclassical	  approach	  to	  the	  labor	  share	  question.	  Studies	  following	  this	  approach	  consider	  the	  elasticity	  of	  substitution	  and	  sectoral	  structure—the	  two	  factors	  discussed	  by	  Solow	  (1958)—as	  the	  determinants	  of	  labor’s	  share	  (Bentolila	  and	  Saint-­‐paul,	  2003;	  Karabarbounis	  and	  Neiman,	  2013).	  	  	  There	  are	  other	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  the	  labor	  share	  question.	  The	  post-­‐Keynesian	  approach	  suggests	  that	  distributive	  shares	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  investment	  and	  saving	  decisions.	   Labor’s	   share	   under	   this	   approach	   is	   determined	   either	   by	   institutional	   factors	  (Dutt,	  1984;	  Bhaduri	  and	  Marglin,	  1990;	  Hein,	  2013),	  or	  by	   the	  balance	  of	   the	   investment	  and	   savings	   (Skott	   1989).	   The	   approach	  derived	   from	   the	   Lewis	  model	   (Lewis	   1954)	   can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  labor	  share	  question	  by	  assuming	  an	  externally	  determined	  constant	  real	  wage,	  which	  challenges	   the	  neoclassical	  assumption	   that	   the	  real	  wage	   is	  determined	  by	   the	   marginal	   productivity	   of	   labor.	   Appendix	   C	   provides	   a	   comparison	   of	   different	  approaches	  with	  simple	  models.	  	  This	  chapter	  follows	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  to	  explain	  labor’s	  share	  in	  China	  because	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  and	  there	  were	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  power	  relation	  during	  China’s	  economic	  transition,	  which	  may	  have	  important	  effects	  on	  distribution,	   as	   I	   have	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	   3.	   This	   chapter	   uses	   a	   panel	   analysis	  with	  China’s	  regional	  data	  and	  enterprise	  data	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  power	  relation	  affects	  labor’s	  share.	   Compared	   to	   the	   cointegration	   analysis	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   the	   panel	   analysis	   uses	  variables	   available	   on	   the	   regional	   level	   and	   on	   the	   enterprise	   level	   to	   straightforwardly	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depict	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   production,	   instead	   relying	   the	   rate	   of	   surplus	  value	  or	  the	  Marxian	  measure	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  Specifically,	  I	  examine	  how	  the	  bonus-­‐wage	  ratio,	   management-­‐worker	   wage	   inequality,	   the	   reserve	   army	   of	   labor,	   and	   the	   fallback	  position	  of	  workers	  affect	  labor’s	  share	  over	  the	  reform	  era.	  	  The	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  chapter	  are	  as	  follows.	  First,	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era,	  there	  was	  a	  U-­‐shape	  relationship	  between	  labor’s	  share	  and	  the	  bonus-­‐wage	  ratio,	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  factory	  regime	  centered	  on	  material	  incentives	  led	  to	  a	  fall	  in	   labor’s	   share	  when	   those	   incentives	  were	   small	   but	   a	   rise	   in	   labor’s	   share	  when	   those	  incentives	   were	   increasingly	   large.	   Second,	   in	   the	   second	   stage	   of	   the	   reform	   era,	  management-­‐worker	   wage	   inequality	   and	   the	   reserve	   army	   of	   labor	   have	   a	   significantly	  negative	   effect	   on	   labor’s	   share,	  while	   the	   fallback	   position	   of	  workers	   has	   a	   significantly	  positive	  effect	  on	  labor’s	  share,	  which	  implies	  that	  the	  China’s	  economic	  system	  has	  become	  capitalism-­‐dominated	  in	  this	  stage.	  	  This	   chapter	   may	   contribute	   to	   the	   current	   literature	   in	   three	   aspects.	   First	   of	   all,	   it	  explains	  China’s	  labor	  share	  with	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production,	  while	  the	  current	  literature	  has	  not	  taken	  this	  power	  relation	  into	  account.	  Although	  privatization	  and	  globalization	  are	  often	   considered	   (Luo	  and	  Zhang,	  2010),	   the	  variables	   adopted	  here	  are	  more	  straightforward	  to	  reveal	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production.	  Secondly,	  as	  I	  did	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  rigorously	  follow	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  to	  establish	  the	  empirical	  model	  based	  on	  an	  exploration	  for	  the	  factors	  of	  conventionally	  measured	  labor’s	  share.	  Lastly,	  the	  empirical	  model	  established	  here	  is	  applied	  to	  both	  macro	  and	  micro	  data	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  results	  more	  robust.	  	  In	   what	   follows,	   this	   chapter	   is	   organized	   into	   four	   sections.	   Section	   4.2	   reviews	   the	  relevant	   literature.	   Section	  4.3	  establishes	   the	  empirical	  model	   and	  discusses	   the	  variable	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selection	   issue	   and	   data	   sources.	   Section	   4.4	   discusses	   the	   econometric	   strategy	   and	  analyzes	  the	  econometric	  results.	  Section	  4.5	  concludes	  this	  chapter.	  	  
4.2 Literature	  Review	  
4.2.1 Early	  Studies	  
After	  Kaldor	   (1956;	  1961)	  proposed	   the	   fact	  of	   relatively	   stable	  distributive	   shares	   in	  the	   advanced	   capitalist	   economies,	   which	   Keynes	   (1939)	   earlier	   described	   as	   “a	   bit	   of	   a	  miracle”,	   the	   labor	   share	   question	   attracted	   little	   attention	   from	   the	   orthodox	  with	   a	   few	  exceptions	   such	   as	   Solow	   (1958)	   and	  Nordhaus	   (1974).	  Blanchard	   (1997)	  documents	   the	  rise	  of	  capital’s	  share	  for	  European	  continental	  countries	  since	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  the	  early	  1980s,	   which	   brought	   the	   labor	   share	   question	   back	   to	   discussion.	   Blanchard	   (1997)	  explains	  this	  rise	  of	  capital’s	  share	  with	  the	  reduction	  of	   labor	  demand	  as	  firms	  reacted	  to	  the	  adverse	  shift	  of	  labor	  supply	  during	  the	  1970s.	  How	  to	  measure	  labor’s	  share	  was	  also	  a	  concern	  of	  the	  discussion	  (Krueger,	  1999;	  Gollin,	  2002).	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  orthodox	  that	  had	  kept	  almost	  silent	  on	  the	  labor	  share	  question	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  there	  were	  continuous	  relevant	  discussions	  in	  heterodox	  economics.	  Distributive	  shares	  in	  heterodox	  economics	  are	  not	  only	  outcomes	  of	  distribution,	  but	  also	  crucial	  for	  the	  profitability	   and	   thus	   capital	   accumulation	   as	   well	   as	   crisis	   tendencies	   of	   capitalism.	  Distributive	   shares	   measured	   by	   the	   conventional	   approach	   are	   often	   used	   to	   proxy	   the	  power	   of	   classes	   (Goodwin,	   1967;	   Boddy	   and	   Crotty,	   1975;	   Wolff	   1979;	   Taylor	   1979;	  Weisskopf,	  1979;	  Islam	  1988;	  Sherman,	  1990;	  Raffalovich	  et	  al.,	  1992;	  Basu	  and	  Vasudevan,	  2011;	  Sasaki	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  while	  some	  studies	  choose	  to	  more	  rigorously	  follow	  the	  Marxian	  approach	   (Moseley	   1985,	   1987).	   Distributive	   shares	   can	   also	   reflect	   institutional	   shifts	  under	  capitalism,	  which	  has	  been	  discussed	  by	  both	  the	  Regulation	  theory	  (Aglietta,	  2000)	  and	   the	   Social	   Structure	   of	   Accumulation	   theory	   (Bowles	   et	   al.,	   1984;	   Kotz	   et	   al.,	   1994).	  
79	  	  
Contrary	   to	   the	  neoclassical	   approach,	  heterodox	  economics	   considers	  distributive	   shares	  not	   only	   a	  micro	   issue	   that	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   production	  process,	   but	   also	   a	  macro	   issue	  relevant	  to	  the	  power	  structure	  between	  classes	  and	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  capitalist	  economy.	  	  
4.2.2 Recent	  Studies	  
Studies	   on	   the	   labor	   share	   question	   in	   the	   past	   fifteen	   years	   in	   general	   followed	   the	  neoclassical	   approach	   to	   different	   extents.	   Bentolila	   and	   Saint-­‐paul	   (2003)	   and	  Karabarbounis	   and	   Neiman	   (2013)	   represent	   applications	   of	   the	   neoclassical	   approach,	  while	  studies	  such	  as	  Diwan	  (2001),	  Harrison	  (2002),	  and	  Jayadev	  (2007)	  provide	  empirical	  analyses	   that	   have	   no	   relation	   with	   the	   neoclassical	   approach.	   Generally	   speaking,	   these	  studies	  emphasize	  the	  role	  of	  three	  factors	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  	  The	  first	  factor	  is	  globalization.	  Studies	  confirm	  that	  globalization	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	   labor’s	   share.	   This	   strand	   of	   literature	   belongs	   to	   broader	   reflections	   of	   globalization	  since	  the	  late	  1990s	  (Rodrik,	  1997).	  Diwan	  (2001)	  considers	  financial	  crises	  as	  “episodes	  of	  distributional	   fights”	   between	   labor	   and	   capital	   and	   finds	   that	   capital	   controls	   have	   a	  positive	  effect	  on	  labor’s	  share	  (especially	  during	  crisis	  years)	  with	  a	  dataset	  covering	  135	  countries	   over	   the	   period	   from	   1975	   to	   the	   mid-­‐1990s.	   Diwan’s	   analysis	   is	   based	   on	   a	  bargaining	   power	   model	   and	   finds	   that	   the	   effects	   of	   explantary	   variables	   during	   crisis	  years	  differ	   from	  the	  effects	  during	  non-­‐crisis	  years.	  Similarly,	  using	  data	   from	  more	   than	  100	  countries	  over	  the	  period	  1960-­‐1997,	  Harrison	  (2002)	  finds	  that	  trade	  shares	  (export	  plus	   import	   divided	  by	  GDP)	   and	   exchange	   rate	   crises	   have	  negative	   effects	  while	   capital	  controls	   have	   positive	   effects	   on	   labor’s	   share.	   Guscina	   (2006)	   examines	   the	   effect	   of	  globalization	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  measures	  (the	  trade-­‐GDP	  ratio,	  the	  FDI-­‐GDP	  ratio,	  the	  capital	  flows-­‐GDP	  ratio,	   and	   trade	   shares	  with	  developing	   countries)	   for	  18	  OECD	  countries	  over	  the	  period	  1960-­‐2000	  and	   finds	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	   labor’s	   share.	   Jayadev	   (2007)	   finds	  a	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negative	   effect	   of	   capital	   account	   openness	   on	   labor’s	   share	  with	   a	   dataset	   covering	   over	  100	   countries	   for	   the	  period	  1972-­‐1995,	  where	   the	  openness	   is	  measured	  by	   the	   ratio	  of	  trade	  taxes	  to	  trade,	  and	  the	  residual	  derived	  from	  the	  regression	  of	  the	  trade-­‐GDP	  ratio	  on	  the	   log	   of	   per	   capita	   GDP	   and	   the	   log	   of	   population.	   In	   addition,	   Berthold	   et	   al.	   (2002)	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  globalization	  on	  firms’	  substitution	  of	  capital	  for	  labor.	  Oyvat	  (2010),	  Schneider	  (2011),	  Hutchinson	  and	  Persyn	  (2012),	  Hogrefe	  and	  Kappler	  (2013)	  and	  Elsby	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  confirms	  the	  negative	  effect	  of	  globalization	  with	  different	  datasets.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Buch	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  trade	  openness	  and	  labor’s	  share	   for	  German	  and	   Italian	   regions	   and	   find	  mixed	   results.	   For	  German	   regions,	   import	  openness	  and	  export	  openness	  has	  positive	  and	  negative	   impact,	   respectively,	  while	   trade	  openness	   does	   not	   have	   a	   significant	   impact	   for	   Italian	   regions.	   Decreuse	   and	   Maarek	  (2008)	  find	  a	  U-­‐shaped	  relationship	  between	  labor’s	  share	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  and	  the	  FDI	   stock-­‐GDP	   ratio	   for	  developing	   countries.	  Ahsan	  and	  Mitra	   (2014)	   find	   that	   trade	  liberalization	   led	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   labor’s	   share	   for	   small,	   labor-­‐intensive	   firms	   but	   a	  reduction	  for	  large,	  less	  labor-­‐intensive	  firms	  in	  India.	  	  The	   second	   factor	   is	   technology.	   Studies	   following	   the	   neoclassical	   approach	   suggest	  that	  technology	  is	  a	  basic	  determinant	  of	  labor’s	  share	  because	  it	  determines	  the	  factor	  ratio	  (the	   capital-­‐labor	   ratio	   in	   most	   cases)	   and	   the	   marginal	   productivity	   of	   factors	   in	   a	  theoretically	  optimal	  environment.	  Bentolila	  and	  Saint-­‐paul	  (2003)	  establish	  a	  model	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  neoclassical	  production	  theory	  and	  suggest	  that	  the	  capital-­‐output	  ratio	  and	  the	  total	  factor	  productivity	  (TFP	  hereafter)	  are	  determinants	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  Their	  empirical	  analysis	  with	   a	   panel	   for	   13	   industries	   of	   12	  OECD	   countries	   over	   the	   period	   1972-­‐1993	  finds	  that	  these	  two	  variables	  have	  negative	  effects	  on	  labor’s	  share.	  In	  Hogrefe	  and	  Kappler	  (2013),	  both	   the	  capital-­‐output	   ratio	  and	   the	  TFP	  are	  used	  as	  explanatory	  variables.	  They	  also	  find	  these	  variables	  have	  negative	  effects	  on	  labor’s	  share	  for	  19	  OECD	  countries	  over	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the	   period	   1960-­‐2008.	   Karabarbounis	   and	   Neiman	   (2013)	   establish	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   elasticity	   of	   substitution,	   the	   distribution	   parameter	   in	   a	   CES	   production	  function,	  the	  capital-­‐augmenting	  technology,	  markups	  of	  intermediate	  input	  producers,	  the	  rental	   rate	   of	   capital	   paid	   by	   the	   intermediate	   input	   producers,	   and	   labor’s	   share	  with	   a	  general	  equilibrium	  model.	  Their	  empirical	  analysis	  with	  a	  panel	  for	  59	  countries	  over	  the	  period	   1975-­‐2012	   finds	   that	   the	   lower	   rental	   rate	   of	   capital	   explains	   roughly	   half	   of	   the	  decline	  in	  labor’s	  share.	  Nevertheless,	  they	  did	  not	  explore	  why	  the	  rental	  rate	  of	  capital	  (i.e.	  the	  relative	  price	  of	  investments)	  declined.	  Elsby	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  limited	  support	   for	   neoclassical	   explanations	   based	  on	   the	   substitution	   of	   capital	   for	   labor	   in	   the	  case	  of	  the	  US.	  	  The	   neoclassical	   approach	   to	   the	   labor	   share	   question	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   “technological	  determinism”	   and	   meanwhile	   circular	   reasoning.	   First	   of	   all,	   labor’s	   share	   under	   this	  approach	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  production	  function	  that	  reveals	  certain	  technology;	  however,	  this	  approach	  never	  examines	  whether	  changes	  in	  technology	  do	  happen	  through	  observing	  the	   production	   process	   before	   it	   explains	   labor’s	   share	  with	   technology.	   Secondly,	   all	   the	  parameters	   of	   the	   production	   function	   that	   intend	   to	   reveal	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	  technology	  are	  derived	   from	   the	   same	  data	  by	  which	   labor’s	   share	   is	   calculated.68	  If	   there	  are	  factors	  other	  than	  technology	  that	  determines	  labor’s	  share,	  how	  can	  one	  use	  this	  data	  to	   calculate	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   production	   function?	   To	   put	   it	   in	   another	   way,	   if	   one	  assumes	   that	   only	   technology	  determines	   labor’s	   share,	   there	   is	  no	  way	   to	   actually	  prove	  that	  technology	  determines	  labor’s	  share	  because	  it	  is	  assumed!	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Taking	   Bentolila	   and	   Saint-­‐paul	   (2003)	   as	   an	   example.	   Their	   empirical	   analysis	   uses	   TFP	  derived	   from	   the	   Cobb-­‐Douglas	   production	   function	   as	   an	   explanatory	   variable	   for	   labor’s	   share.	  However,	  the	  Cobb-­‐Douglas	  function	  assumes	  a	  constant	  labor’s	  share.	  Adopting	  TFP	  means	  that	  the	  authors	  on	  one	  hand	  give	  up	  the	  Cobb-­‐Douglas	  production	  function,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  recycle	  it	  in	  another	  way	  with	  the	  purpose	  to	  capture	  some	  unknown	  components	  of	  technical	  change.	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Studies	   not	   following	   the	   neoclassical	   approach	   may	   also	   consider	   technology	   as	   a	  determinant	   without	   imposing	   a	   neoclassical	   production	   function.	   For	   instance,	   Harrison	  (2002)	  finds	  a	  negative	  effect	  of	   the	   labor-­‐capital	  ratio	  on	   labor’s	  share.	  Similarly,	  Guscina	  (2006)	   finds	   labor	  productivity	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	   labor’s	  share.	  Kristal	   (2010)	   finds	  that	  labor’s	  share	  in	  the	  U.S.	  is	  largely	  explained	  by	  the	  working-­‐class	  organizational	  power	  in	   the	   economic	   and	  political	   spheres	   and	   structural	   power	   in	   the	   global	   sphere.	  Another	  article	  by	  Kristal	  (2013)	  suggests	  that	  the	  decline	  of	  labor’s	  share	  in	  the	  U.S.	  was	  led	  by	  the	  erosion	   in	  workers’	   positional	   power	   partly	   as	   the	   outcome	   of	   class-­‐biased	   technological	  change.	  	  The	   third	   factor	   is	   labor	   market	   institutions.	   Wallace	   et	   al.	   (1999)	   examine	   the	  relationship	   between	   union	   membership	   and	   strike	   activity	   on	   changes	   in	   labor’s	   share	  during	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  U.S.	  economy	  and	  find	  that	  they	  were	  more	  instrumental	   for	   impacting	   labor’s	  share	  during	  the	  capital-­‐labor	  accord	  period	  but	   less	   in	  later	  periods.	  Bentolila	  and	  Saint-­‐paul	  (2003)	  find	  that	  the	  frequency	  of	  labor	  conflicts	  has	  a	  negative	   effect	   on	   labor’s	   share.	   Guscina	   (2006)	   uses	   union	   density	   and	   a	   variable	  measuring	   the	   strictness	   of	   employment	   protection	   in	   the	   regressions	   and	   finds	   positive	  effects	  on	  labor’s	  share.	  Bental	  and	  Demougin	  (2010)	  establish	  a	  model	  with	  moral	  hazard	  and	  irreversible	   investment	  that	  affect	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	   labor	  and	  suggest	  that	  the	  improvements	   in	   ICT	   technologies	   weaken	   the	   bargaining	   power	   of	   labor	   thus	   has	   a	  negative	  effect	  on	  labor’s	  share.	  Agnese	  and	  Sala	  (2010)	  finds	  that	  deunionization	  accounts	  for	   8	   percentage	   points	   of	   the	   decline	   in	   Japan’s	   labor	   share	   since	   1990.	   Maarek	   (2010)	  suggests	   that	   labor’s	   share	   in	   developing	   countries	   are	   lower	   than	   that	   in	   developed	  countries	  because	   the	   larger	   informal	   sector	   in	  developing	  countries	  determines	  workers’	  outside	  opportunities	  in	  wage	  setting.	  Fichtenbaum	  (2011)	  finds	  that	  over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2006	  the	  fall	  in	  the	  union	  density	  can	  explain	  29	  percent	  decline	  of	  labor’s	  share	  in	  the	  US.	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Deakin	   et	   al.	   (2014)	   find	   that	  worker-­‐protective	   labor	   laws	  are	  positively	   correlated	  with	  labor’s	  share	  in	  six	  OECD	  countries	  over	  the	  period	  1970-­‐2010.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Elsby	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  suggest	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  unionization	  and	  labor’s	  share	  in	  the	  U.S.	  is	  inconclusive.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  globalization,	  technology,	  and	  labor	  market	  institutions,	  relevant	  studies	  have	   also	   examined	   the	   effects	   of	   government	   expenditure	   (Harrison,	   2002),	   sectoral	  structure	   (Young,	   2006;	   Elsby	   et	   al.,	   2013),	   privatization	   (Torrini,	   2005),	   financial	   crises	  (Diwan,	  2001;	  Van	  Arnum	  and	  Naples	  2013),	   and	  economic	   freedom	  (Young	  and	  Lawson,	  2014).	  	  
4.2.3 Studies	  on	  China’s	  Labor	  Share	  
Studies	   on	   China’s	   labor	   share	   appeared	   only	   in	   recent	   years,	   starting	  with	   Bai	   et	   al.	  (2008),	  which	  analyzes	  the	  determinants	  of	  distributive	  shares	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level,	  and	  Bai	   and	   Qian	   (2010b),	  which	   documents	   that	   China’s	   labor	   share	   on	   the	  macro	   level	   has	  experienced	  a	  major	  decline	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  	  Studies	   on	   the	   determinants	   of	   China’s	   labor	   share	   use	   data	   of	   national,	   reginal,	   or	  enterprise	   levels.	   The	   determinants	   discussed	   in	   these	   studies	   concentrate	   on	   sectoral	  structure	  (Bai	  and	  Qian,	  2009;	  2010a;	  2010b;	  Qian	  and	  Chi,	  2011),	  technology	  (Huang	  and	  Xu,	   2009;	   Bai	   and	   Qian,	   2009;	   2010a;	   2010b),	   ownership	   (Bai	   and	   Qian,	   2010a;	   Luo	   and	  Zhang,	  2010;	  Chang	  and	  Wang,	  2011),	  globalization	  (Bai	  and	  Qian	  2010a;	  C.	  Luo	  and	  Zhang	  2010;	  Shao	  and	  Huang	  2010;	  J.	  Zhang,	  Chen,	  and	  Zhou	  2012),	  and	  the	  dual	  structure	  of	  the	  economy	  (Gong	  and	  Yang,	  2010;	  Weng,	  2011;	   Jiang	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Table	  4-­‐1	  summaries	   the	  main	  empirical	  studies.	  	  The	  main	  findings	  of	  these	  studies	  are:	  sectoral	  structure	  is	  an	  important	  cause	  for	  the	  decline	  of	   labor’s	  share	  on	   the	  macro	   level;	  privatization	   is	  another	  cause	   for	   this	  decline,	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which	  surported	  by	  both	  macro	  and	  micro	  evidences;	  results	  of	  technology,	  trade	  openness	  and	  FDI	  are	  mixed;	  the	  dual	  structure	  of	  the	  economy	  has	  not	  been	  well	  anayzed	  empirically.	  	  In	   terms	   of	   the	   findings,	   although	   the	   effect	   of	   privatization	   is	   clear,	   some	   studies	  attribute	  the	  decline	  in	  labor’s	  share	  after	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  state-­‐owned	  sector	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  “monopoly	  power”	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (Bai	  and	  Qian	  2010b;	  Chen	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  where	  the	  monopoly	  power	  is	  usually	  measured	  by	  markups,	  defined	  as	  profits	  devided	  by	  sales	   costs,	   the	  Herfindahl	   index,	   or	   the	   concentration	   ratio.	  However,	   these	   studies	   have	  not	   provided	   any	   evidence	   that	   the	  monopoly	   power	   belongs	   to	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	  rather	   than	   private	   enteprises,	   neither	   have	   they	   show	   that	   only	   the	  monopoly	   power	   of	  state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   represses	   labor’s	   share.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   empirical	   results	   of	  these	  studies	  even	  show	  that	  both	  state-­‐owned	  and	  private	  enterprises	  experienced	  similar	  rise	  in	  the	  monopoly	  power	  (Chen	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  In	  terms	  of	  theroies,	  most	  of	  these	  studies	  follow	  the	  neoclasscial	  approach	  while	  others	  follow	  the	  Lewis	  approach.	  For	  the	  latter,	  Gong	  and	  Yang	  (2010)	  suggest	  that	  the	  unlimited	  supply	  of	  labor	  makes	  wages	  grow	  much	  slower	  than	  labor	  productivity,	  but	  they	  have	  not	  examined	  it	  empirically.	  Weng	  (2011)	  finds	  that	  the	  labor	  transfer	  from	  rural	  to	  urban	  areas	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	   labor’s	   share,	  but	   the	   regression	  method	   (OLS	  with	  national	   time	  series	   data)	   is	   problematic.	   Jiang	   et	   al.	   (2014)	   find	   that	   there	   is	   a	   U-­‐shaped	   relationship	  between	   the	   dual	   structure,	   measured	   by	   the	   employment	   share	   of	   the	   non-­‐agricultural	  sector,	  and	  labor’s	  share,	  but	  their	  results	  suffer	  from	  the	  spurious	  regression	  problem	  since	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  is	  over	  0.8.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  data,	  the	  region	  panel	  is	  most	  widely	  used	  in	  these	  studies.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  regions	  (31	  at	  most,	  depending	  on	  how	  to	  combine	  the	  data	  of	  some	  regions)	  and	   the	   length	  of	   the	  panel,	   the	   spurious	   regression	  problem	   is	   likely	   to	  happen,	  such	  as	  Jiang	  et	  al.	  (2014).	  Moreover,	  regressions	  with	  region	  panel	  do	  not	  control	  the	  time	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Piovani	  (2013)	  explains	  the	  wage	  share	  of	  China’s	  industrial	  sector	  from	  the	  class	  power	  perspective	  with	  the	  conintegration	  method.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  problem	  with	  measuring	  the	  wage	  share	  that	  I	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  variables	  used	  to	  depict	  the	  reserve	  army	  of	  labor	   are	   also	   well-­‐founded,	   which	   include	   state	   share	   of	   total	   formal	   industrial	  employment	  and	  the	  share	  of	  staff	  and	  workers	  in	  total	  non-­‐industrial	  employment.	  These	  variables	  can	  depict	  the	  structure	  of	  employment	  but	  cannot	  depict	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  reserve	  army.	  
4.2.4 Summary	  of	  the	  Literature	  Review	  
In	  the	  current	  literature	  on	  China’s	  labor	  share,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  empirical	  exploration	  on	  the	  effect	  of	   the	  power	  relation	   following	  the	  Marxian	  approach.	  Some	  studies	  do	  have	  discussed	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  labor;	  however,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  labor	  in	  non-­‐Marxian	  approaches	  is	  a	  different	  category	  than	  the	  power	  of	  labor	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production.	  In	  the	  labor	  market,	  from	  the	  neoclassical	  approach,	  labor	  supply,	  labor	  demand,	  and	  labor	  market	  institutions	  all	  have	  effects	  on	  the	  equilibrium	  wage;	  from	  the	  Lewis	  approach,	  since	  labor	  supply	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  unlimited,	  the	  average	  earnings	  in	  the	   subsistence	   (non-­‐capitalist)	   sector	   determines	   the	   wage	   level	   in	   the	   capitalist	   sector	  (Lewis,	   1954).	   Thus,	   the	   bargaining	   power	   in	   the	   neoclassical	   approach	   and	   in	   the	   Lewis	  approach	  is	  constrained	  within	  the	  labor	  market.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  key	  insight	  of	  Marx	  in	  terms	  of	  distribution	  (including	  the	  determination	  of	  wages)	  is	  that	  distribution	  is	  not	  determined	  in	   the	   labor	   market	   (which	   Marx	   depicts	   as	   the	   place	   where	   “right	   against	   right”)	   but	  determined	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  (which	  Marx	  depicts	  as	  the	  place	  where	  “between	  equal	  rights,	   force	  decides”)	   (Marx,	  1976,	  p.344).	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Marx	  omits	   the	  labor	  market.	  In	  fact,	  Marx	  has	  discussed	  a	  lot	  about	  labor	  supply,	  labor	  demand,	  as	  well	  as	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labor	   market	   institutions. 69 	  What	   Marx	   means	   is	   that	   the	   labor	   market	   does	   not	  independently	  determines	  distribution;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  labor	  market	  affects	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  where	  distribution	  is	  finally	  determined,	  and	  there	  are	  other	  factors	  from	  the	  labor	  process	  that	  also	  affect	  the	  power	  relation.	  Therefore,	  I	  suggest	  that	  in	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  labor	  and	  the	  power	  of	  workers	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production.	  However,	  given	  that	  the	  bargaining	  power	   in	   the	  non-­‐Marxian	  approaches	  has	  different	  meanings,	   I	  use	   the	  power	  relation	   in	  the	   sphere	   of	   production	   to	   distinguish	   the	  Marxian	   approach	   from	  others.	   Based	   on	   this	  distinction,	  the	  current	  studies	  on	  China’s	  labor	  share	  have	  the	  following	  deficiencies.	  	  First,	  in	  terms	  of	  theories,	  a	  few	  studies	  have	  applied	  the	  Lewis	  approach	  to	  discuss	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  labor,	  but	  no	  study	  applies	  the	  power	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  from	  the	  Marxian	   approach.	   Important	   aspects	   of	   the	   power	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   production	   thus	  have	  not	  been	  explored.	  	  Second,	   the	  selection	  of	  variables	   for	   the	  bargaining	  power	   is	  not	  well	  grounded,	  as	   is	  discussed	  in	  Section	  4.2.3.	  Variables	  such	  as	  unionization,	  labor	  shortage,	  labor	  surplus	  have	  led	  to	  strange	  results	  that	  hard	  to	  interpret.	  Variables	  such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  labor	  dispute	  arbitration	   have	   not	   reflected	   the	   bargaining	   power	   straightforwardly.70 	  This	   chapter	  chooses	   variables	   to	   reflect	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   production	   based	   on	   the	  well-­‐developed	   labor	   discipline	  model	   built	   on	  Marx’s	   theories	   (Bowles,	   1985;	   Schor	   and	  Bowles,	  1987)	  and	  the	  historical	  analysis	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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  Rigorously,	   the	   labor	  market	   in	   the	  Marxian	  approach	   should	  be	   the	  market	  of	   labor	  power.	  Marx	   discusses	   the	   supply	   of	   labor	   power	   in	   the	   theory	   of	   primitive	   capital	   accumulation	   and	   the	  theory	  of	  the	  reserve	  army	  of	  labor,	  and	  also	  discusses	  how	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  labor	  power	  are	   determined	   in	   the	   cycles	   of	   capital	   accumulation.	   In	   terms	   of	   labor	   market	   institutions,	  proletarianization	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  reserve	  army	  of	  labor	  are	  among	  the	  basic	  institutions	  of	  the	  capitalist	  market	  of	  labor	  power,	  as	  argued	  by	  Marx	  (Marx,	  1976).	  	  
70	  In	   principle,	   more	   labor	   dispute	   arbitration	   can	   imply	   either	   greater	   or	   smaller	   bargaining	  power	  of	  workers.	  	  
91	  	  
Third,	   in	   terms	   of	   econometric	   methods,	   the	   current	   studies	   associated	   to	   the	  bargaining	  power	   of	   labor	   have	  not	   apply	   panel	   regression	  methods	   to	   region	  panel	   data	  (except	  Jiang	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Panel	  regressions	  are	  useful	  in	  showing	  the	  relationship	  between	  variables	   by	   purging	   out	   fixed	   effects,	   which	   answers	   different	   questions	   than	   the	  cointegration	   method	   in	   Chapter	   2	   of	   this	   study.	   This	   chapter	   will	   apply	   the	   panel	   data	  methods	  to	  both	  macro-­‐level	  (region)	  and	  micro-­‐level	  data.	  	  Lastly,	  in	  terms	  of	  period	  selection,	  the	  current	  studies	  seem	  to	  be	  overly	  arbitrary.	  The	  historical	  analysis	  in	  Chapter	  3	  suggests	  that	  the	  determination	  mechanism	  of	  labor’s	  share	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  that	   in	  the	  second	  stage.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	   that	   period	   selection	   affects	   the	   conclusions	   one	   may	   reach.	   Thus,	   the	   following	  regressions	   of	   this	   chapter	   will	   analyze	   the	   two	   stages	   of	   the	   reform	   era	   separately.	  However,	   the	  period	   selection	  has	   to	   consider	  data	   availability	   as	  well.	   Therefore,	   for	   the	  region	  data,	  I	  will	  choose	  the	  period	  1980-­‐1991	  for	  the	  first	  stage	  and	  the	  period	  1999-­‐2010	  for	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era.	  Periods	  that	  the	  enterprise	  data	  covers	  are	  all	  in	  the	  second	   stage	   of	   the	   reform	   era,	   thus	   I	   will	   use	   all	   the	   available	   enterprise	   data	   for	   the	  analysis.	  	  
4.3 Empirical	  Models,	  Variable	  Selection	  and	  Data	  Sources	  
4.3.1 Empirical	  Models	  
I	  start	  with	  the	  empirical	  models	  for	  the	  region	  panel.	  The	  empirical	  models	  attempt	  to	  rigorously	   follow	   the	   Marxian	   approach.	   Thus,	   as	   I	   did	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   the	   first	   step	   is	   to	  consider	  the	  difference	  between	  labor’s	  shares	  measured	  by	  the	  conventional	  approach	  and	  the	  Marxian	   approach,	   and	   the	   second	   step	   is	   to	   consider	  what	   determines	   labor’s	   share	  measured	  by	  the	  Marxian	  approach.	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In	  the	  first	  step,	  the	  difference	  between	  labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	  the	  two	  approaches	  is	   determined	   by	   two	   factors:	   first,	   the	   share	   of	   the	   non-­‐dominant	   part	   in	   the	   economy;	  second,	   the	   share	   of	   surplus	   value	  distributed	   to	   unproductive	   labor	   as	  wages	   (hereafter,	  unproductive	  labor).	  Thus,	  I	  take	  the	  shares	  of	  agriculture,	  self-­‐employment,	  and	  non-­‐profit	  institutions	   in	   the	   economy	  as	  well	   as	  unproductive	   labor	   as	   explanatory	   variables	   in	   the	  empirical	  models.	  Furthermore,	  since	  self-­‐employment	  emerged	  and	  developed	  only	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era,	  the	  empirical	  model	  for	  the	  first	  stage	  will	  consider	  all	  these	  variables	  except	  self-­‐employment.	  	  In	   the	   second	  step,	   according	   to	   the	  analysis	   in	  Chapter	  2	  and	  3,	  one	   should	   take	   into	  account	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   value	   of	   labor	  power,	   realization	   conditions,	   labor	  productivity,	  and	  the	  power	  relation	  that	  reflects	  class	  struggle.	  	  The	  value	  of	   labor	  power	   in	  a	  given	  period	   is	   initially	  a	   constant.	   	  The	  power	   relation	  may	  lead	  to	  changes	  to	  the	  constant.	  Therefore,	  the	  value	  of	  labor	  power	  of	  any	  time	  can	  be	  expressed	   as	   a	   function	   of	   the	  power	   relation	  plus	   a	   constant.	   The	   fixed-­‐effect	  model	   can	  purge	   out	   the	   constant	   in	   this	   expression,	   leaving	   a	   function	   of	   the	   power	   relation.	   Given	  that	   there	   have	   been	   variables	   for	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   the	   empirical	  model,	   there	   is	   no	  need	   to	   take	   the	   value	   of	   labor	   power	   as	   an	   explanatory	   variable.	   Next,	   I	   use	   real	   GDP	  growth	   and	   real	   GDP	   per	   capita	   to	   capture	   realization	   conditions	   and	   labor	   productivity,	  respectively.	  Variables	  that	  reflect	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  should	  be	  selected	  separately	  for	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  reform	  era.	  In	   the	   first	   stage,	   under	   the	   factory	   regime,	   as	   cadres	   increasingly	   used	   material	  incentives,	  wages	  tended	  to	  squeeze	  profits	  since	  cadres	  had	  only	  the	  carrot	  strategy	  but	  no	  stick	   of	   unemployment.	   Thus,	   when	   material	   incentives	   were	   small,	   they	   were	   useful	   to	  raise	   the	   profit	   share	   by	   raising	   labor	   productivity	   higher;	   however,	   with	   material	  incentives	  being	  abused,	  they	  tended	  to	  raise	  labor’s	  share.	  Therefore,	  there	  should	  be	  a	  U-­‐
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shaped	  relationship	  between	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  material	  incentives	  and	  labor’s	  share.	  This	  U-­‐shaped	  relationship	  depicts	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  first	  stage.	  	  There	  is	  some	  dialectics	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  material	  incentives	  and	  the	  power	  of	  workers.	  In	  the	  early	  period	  of	  the	  first	  stage,	  given	  that	  there	  were	  still	  some	  legacies	  of	  the	  Maoist	  factory	  regime,	  workers	  were	  still	  willing	  to	  contribute	  more	  efforts	  if	  they	  were	  provided	  with	  small	  amounts	  of	  material	  incentives.	  As	  these	  legacies	  being	  destroyed,	  the	  still	  powerful	  workers	  would	  require	  more	  material	  incentives,	  whereas	  material	  incentives	  might	  become	  the	  only	  way	  for	  cadres	  to	  make	  workers	  contribute	  more	  efforts.	  Since	  the	  increase	  of	  the	  effort	  contribution	  could	  be	  less	  than	  that	  of	  material	  incentives,	  distribution	  turned	  to	  be	  favorable	  to	  workers.	  As	  the	  game	  proceeded,	  cadres	  would	  provide	  workers	  more	   and	   more	   material	   incentives;	   however,	   as	   the	   game	   ended	   (i.e.	   workers	   were	  defeated	  by	   the	   laying-­‐off	  policy),	   the	   large	   share	  of	  material	   incentives	   in	  workers’	  wage	  bill	   turned	   from	   the	   success	   of	   their	   power	   into	   the	   reliance	   on	   the	   management	   who	  mastered	  the	  distribution	  of	  material	  incentives—in	  contrast	  to	  the	  cadres	  who	  tried	  their	  best	   to	  satisfy	  workers’	   requirements	  on	  material	   incentives.	  Therefore,	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	  U-­‐shaped	  relationship	  between	  the	  bonus-­‐wage	  ratio	  and	  labor’s	  share	  only	  existed	  before	  the	   game	   ended,	   i.e.	   in	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	   reform	   era,	   while	   in	   the	   second	   stage,	   this	  relationship	  did	  not	  exist.	  71	  In	   the	   second	   stage,	   my	   analysis	   in	   Chapter	   3	   emphasizes	   two	   aspects	   of	   the	   power	  relation:	  class	  division	  and	  the	  commodification	  of	  labor	  power.	  Class	  division	  here	  refers	  to	  the	  division	  between	  cadres	  and	  workers,	  which	  greatly	  shifted	  the	  power	  on	  the	  shop	  floor.	  Commodification	  of	  labor	  power	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  workers	  turned	  to	  be	  disciplined	  by	  a	  reserve	  army	  of	  labor,	  thus	  workers	  have	  to	  sell	  their	  labor	  power	  in	  order	  to	  get	  access	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Ning	  (2013)	  uses	  the	  bonus-­‐wage	  ratio	  in	  the	  empirical	  model	  for	  the	  period	  2002-­‐2004.	  As	  I	  suggest	   in	   the	   following	   paragraphs,	   the	   bonus-­‐wage	   ratio	   in	   the	   second	   stage	   resulted	   from	   the	  decline	  in	  the	  power	  of	  workers,	  but	  other	  variables	  can	  fully	  depict	  this	  decline.	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consumption	   goods.	   These	   two	   aspects	   correspond	   to	   the	   two	   groups	   of	   factors	   for	   the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production:	  factors	  in	  the	  production	  process	  and	  factors	  in	  the	  labor	  market.	  	  Such	  a	  major	  change	  in	  the	  power	  relation	  has	  brought	  changes	  in	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  economy,	   thus	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   many	   aspects	   can	   reflect	   the	   change	   in	   the	   power	  relation.	  However,	   I	  argue	   that	  some	  of	   these	  aspects	  are	  more	   fundamental	   to	   the	  power	  relation,	   while	   other	   aspects	   are	   merely	   results	   of	   the	   power	   relation.	   Capturing	   these	  fundamental	   aspects	   allows	   us	   safely	   ignoring	   the	   resultant	   aspects.	   Further,	   I	   argue	   that	  class	  division	  and	  the	  commodification	  of	  labor	  power	  are	  the	  two	  fundamental	  aspects.	  	  In	   terms	   of	   class	   division,	   the	   relationship	   between	   cadres	   and	   workers	   changed,	  reflected	   by	   the	   wage	   inequality	   between	   cadres	   and	   workers.	   Cadres	   pursued	   raising	  wages	  for	  all	  workers	  in	  the	  first	  stage,	  while	  they	  became	  much	  more	  self-­‐interested	  in	  the	  second	  stage.	  Thus,	  the	  management-­‐worker	  wage	  inequality	  is	  a	  key	  variable	  that	  reflects	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  second	  stage.	  	  In	   terms	  of	   commodification	  of	   labor	  power,	   after	  millions	  of	  workers	   in	   state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  were	  laid	  off,	  the	  power	  relation	  tended	  to	  be	  capitalist.	  Unemployment	  became	  an	  instrument	  to	  discipline	  workers.	  Thus,	  I	  use	  the	  two	  key	  variables	  in	  the	  labor	  discipline	  model	   to	   reflect	   the	  power	  relation:	   the	   relative	  size	  of	   the	   reserve	  army	  and	   the	   fallback	  position	  of	  workers.	  The	  first	  variable	  depicts	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  fired	  worker	  to	  find	  a	  new	  job,	   and	   the	   second	   depicts	   the	   income-­‐replacing	   social	   benefits	   that	   a	   fired	   worker	   can	  receive.	  	  Furthermore,	  I	  also	  consider	  the	  ownership	  structure	  and	  globalization	  as	  explanatory	  variables.	   The	   ownership	   structure	   may	   affect	   labor’s	   share	   because	   state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  and	  private	  enterprises	  have	  different	  labor	  practices.	  A	  simple	  fact	  is	  that	  the	  average	  working	  hours	   in	  private	   enterprises	   are	  much	   longer	   than	   those	   in	   state-­‐owned	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enterprises.72	  Also,	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  are	  different	  from	  their	  private	  counterparts	  in	  promoting	  labor	  productivity	  growth	  (Lo	  and	  Zhang,	  2010;	  Lo	  and	  Li,	  2011).	  Globalization	  may	   lead	  to	  more	   intense	  competition	  between	  workers	  across	  countries,	  which	   in	  theory	  may	  also	  cause	  labor’s	  share	  to	  change.	  These	  variables	  are	  related	  to	  the	  power	  relation	  to	  different	   extents;	   however,	   as	   I	   argued,	   they	   are	   not	   fundamental	   aspects	   of	   the	   power	  relation.	   Thus,	   they	   do	   not	   necessarily	   have	   significant	   effects	   on	   labor’s	   share	   if	   the	  fundamental	  aspects	  are	  controlled	  in	  the	  empirical	  models.	  	  To	  sum	  up,	  I	  establish	  the	  model	   in	  Equation	  (4.1)	  for	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era	  and	  the	  model	  in	  Equation	  (4.2)	  for	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era.	  	  	   𝐿𝑆!" = 𝛼!𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆!" + 𝛼!𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑄!" + 𝛼!𝐿𝑃!" + 𝛼!𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻!" + 𝛼!𝐴𝐺𝑅!" + 𝛼!𝑁𝑃!"	  +𝛼!𝑈𝑃!" + 𝛼!𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛼!𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸!" + 𝛾! + 𝜇! + 𝜀!"	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.1)	  	  𝐿𝑆!" = 𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄!" + 𝛽!𝑅𝐴𝐿!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐵!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻!" + 𝛽!𝐴𝐺𝑅!" + 𝛽!𝐺𝐸𝑇𝐼!"	  +𝛽!𝑁𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑃!" + 𝛽!"𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!!𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸!" + 𝜃! + 𝜋! + 𝜂!"	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.2)	  
	  Table	   4-­‐2	   lists	   the	   definitions	   of	   all	   the	   variables.	   In	   Equation	   (4.1)	   and	   (4.2),	   the	  subscripts	  𝑖	  and	  𝑡	  represent	  a	  region	  (29	  provinces,	  autonomous	  regions,	  and	  municipalities;	  Chongqing	  and	  Sichuan	  are	  combined;	  Tibet	  is	  excluded	  due	  to	  data	  availability)	  and	  a	  year,	  respectively.	  𝛾! 	  and	  𝜃! 	  are	  region	  fixed	  effects.	  𝜇!	  and	  𝜋!	  are	  time	  fixed	  effects.	  𝜀!"	  and	  𝜂!"	  are	  error	  terms.	  The	  next	  section	  discusses	  in	  detail	  variable	  selection	  issues	  and	  data	  sources.	  For	   enterprise	   panels,	   there	   are	   two	   data	   sources.	   One	   is	   an	   enterprise	   survey	  conducted	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Nanjing	  covering	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2001.	  The	  other	  is	  the	  public	  data	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  According	   to	   a	   2006	   survey	   conducted	   by	   the	  ACFTU,	   the	   average	   of	  weekly	  working	   hours	  was	  46.14	  in	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  and	  state-­‐holding	  companies	  and	  53.16	  in	  private	  enterprises	  and	  self-­‐employed	  units	  (ACFTU,	  2010).	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of	  listed	  companies	  covering	  the	  period	  1999-­‐2011.	  I	  use	  subscript	  “NJ”	  and	  “LC”	  to	  label	  the	  variables	  for	  the	  Nanjing	  enterprise	  panel	  and	  the	  listed	  company	  panel,	  respectively.	  	  To	  sum	  up,	  the	  empirical	  models	  for	  enterprise	  panels	  are	  as	  follows.	  	  	   𝐿𝑆!"#$ = 𝛿!𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄!"#$ + 𝛿!𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻!"#$ + 𝛿!𝑆𝑂𝐸!"#$ + 𝛿!𝐾𝑌!"#$	  𝜆!𝐷𝑠! + 𝜆!𝐷𝑝! + 𝜔! + 𝜏! + 𝜑!"	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.3)	  	  𝐿𝑆!"!" = 𝜌!𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄!"#$ + 𝜌!𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻!"#$ + 𝜌!𝑆𝑂𝐸!"#$ + 𝜌!𝐾𝑌!"#$ + 𝜌!𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇!"#$	  𝜆!𝐷𝑟! + 𝜆!𝐷𝑞! + 𝜐! + 𝜗! + 𝜎!"	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.4)	  
	  The	  definitions	  of	  variables	  in	  Equation	  (4.3)	  and	  (4.4)	  are	  also	  listed	  in	  Table	  4-­‐2,	  4-­‐3,	  and	  4-­‐4.	  Subscripts	  𝑖	  and	  𝑡	  represent	  an	  enterprise	  and	  a	  year,	  respectively.	  The	  Σ	  signs	  are	  used	  to	  express	  region,	  industry,	  or	  scale	  dummies.	  𝜔! 	  and	  𝜐! 	  are	  enterprise	  fixed	  effects.	  𝜏!	  and	  𝜗!	  are	  time	  fixed	  effects.	  𝜑!"	  and	  𝜎!"	  are	  error	  terms.	  	  The	  building	  of	  the	  micro	  models	  is	  in	  general	  the	  same	  as	  that	  of	  the	  macro	  models.	  The	  micro	  models	  use	   the	   capital-­‐output	   ratio,	   total	   assets/scale	  dummies,	   industry	  dummies,	  and	  region	  dummies	  to	  control	  enterprise	  characteristics.	  Some	  variables	  are	  not	  necessary	  for	  micro	  models:	  variables	  of	  the	  non-­‐dominant	  part	  and	  unproductive	  labor	  do	  not	  appear	  in	  micro	  models	  because	  these	  models	  are	  going	  to	  explain	  distribution	  within	  enterprises.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  some	  variables	  are	  missing	  in	  the	  micro	  models:	  labor	  productivity,	  the	  reserve	  army	  effect,	  fallback	  position,	  and	  trade	  openness.	  Labor	  productivity	  affects	  labor’s	  share	  by	  repressing	  the	  unit	  value	  of	  consumption	  goods,	  thus	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  general	  level	  of	  labor	  productivity	  rather	  than	  the	  labor	  productivity	  of	  a	  particular	  enterprise.	  The	  effect	  of	  labor	  productivity	  is	  fixed	  for	  the	  enterprises	  of	  a	  given	  region	  at	  a	  given	  year.	  Similarly,	  effects	  of	  the	  reserve	  army,	  fallback	  position,	  and	  trade	  openness	  are	  all	  fixed	  in	  this	  sense.	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For	   the	  Nanjing	  Survey,	  since	  all	  enterprises	  were	   located	   in	   the	  same	  city,	  one	  can	  purge	  out	   the	  missing	   fixed	  effects	  with	  a	   fixed-­‐effect	  model;	  however,	   for	   the	   listed	   companies,	  since	  enterprises	  were	  located	  in	  different	  places,	  the	  fixed-­‐effect	  model	  cannot	  resolve	  the	  missing	   variable	   problem,	   thus	   one	   should	   find	   an	   instrumental	   variable,	   which	   I	   will	  discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Section	  4.4.1.	  	  
Table	  4-­‐2	  Definitions	  and	  Data	  Sources	  of	  Variables	  for	  the	  Region	  Panel	  
Variable	   Definition	   Notes	   Data	  Sources	  𝐿𝑆	   Labor’s	  share	   CE	  /	  (GDP	  -­‐	  depreciation)	   Hsueh	  and	  Li	  (1999)	  𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆	   Bonus-­‐wage	  ratio	   Bonuses	  /	  wages	   China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑄	   Square	  of	  BONUS	   	   	  𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄	   Management-­‐worker	  wage	  inequality	   Management	  average	  wage	  /	  average	  wage	  of	  all	  employees	   CCER	  and	  CSMAR	  
𝑅𝐴𝐿	   Reserve	  army	  of	  labor	   (Adjusted	  agricultural	  employment	  +	  urban	  registered	  unemployment	  +	  not-­‐on-­‐post	  workers)	  /	  urban	  employment	  
China	  Statistical	  Yearbook,	  China	  Labor	  Statistical	  Yearbook,	  Baidu	  Migration	  
𝐹𝐵	   Fallback	  position	   Average	  subsidy	  for	  lowest	  living	  conditions	  *	  (formal	  employment	  in	  enterprises	  /	  urban	  employment	  in	  enterprises)	  
China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  China	  Civil	  Affairs’	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  𝐿𝑃	   Labor	  productivity	   Real	  GDP	  per	  capita	  	   China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  	  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻	   GDP	  growth	   Real	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	   China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  𝐴𝐺𝑅	   Share	  of	  agriculture	   Value	  added	  of	  agriculture	  /	  GDP	   China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  𝐺𝐸𝑇𝐼	   Share	  of	  self-­‐employment	   Urban	  self-­‐employment	  /	  urban	  employment	   China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  𝑁𝑃	   Share	  of	  scientific	  research,	  education,	  culture,	  and	  medical	  services	   Value	  added	  of	  scientific	  research,	  education,	  culture,	  and	  medical	  services	  /	  GDP	   China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  𝑈𝑃	   Share	  of	  unproductive	  labor	   Wage	  bill	  of	  commerce,	  finance,	  and	  the	  state	  sector	  /	  wage	  bill	  of	  formal	  employment	   China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  𝑆𝑂𝐸	   Share	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	   Industrial	  output	  of	  state-­‐owned	  and	  state-­‐holding	  enterprises	  /	  total	  industrial	  output	   China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  	  𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸	   Trade	  openness	   (Export	  +	  import)	  /	  GDP	   China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	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Table	  4-­‐3	  Definitions	  and	  Data	  Sources	  of	  Variables	  for	  the	  Nanjing	  Enterprise	  Panel	  
Variable	   Definition	   Notes	   Data	  Sources	  𝐿𝑆!"	   Labor’s	  share	   Wages	  /	  (wages	  +	  profits	  +	  taxes)	   Nanjing	  Industrial	  Enterprise	  Survey	  𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄!"	   Management-­‐worker	  wage	  inequality	   Average	  earnings	  of	  the	  top	  10	  employees	  /	  average	  earnings	  of	  production	  workers	  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻!"	  Growth	  of	  industrial	  output	   	   	  𝑆𝑂𝐸!"	   Share	  of	  state-­‐owned	  equity	   State-­‐owned	  equity	  /	  total	  equity	   	  𝐾𝑌!"	   Capital-­‐output	  ratio	   Total	  assets	  /	  industrial	  output	  𝐷𝑠	   Scale	  dummy	   	  𝐷𝑝	   Industry	  dummy	   	  
Table	  4-­‐4	  Definitions	  and	  Data	  Sources	  of	  Variables	  for	  the	  Listed	  Company	  Panel	  
Variable	   Definition	   Notes	   Data	  Sources	  𝐿𝑆!" 	   Labor’s	  share	   Wages	  /	  (wages	  +	  profits	  +	  taxes)	   CCER	  and	  CSMAR	  𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄!" 	   Management-­‐worker	  wage	  inequality	   Management	  average	  wage	  /	  average	  wage	  of	  all	  employees	  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻!" 	  Growth	  of	  revenue	   	   	  𝑆𝑂𝐸!" 	   State	  control	  dummy	   1	  for	  state	  control,	  0	  for	  non-­‐state	  control	  
	  𝐾𝑌!" 	   Capital-­‐output	  ratio	   Total	  assets	  /	  (wages	  +	  profits	  +	  taxes)	  𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇!" 	   Total	  asset	   	  𝐷𝑟	   Region	  dummy	   	  𝐷𝑞	   Industry	  dummy	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4.3.2 Variable	  Selection	  and	  Data	  Sources	  
In	   what	   follows	   I	   will	   discuss	   key	   variables	   and	   their	   expected	   signs	   in	   this	   section.	  Table	  4-­‐2,	  4-­‐3,	  and	  4-­‐4	  list	  the	  data	  sources	  for	  each	  variable.	  I	  will	  discuss	  some	  of	  the	  data	  sources	   in	  more	  detail.	  Table	  4-­‐5,	  4-­‐6,	  4-­‐7,	  and	  4-­‐8	  give	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  of	  all	   the	  variables.	  
4.3.2.1 Labor’s	  share	  
In	  Equation	  (4.1)	  and	  (4.2),	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  𝐿𝑆,	  is	  labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	  the	  conventional	  approach,	  i.e.	  the	  compensation	  of	  employees	  divided	  by	  GDP	  subtracting	  the	  depreciation	   of	   fixed	   capital,	   same	   as	   the	  measure	   LS1	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   The	   depreciation	   of	  fixed	  capital	  is	  subtracted	  from	  the	  denominator	  because	  it	  is	  a	  transfer	  of	  value,	  rather	  than	  a	  part	  of	  newly	  created	  value.	  In	  Equation	  (4.3)	  and	  (4.4),	  the	  dependent	  variables,	  𝐿𝑆!"	  and	  𝐿𝑆!" ,	   are	  measured	   similarly.	   The	   data	   from	   the	   Nanjing	   enterprise	   survey	   and	   from	   the	  listed	  companies	  are	  Winsorized	  (5%).	  	  
4.3.2.2 Management-­‐Worker	  Inequality	  
For	  Equation	  (4.2),	   since	   there	   is	  no	  data	  of	  management	  wages	   for	   the	  region	   level,	   I	  use	  micro	  data	  of	  listed	  companies	  to	  construct	  management-­‐worker	  inequality,	  using	  CCER	  and	  CSMAR	  datasets.73	  This	  constructed	  measure	  equals	   the	  average	  wage	  of	  all	  directors,	  supervisors,	  and	  executives	  divided	  by	   the	  average	  wage	  of	  all	  employees	   in	   the	  region	  of	  the	  year.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  The	  micro	  data	  is	  Winsorized	  (5%).	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For	   Equation	   (4.3),	   I	   use	   the	   average	   earnings	   of	   the	   top	   10	   employees	   to	   proxy	   the	  management	   wages	   in	   the	   calculation	   of	   management-­‐worker	   inequality	   because	   the	  Nanjing	  Survey	  does	  not	  provide	  data	  on	  management	  wages.	  	  For	   Equation	   (4.4),	   I	   measure	   management-­‐worker	   inequality	   with	   the	   ratio	   of	   the	  average	  wage	  of	  directors,	  supervisors,	  and	  executives	  (excluding	  those	  who	  are	  not	  paid	  by	  their	  companies)	  to	  the	  average	  wage	  of	  all	  employees.	  	  Higher	  management-­‐worker	   inequality	  means	  that	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  is	  less	  favorable	  to	  workers;	  thus,	  the	  sign	  of	  the	  management-­‐worker	  inequality	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  negative.	  	  
4.3.2.3 Reserve	  Army	  of	  Labor	  
The	  most	   intuitive	  way	  to	  measure	   the	  reserve	  army	  effect	   is	   the	  unemployment	  rate;	  however,	  the	  unemployment	  data	  in	  China	  only	  covers	  urban	  registered	  unemployment	  but	  not	   includes	   unemployed	   migrant	   workers	   or	   unregistered	   urban	   unemployment.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   reserve	   army	   should	   also	   take	   the	   underemployed	   in	   the	   rural	   areas	   into	  account,	  which	  has	  composed	  the	  main	  source	  of	  workers	  in	  urban	  areas.	  Thus,	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  reserve	  army	  is	  measured	  as	  follows.	  	  
𝑅𝐴𝐿 = !"#$%&'"  !"#$%&'(&#!'  !"#$%&"!'(!!"#$%  !"#$%&"!"'  !"#$%&'($#")!  !"#!!"!!"#$  !"#$%#&!"#$%  !"#$%&"!'( 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.5)	  The	  numerator	  of	  Equation	  (4.5)	  means	  that	  the	  reserve	  army	  also	  includes	  not-­‐on-­‐post	  workers	  and	  agricultural	  employment,	   in	  addition	  to	   the	  urban	  registered	  unemployment.	  Not-­‐on-­‐post	   workers	   are	   mainly	   laid-­‐off	   workers	   who	   have	   not	   been	   registered	   as	  unemployment.	  	  I	  adjust	  agricultural	  employment	  because	   the	  reserve	  army	  of	  a	   region	  should	   include	  agricultural	  employment	  from	  neighbor	  regions.	  Peasants	  in	  a	  region	  may	  work	  out	  of	  their	  home	   regions,	  which	   can	   be	   seen	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   over	   60	   percent	   of	  migrant	  workers	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from	  rural	  areas	  worked	  out	  of	  their	  home	  regions	  in	  2013.	  The	  question	  is	  how	  to	  define	  neighbor	   regions.	   Geographical	   neighbor	   regions	   might	   be	   different	   from	   the	   regional	  sources	  of	  migrant	  workers	  for	  a	  region.	  Thus,	  I	  define	  the	  neighbor	  regions	  of	  a	  region	  as	  the	   top	   three	  destination	   regions	   for	   the	   travelers	   from	   the	   region	   in	  question	  during	   the	  Chinese	   New	   Year	   period.	   Baidu	  migration	   provides	   the	   destination	   regions	   for	   travelers	  during	   the	   last	   10	   days	   before	   the	   Chinese	   New	   Year	   of	   2015	  when	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	  travelers	   were	   traveling	   from	   their	   work	   regions	   to	   home	   regions,	   using	   the	   data	   of	   a	  popular	  smartphone	  application	  that	  can	  locate	  millions	  of	  their	  users.	  Although	  the	  quality	  of	   the	   data	   is	   questionable,	  what	   I	   need	   from	   it	   is	   only	   the	   top	   three	   destination	   regions	  rather	  than	  more	  detailed	  data;	  thus	  the	  quality	  issue	  should	  not	  impact	  the	  adjustment.	  To	  sum	  up,	   the	   adjusted	   agricultural	   employment	   is	   the	   sum	  of	   the	   agricultural	   employment	  from	  the	  local	  region	  and	  that	  from	  the	  selected	  three	  neighbor	  regions.	  	  The	  reserve	  army	  of	  labor	  represses	  the	  power	  of	  workers,	  thus	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  labor’s	  share.	  	  
4.3.2.4 Fallback	  Position	  
The	   fallback	   position	   should	   consider	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   parts	   that	  compose	  the	  urban	  working	  class:	  migrant	  workers	  and	  formal	  workers.	  The	  latter	  refers	  to	  workers	  of	  the	  urban	  unit	  sector.	  Thus,	  the	  overall	  fallback	  position	  is	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  the	  fallback	  positions	  for	  migrant	  workers	  and	  formal	  workers,	  as	  shown	  in	  Equation	  (4.6).	  	  	  
𝐹𝐵 = 𝐹𝐵  𝑜𝑓  𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛  𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 	  +𝐹𝐵  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ 1 − !"#$%&  !"#$%&"!'(!"#$%  !"#!"#$%&' 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.6)	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In	   the	   labor	   discipline	   model,	   the	   fallback	   position	   is	   the	   income-­‐replacing	   social	  subsidies	   that	  a	  worker	  can	  receive	  after	  being	   fired.	  This	  definition	  means	   that	  a	  worker	  should	  not	  receive	  the	  income-­‐replacing	  subsidies	  when	  he/she	  keeps	  the	  job.	  This	  reminds	  us	   to	   scrutinize	   whether	   agricultural	   income	   is	   the	   fallback	   position	   of	   migrant	   workers	  from	  rural	  areas.	  I	  argue	  that	  it	   is	  not	  their	  fallback	  position	  because	  migrant	  workers	  can	  receive	  agricultural	  income	  even	  when	  they	  have	  a	  job	  in	  urban	  areas.	  This	  results	  from	  the	  fact	   that	   agricultural	   production	   is	   organized	   by	   households	   and	   the	  majority	   of	  migrant	  workers’	  households	  have	  to	  maintain	  agricultural	  production	  since	  their	  wages	  from	  urban	  jobs	   cannot	   afford	   the	   living	   costs	   for	   their	   households	   to	   live	   in	   urban	   areas.	   A	   2009	  investigation	   shows	   that	  80	  percent	  of	  migrant	  workers	   live	   in	  urban	  areas	  without	   their	  family	  members.74	  For	  a	  typical	  rural	  family,	  some	  of	  the	  family	  members	  (especially	  aging	  parents	  and	  young	  children)	  still	  need	  to	  engage	  in	  agricultural	  production	  and	  live	   in	  the	  rural	  areas,	  since	  the	  living	  cost	  in	  these	  areas	  is	  much	  lower.	  Considering	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  fallback	  position	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  less	  than	  5	  percent	  of	  migrant	   workers	   have	   access	   to	   unemployment	   insurances,75	  I	   suggest	   that	   the	   fallback	  position	  of	  migrant	  workers	  is	  zero.	  	  For	   formal	   workers,	   I	   use	   the	   average	   subsidy	   for	   lowest	   living	   conditions	   as	   their	  fallback	  position.	  This	   subsidy	   is	  distributed	   to	  urban	   residents	   (migrant	  workers	  are	  not	  included)	   whose	   family	   income	   per	   capita	   is	   lower	   than	   the	   standard	   for	   lowest	   living	  conditions	   stipulated	   by	   the	   government.	   Most	   of	   the	   urban	   residents	   who	   receive	   this	  subsidy	  have	  experienced	  a	  long	  period	  of	  unemployment.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Sources:	   National	   Statistical	   Bureau,	   “Investigation	   Report	   on	   Migrant	   Workers	   2009,”	   (in	  Chinese)	  http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20100319_402628281.htm.	  
75	  Sources:	   National	   Statistical	   Bureau,	   “Investigation	   Report	   on	   Migrant	   Workers	   2009,”	   (in	  Chinese)	  http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20100319_402628281.htm.	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Given	  that	  the	  fallback	  position	  of	  migrant	  workers	  is	  zero	  and	  the	  fallback	  position	  of	  formal	  workers	  is	  measured	  the	  average	  subsidy	  for	  lowest	  living	  conditions,	  Equation	  (4.6)	  is	  rewritten	  as	  follows.	  	  	   𝐹𝐵 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡  𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗ !"#$%&  !"#$%&"!'(!"#$%  !"#$%&"!'( 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.7)	  	  A	   higher	   fallback	   position	   will	   strengthen	   the	   power	   of	   workers,	   thus	   the	   fallback	  position	  should	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  labor’s	  share.	  	  For	  the	  signs	  of	  other	  explanatory	  variables,	  I	  leave	  the	  discussion	  to	  Section	  4.4.2.	  
Table	  4-­‐5	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  the	  Region	  Panel,	  1980-­‐1991	  
Period	   1980-­‐1991	  Variable	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  LS	   338	   0.603	   0.109	   0.249	   0.758	  BONUS	   291	   0.154	   0.047	   0.051	   0.286	  LP	   343	   0.150	   0.085	   0.049	   0.470	  GROWTH	   348	   7.811	   5.111	   -­‐9.680	   23.700	  AGR	   348	   0.305	   0.117	   0.032	   0.598	  NP	   338	   0.065	   0.022	   0.022	   0.139	  UP	   228	   0.179	   0.024	   0.112	   0.240	  SOE	   347	   0.708	   0.131	   0.295	   0.938	  TRADE	   323	   0.200	   0.517	   0.006	   3.824	  Data	  sources:	  author’s	  calculation.	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Table	  4-­‐6	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  the	  Region	  Panel,	  1999-­‐2010	  
Period	   1999-­‐2010	  Variable	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  LS	   348	   0.570	   0.079	   0.382	   0.797	  RAL	   348	   12.815	   11.992	   2.342	   72.217	  INEQ	   348	   2.230	   0.592	   0.816	   3.950	  FB	   348	   0.122	   0.078	   0.006	   0.456	  LP	   348	   0.633	   0.457	   0.113	   3.275	  GROWTH	   348	   10.785	   2.754	   4.571	   23.600	  AGR	   348	   0.142	   0.072	   0.007	   0.364	  SELF	   348	   0.131	   0.051	   0.015	   0.279	  NP	   348	   0.154	   0.039	   0.091	   0.363	  UP	   348	   0.222	   0.026	   0.164	   0.302	  SOE	   348	   0.505	   0.205	   0.107	   0.899	  TRADE	   348	   0.330	   0.417	   0.000	   1.799	  Data	  sources:	  author’s	  calculation.	  
Table	  4-­‐7	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  the	  Nanjing	  Enterprise	  Panel,	  1995-­‐2001	  
Variables	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  LSNJ	   874	   0.594	   0.253	   0.166	   1.380	  INEQNJ	   874	   1.482	   0.392	   1.043	   3.185	  GROWTHNJ	   868	   0.268	   1.269	   -­‐0.958	   19.800	  SOENJ	   872	   0.259	   0.410	   0.000	   1.000	  KYNJ	   874	   1.178	   1.813	   0.023	   26.426	  Data	  sources:	  author’s	  calculation.	  	  
Table	  4-­‐8	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  the	  Listed	  Company	  Panel,	  1999-­‐2011	  
Variable	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  LSLC	   12980	   0.494	   0.230	   0.107	   1.202	  INEQLC	   12980	   2.719	   1.731	   0.374	   8.306	  GROWTHLC	   11695	   1.534	   14.462	   0.022	   1498.156	  SOELC	   12980	   0.616	   0.486	   0.000	   1.000	  KYLC	   12980	   13.622	   28.107	   0.524	   2888.490	  ASSETLC	   12980	   0.592	   4.113	   0.001	   283.529	  Data	  sources:	  author’s	  calculation.	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4.4 Econometric	  Strategy	  and	  Results	  
4.4.1 Econometric	  Strategy	  
Equation	   (4.1)	   and	   (4.2)	   are	   estimated	   with	   the	   fixed	   effect	   model.	   To	   control	   the	  cyclical	  characteristics	  of	  the	  variables,	  Equation	  (4.1)	  and	  (4.2)	  are	  also	  estimated	  with	  3-­‐year	  averages	  of	  variables.	  The	  estimation	  with	  3-­‐year	  averages	   reduces	   the	   length	  of	   the	  panel,	  making	  the	  estimation	  closer	  to	  the	  large-­‐N	  and	  small-­‐T	  hypothesis	  of	  the	  fixed	  effect	  model.	  	  Equation	  (4.3)	  is	  estimated	  with	  the	  fixed	  effect	  model.	  Since	  the	  number	  of	  enterprises	  in	  the	  Nanjing	  survey	  is	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  number	  of	  years,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  estimate	  with	   3-­‐year	   averages	   of	   variables.	   In	   this	   data,	   only	   one	   variable	   that	   reflects	   the	   power	  relation	   is	   available.	  However,	   since	   the	  Nanjing	   survey	  was	   conducted	   in	   the	   same	  place	  where	  the	  reserve	  army	  of	  labor	  and	  fallback	  position	  should	  be	  the	  same	  for	  all	  enterprises,	  we	  can	  ignore	  these	  missing	  variables	  as	  the	  fixed-­‐effect	  model	  can	  purge	  out	  them.	  	  Equation	  (4.4)	  is	  also	  estimated	  with	  the	  fixed	  effect	  model.	  The	  number	  of	  enterprises	  in	  the	  listed	  company	  panel	   is	  also	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  number	  of	  years.	  The	  problem	  of	  missing	   variables	   cannot	   be	   resolved	  with	   fixed	   effects	   because	   the	   listed	   companies	   are	  located	   in	   different	   places	   and	   one	   company	   may	   have	   branches	   in	   different	   places.	  Therefore,	  I	  will	  deal	  with	  the	  missing	  variable	  problem	  with	  instrumental	  variables.	  	  One	  instrumental	  variable	  is	  the	  share	  of	  directors,	  supervisors,	  and	  executives	  who	  are	  not	  paid	  by	  their	  companies	  in	  all	  directors,	  supervisors,	  and	  executives.	  If	  they	  are	  not	  paid,	  they	  are	  very	   likely	  to	  be	  shareholders	  of	   the	  companies,	  and	  thus	  they	  are	  more	   likely	  to	  repress	   the	   wages	   of	   management.	   Thus,	   this	   instrumental	   variable	   is	   negatively	   related	  with	  management-­‐worker	  inequality	  but	  it	  is	  not	  directly	  affect	  labor’s	  share.	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The	   other	   two	   instrumental	   variables	   are	   the	   stock	   share	   of	   the	   second	   largest	  shareholder	  and	  the	  stock	  share	  of	  the	  third	  largest	  shareholder.	  If	  these	  two	  variables	  are	  larger,	   shareholders	   of	   the	   company	   are	   more	   decentralized,	   thus	   it	   is	   easier	   for	   the	  management	   to	   raise	   their	   wages.	   These	   two	   variables	   are	   positively	   related	   with	  management-­‐worker	  inequality	  but	  they	  do	  not	  have	  direct	  impacts	  on	  labor’s	  share.	  	  	  
4.4.2 Econometric	  Results	  
4.4.2.1 Results	  of	  the	  Region	  Panel	  
Table	  4-­‐9	  gives	  the	  regression	  results	  of	  the	  region	  panel.	  	  Model	   (1)	   is	   the	   result	   of	   Equation	   (4.1),	   which	   shows	   that	   there	   is	   a	   U-­‐shaped	  relationship	  between	  the	  bonus-­‐wage	  ratio	  and	  labor’s	  share.	  When	  the	  bonus-­‐wage	  ratio	  is	  greater	  than	  0.19,	  it	  began	  to	  raise	  labor’s	  share.	  	  The	  share	  of	  agriculture	  has	  a	  significantly	  positive	  effect	  on	  labor’s	  share.	  Since	  most	  of	  agricultural	  new	  value	  accrues	  to	  labor’s	  share,	  this	  result	  is	  expected.	  Labor	  productivity	  has	  a	  significantly	  negative	  effect	  on	  labor’s	  share.	  The	  other	  explanatory	  variables	  have	  no	  significant	  effect.	  	  	  Model	  (2)	  is	  the	  regression	  result	  of	  Equation	  (4.1),	  using	  3-­‐year	  averages	  of	  variables.	  This	   result	   confirms	   the	  U-­‐shaped	   relationship	  between	   the	  bonus-­‐wage	   ratio	   and	   labor’s	  share.	   The	   share	   of	   agriculture	   still	   has	   a	   significantly	   positive	   effect.	   Labor	   productivity,	  however,	  shows	  no	  significant	  effect.	  The	  effect	  of	  unproductive	  labor	  becomes	  significant,	  which	  implies	  that	  unproductive	  labor	  was	  also	  squeezing	  profit’s	  share	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	   reform	   era,	   which	   brings	   interesting	   questions	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	  economic	  systems	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  unproductive	  labor	  to	  repress	  capital	  accumulation.	  The	  other	  variables	  have	  no	  significant	  effect.	  	  Model	   (3)	  gives	   the	  results	  of	  Equation	   (4.2).	  The	  management-­‐worker	   inequality	  and	  the	  reserve	  army	  have	  significantly	  negative	  effects.	  The	  fallback	  position	  has	  significantly	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positive	   effects.	   Signs	   of	   these	   variables	   that	   reflect	   the	   power	   relation	   are	   expected.	   The	  share	   of	   self-­‐employment	   has	   a	   significantly	   positive	   effect.	   Given	   that	   most	   of	   self-­‐employment	   new	   value	   accrues	   to	   labor’s	   income,	   this	   result	   is	   reasonable.	   This	   result	  shows	   that,	   the	   share	   of	   agriculture	   has	   no	   significant	   effect	   over	   the	   period	   1999-­‐2010,	  which	   contradicts	   with	   the	   studies	   that	   attribute	   the	   decline	   in	   labor’s	   share	   to	   sectoral	  changes.	  Labor	  productivity	  and	  the	  share	  of	  unproductive	  labor	  have	  no	  significant	  effect.	  Other	  variables	  also	  have	  no	  significant	  effect.	  	  Model	   (4)	   shows	   the	   result	   of	  Equation	   (4.2),	   using	  3-­‐year	   averages	  of	   variables.	  This	  result	   is	  similar	  to	  the	  result	  of	  Model	  (3).	  All	   the	  variables	  that	  reflect	  the	  power	  relation	  have	  expected	  signs.	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Table	  4-­‐9	  Regression	  Results	  of	  the	  Region	  Panel	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  Independent	  variable	   LS	  Period	   1980-­‐1991	   1980-­‐1991	  3-­‐year	  averages	   1999-­‐2010	   1999-­‐2010	  3-­‐year	  averages	  BONUS	   -­‐0.963**	   -­‐0.968*	   	   	  	   (-­‐2.431)	   (-­‐1.783)	   	   	  BONUSQ	   2.568**	   2.820**	   	   	  	   (2.332)	   (2.178)	   	   	  INEQ	   	   	   -­‐0.021**	   -­‐0.032**	  	   	   	   (-­‐2.498)	   (-­‐2.475)	  RAL	   	   	   -­‐0.004**	   -­‐0.004**	  	   	   	   (-­‐2.251)	   (-­‐2.523)	  FB	   	   	   0.189**	   0.343**	  	   	   	   (2.325)	   (2.433)	  LP	   -­‐0.477*	   -­‐0.340	   -­‐0.014	   -­‐0.017	  	   (-­‐1.788)	   (-­‐1.367)	   (-­‐0.662)	   (-­‐0.591)	  GROWTH	   0.000	   -­‐0.001	   -­‐0.002	   -­‐0.003	  	   (0.229)	   (-­‐0.747)	   (-­‐0.746)	   (-­‐0.767)	  AGR	   0.547***	   0.958***	   0.248	   0.083	  	   (2.971)	   (4.608)	   (0.764)	   (0.190)	  SELF	   	   	   0.412***	   0.550***	  	   	   	   (3.479)	   (3.515)	  NP	   0.574	   1.338**	   0.352	   0.132	  	   (1.232)	   (2.618)	   (1.027)	   (0.298)	  UP	   0.920	   0.684	   0.155	   0.277	  	   (1.172)	   (1.095)	   (0.500)	   (0.596)	  SOE	   -­‐0.216	   -­‐0.216	   0.069	   0.049	  	   (-­‐1.344)	   (-­‐1.380)	   (0.699)	   (0.417)	  TRADE	   0.008	   0.015	   0.006	   0.007	  	   (0.540)	   (0.945)	   (0.414)	   (0.285)	  Method	   FE	   FE	   FE	   FE	  N	   207	   100	   348	   116	  Notes:	   t	   statistics	   are	   reported	   in	   parentheses.	   *	   p<0.1,	   **	   p<0.05,	   ***	  p<0.01.	   All	   standard	   errors	   are	   heteroskedasticity-­‐robust.	   All	  specifications	  include	  year	  dummies.	  
109	  	  
4.4.2.2 Results	  of	  the	  Nanjing	  Enterprise	  Panel	  
Table	   4-­‐10	   gives	   the	   regression	   results	   of	   the	   Nanjing	   enterprise	   panel.	   The	  management-­‐worker	   inequality	   has	   a	   significantly	   negative	   effect,	   which	   again	   confirms	  that	  the	  power	  relation	  is	  a	  crucial	  factor	  of	  labor’s	  share.	  The	  share	  of	  state-­‐owned	  equity	  has	  a	  significantly	  positive	  effect.	  The	  capital-­‐output	  ratio	  has	  a	  significantly	  positive	  effect.	  The	   growth	   rate	  of	   industrial	   output	   has	   a	   significantly	  negative	   effect,	  which	  means	   that	  labor’s	  share	  is	  counter-­‐cyclical.	  	  
Table	  4-­‐10	  Regression	  Results	  of	  the	  Nanjing	  Enterprise	  Panel	  
Independent	  variable	   LS	  Period	   1995-­‐2001	  INEQNJ	   -­‐0.077**	  	   (-­‐2.388)	  GROWTHNJ	   -­‐0.012***	  	   (-­‐2.751)	  SOENJ	   0.125***	  	   (2.839)	  KYNJ	   0.022**	  	   (2.090)	  Method	   FE	  N	   866	  Notes:	   t	   statistics	   are	   reported	   in	  parentheses.	  *	  p<0.1,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01.	  All	   standard	   errors	   are	   heteroskedasticity-­‐robust.	   The	   specification	   includes	   year	  dummies,	   industry	   dummies,	   and	   scale	  dummies.	  
4.4.2.3 Results	  of	  the	  Listed	  Company	  Panel	  
Table	  4-­‐11	  shows	   the	   regression	  results	  of	   the	   listed	  company	  panel.	  Model	   (1)	   is	   the	  fixed	  effect	  estimation.	  Model	  (2)	  uses	  instrumental	  variables	  for	  the	  management-­‐worker	  inequality	   because	  missing	   variables	   that	   reflect	   the	   power	   relation	   are	   related	   with	   the	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management-­‐worker	   inequality.	   The	   2SLS	   result	   has	   passed	   the	   underidentification	   test,	  weak	  instrument	  test,	  and	  overidentification	  test.	  The	  coefficients	  of	  Model	  (2)	  are	  close	  to	  those	  of	  Model	   (1).	  The	  management-­‐worker	   inequality	  has	  a	  significantly	  negative	  effect,	  same	  as	  the	  results	  in	  Table	  4-­‐9	  and	  Table	  4-­‐10.	  State	  ownership	  has	  a	  significantly	  positive	  effect.	  Capital-­‐output	  ratio	  has	  a	  significantly	  positive	  effect.	  The	  growth	  rate	  of	  revenue	  has	  a	   negative	   effect,	   which	   again	   means	   that	   labor’s	   share	   is	   counter-­‐cyclical.	   The	   scale	   of	  enterprises	  measured	  by	  total	  assets	  has	  a	  significantly	  negative	  effect.	  	  
Table	  4-­‐11	  Regression	  Results	  of	  the	  Listed	  Company	  Panel	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	  Independent	  variable	   LS	  Period	   1999-­‐2011	  INEQLC	   -­‐0.018***	   -­‐0.026*	  	   (-­‐10.504)	   (-­‐1.829)	  GROWTHLC	   -­‐0.000**	   -­‐0.000**	  	   (-­‐2.136)	   (-­‐2.072)	  SOELC	   0.032***	   0.047***	  	   -­‐3.597	   -­‐5.493	  KYLC	   0.004***	   0.004***	  	   -­‐4.228	   -­‐7.926	  ASSETLC	   -­‐0.034***	   -­‐0.041***	  	  	   (-­‐3.429)	   (-­‐6.879)	  Method	   FE	   2SLS	  N	   11693	   9867	  Underidentification	  test,	  p-­‐value	   0	  Kleibergen-­‐Paap	  Wald	  stat.	   23.09	  Overidentification	  test,	  p-­‐value	   0.21	  Notes:	  t	  statistics	  are	  reported	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  p<0.1,	  **	  p<0.05,	   ***	   p<0.01.	   All	   standard	   errors	   are	  heteroskedasticity-­‐robust.	  All	  specifications	  include	  year	  dummies,	  industry	  dummies,	  and	  region	  dummies.	  
Lastly,	  note	  that	   the	  results	   in	  Table	  4-­‐9	  suggest	   that,	  controlling	  variables	  that	  reflect	  the	  power	  relation,	  state	  ownership	  has	  no	  significant	  effect	  on	  labor’s	  share,	  but	  results	  in	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Table	  4-­‐10	  and	  4-­‐11	  show	  that	  state	  ownership	  has	  a	  significant	  positive	  effect	  on	   labor’s	  share.	  One	  possible	  reason	  for	  this	  contradiction	  might	  be	  that	  factors	  that	  reflect	  the	  power	  relation	  are	  not	  all	  controlled	  on	  the	  micro	  level	  due	  to	  data	  availability;	  as	  the	  result,	  state	  ownership	  which	  is	  mostly	  related	  to	  the	  power	  relation	  becomes	  significant	  on	  the	  micro	  data.	   Another	   possible	   reason	   might	   be	   the	   growth	   of	   labor	   productivity	   caused	   by	   the	  state-­‐owned	   investments.	   Lo	   and	   Zhang	   (2010)	   and	   Lo	   and	   Li	   (2011)	   argue	   that	  investments	   led	   by	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   can	   greatly	   promote	   the	   growth	   of	   labor	  productivity	   for	   the	  entire	  economy	   through	   the	  Kaldor-­‐Verdoorn	  effect.	  Given	   this	  effect,	  although	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  have	  higher	  labor’s	  share	  on	  the	  micro	  level,	  they	  tend	  to	  promote	   the	   growth	   of	   labor	   productivity	   on	   the	   macro	   level,	   which	   may	   offset	   their	  positive	  effect	  on	  macro-­‐level	  labor’s	  share.	  Therefore,	  the	  effect	  of	  state	  ownership	  on	  the	  macro	  level	  becomes	  statistically	  insignificant.	  	  
4.5 Conclusion	  
	  This	  chapter	  provides	  macro	  and	  micro	  empirical	  evidences	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  production	  on	  labor’s	  share.	  Following	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  and	  based	  on	  the	  historical	  analysis	  of	   the	  changes	   in	   the	  power	  relation,	   I	  establish	  empirical	  models	   and	   select	   variables	   to	   reflect	   the	   power	   relation.	   The	   results	   have	   shown	   that	  factors	   that	   reflect	   the	  power	  relation	  have	  significant	  effects	  on	   labor’s	   share.	  Macro	  and	  micro	   evidences	   have	   shown	   similar	   results.	   Sectoral	   structure	   does	   not	   have	   significant	  effect	  on	  labor’s	  share	  over	  the	  period	  1999-­‐2010.	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CHAPTER	  5 	  CONCLUSION	  	  China’s	   fast	   economic	   growth	   over	   the	   past	   three	   decades	   has	   been	   one	   of	   the	  major	  events	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era	  of	  capitalism.	  This	  event	  was	  unlikely	  to	  happen	  without	  China’s	  particular	   institutional	  advantages;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   this	  event	  has	  resulted	   from	  one	  of	  the	  typical	  driving	  forces	  for	  capital	  accumulation—the	  decline	  in	  labor’s	  share.	  This	  study	  suggests	  that	  the	  decline	  in	  labor’s	  share	  has	  resulted	  from	  a	  typical	  reason	  for	  a	  capitalist	  economy—the	  decline	  in	  the	  power	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  	  This	  study	  highlights	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  in	  addressing	  the	  labor	  share	  question,	  thus	  in	   methodology	   it	   differs	   from	   the	   orthodox	   literature,	   most	   of	   which	   follows	   the	  neoclassical	   approach,	   and	   also	   differs	   from	   the	   majority	   of	   heterodox	   literature,	   which	  considers	   labor’s	   share	  measured	  by	   the	   conventional	   approach	  as	  a	  proxy	   for	   the	  power	  relation.	  This	  study	  follows	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  in	  two	  aspects:	  first,	   it	  measures	  labor’s	  share	  with	   the	  Marxian	  approach;	   second,	   it	   emphasizes	   the	  Marxian	  proposition	   that	   the	  power	   relation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   production	   plays	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   determination	   of	  distribution.	  	  The	  Marxian	  measure	  of	  labor’s	  share	  is	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  rate	  of	  surplus	  value.	  I	  find	  that	  labor’s	  share	  measured	  by	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  experienced	  changes	  following	  an	  inverse-­‐U	  shape,	  which	  might	  depict	  the	  trends	  of	  the	  power	  relation	  over	  China’s	  reform	  era.	  According	  to	  these	  trends,	  I	  divide	  the	  reform	  era	  into	  two	  stages:	  the	  first	  stage	  is	  from	  1978	  to	  the	  early	  1990s,	  and	  the	  second	  stage	  is	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  global	   financial	  and	  economic	  crisis.	  The	  historical	  analysis	   in	  Chapter	  3	  suggests	   that	   the	  factory	   regime	   in	   the	   first	   stage	  was	  built	   on	  material	   incentives	   and	   featured	  by	   the	   still	  powerful	   workers	   and	   the	   limited	   inequality	   between	   cadres	   and	   workers.	   The	   power	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relation	   between	   the	   state,	   cadres,	   and	   workers	   led	   to	   problems	   that	   threatened	   the	  sustainability	  of	  capital	  accumulation.	  Only	  after	  a	  series	  of	  reforms	  weakened	  the	  power	  of	  the	   working	   class	   were	   these	   problems	   resolved.	   Labor’s	   share	   declined	   and	   Capital	  accumulation	  was	  revitalized	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  as	  a	  result.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   historical	   analysis,	   this	   study	   has	   also	   examined	   how	   the	   power	  relation	  has	  affected	  labor’s	  share	  with	  econometric	  methods.	  The	  econometric	  analysis	  of	  this	   study	   is	   composed	   of	   three	   parts.	   The	   first	   part	   uses	   national	   time	   series	   data	   to	  examine	   the	   relationship	   between	   labor’s	   shares	  measured	   by	   the	  Marxian	   approach	   and	  the	  conventional	  approach	  in	  a	  cointegration	  analysis.	  The	  cointegration	  analysis	  confirms	  that	   there	   is	   a	   long-­‐run	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   measures.	   The	   second	   part	   uses	  region	  panel	  data	  to	  examine	  how	  determinants	  of	  the	  power	  relation	  affects	  labor’s	  share.	  These	   determinants	   include	   the	   bonus-­‐wage	   ratio,	   management-­‐worker	   inequality,	   the	  reserve	   army	   effect,	   and	   the	   fallback	   position.	   The	   results	   confirm	   the	   role	   of	   the	   power	  relation	   in	   determining	   labor’s	   share,	   but	   also	   show	   that	   sectoral	   structure	   has	   no	  significant	  effect	  on	  labor’s	  share	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  reform	  era.	  The	  third	  part	  uses	  enterprise	  panel	  data	  to	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  management-­‐worker	  inequality	  on	  labor’s	  share.	  These	  micro	  evidences	  also	  support	  that	  the	  power	  relation	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  distribution.	  	  Corresponding	   to	   the	  neoclassical	  approach	  and	   the	  Marxian	  approach,	  policies	  aimed	  at	   raising	   the	   labor	   share	   follow	   two	  distinct	   approaches,	   respectively:	   the	  modernization	  approach	  and	  the	  power	  approach.	  	  The	   modernization	   approach	   suggests	   that	   the	   decline	   in	   labor’s	   share	   was	   mainly	  caused	   by	   sectoral	   changes,	   and	   since	   sectoral	   changes	   are	   inevitable	   for	   economic	  “modernization”,	  policies	  should	  promote	  sectoral	  changes	  and	  wait	  for	  the	  Kuznets	  turning	  point.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   modernization	   approach	   suggests	   that	   distribution	   is	   distorted	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because	  there	  is	  still	  a	  lack	  of	  marketization	  in	  China;	  thus,	  proponents	  of	  the	  modernization	  approach	  propose	  that	  China	  needs	  more	  reform	  for	  marketization.	  	  The	   neoclassical	   approach	   to	   the	   labor	   share	   question	   is	   built	   on	   the	   marginal	  productivity	  theory,	  which	  attributes	  distribution	  to	  technology	  and	  market	  behaviors	  but	  leaves	   no	   room	   for	   the	   power	   relation	   that	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   daily	   capitalist	   production.	  From	  the	  neoclassical	  perspective,	  low	  labor’s	  share	  is	  no	  less	  acceptable	  than	  a	  high	  labor’	  share,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  the	  market	  that	  “determines”	  distribution.	  However,	  low	  labor’s	  share	  and	  high	  labor’s	  share	  make	  great	  differences	  in	  capital	  accumulation.	  If	  labor’s	  share	  is	  too	  low,	   the	   economy	   has	   to	   face	   the	   crisis	   tendency	   of	   under	   consumption;	   the	   resultant	  reliance	  on	  investments	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  crisis	  of	  over	  accumulation.	  	  My	  analysis	  following	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  draws	  conclusions	  that	  are	  opposite	  to	  the	  neoclassical	   ones.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   decline	   in	   labor’s	   share	   in	   recent	   years	  was	   caused	   by	  power	   changes	   instead	   of	   sectoral	   changes,	   by	   the	   excess	   of	  marketization	   instead	   of	   the	  lack	  of	  marketization.	  To	  raise	   labor’s	  share	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  the	  problems	  with	  China’s	  capital	   accumulation,	   policies	  must	   be	   aimed	   at	   strengthening	   the	   power	   of	   the	   working	  class.	  	  In	   the	  Report	   to	   the	  Eighteenth	  National	  Congress	  of	   the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	   in	  2012,	  raising	  labor’s	  share	  of	  the	  national	  income	  was	  set	  as	  a	  goal	  for	  the	  reform	  on	  income	  distribution;	   however,	   policies	   proposed	   later	   for	   this	   goal	   were	   merely	   focused	   on	  enhancing	   the	   skills	   of	   workers	   and	   creating	   more	   jobs	   for	   workers	   by	   promoting	   the	  development	   of	   the	   service	   sector	   and	   labor-­‐intensive,	   small-­‐scale	   enterprises.	   No	   policy	  was	  proposed	  to	  strengthen	  the	  power	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  It	   is	  unlikely	   for	   the	  state	   to	   rebalance	   the	  power	  of	   capital	  and	   labor.	  How	  to	  sustain	  capital	   accumulation	   and	   economic	   growth	   (rather	   than	   how	   to	   raise	   labor’s	   share)	   has	  been	  the	  main	  concern	  of	  the	  state	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  crisis.	  If	  this	  situation	  continues,	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APPENDIX	  A	  DATA	  SOURCES	  
A.1	  Agriculture	  
𝑁𝑉!:	   Net	   value	   of	   agriculture.	   For	   the	   period	   1956-­‐1977,	  𝑁𝑉!	  is	   from	   China	   Statistic	  Yearbook	  1994.	  For	  the	  period	  1978-­‐2003,	  𝑁𝑉!	  is	  calculated	  by	  subtracting	  depreciation	  of	  fixed	   assets	   from	   value	   added	  with	   the	   data	   from	  Hsueh	   and	   Li	   (1999)	   and	   NBS	   (2007).	  Since	  the	  definition	  of	  “net	  value”	  in	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  1994	  slightly	  differs	  from	  that	  in	  Hsueh	  and	  Li	  (1999)	  and	  NBS	  (2007),	  all	  the	  data	  for	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1977	  is	  adjusted	  by	  multiplying	   the	   ratio	  of	   “net	  value”	   in	  1978	   from	  Hsueh	  and	  Li	   (1999)	   to	   that	   from	  China	  Statistic	   Yearbook	   1994.	   For	   the	   period	   2004-­‐2012,	  𝑁𝑉!	  is	   calculated	   by	   subtracting	   an	  estimated	  depreciation	  of	  fixed	  assets	  from	  value	  added.	  Since	  the	  value	  added	  data	  in	  China	  Statistic	   Yearbook	   2013	   slightly	   differs	   from	   that	   in	   NBS	   (2007),	   it	   is	   also	   adjusted	   by	  multiplying	  the	  ratio	  of	  “value	  added”	  in	  2003	  from	  NBS	  (2007)	  to	  that	  from	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  2013.	  The	  estimated	  depreciation	  rate	  equals	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  depreciation	  of	  fixed	  assets	   divided	   by	   the	   sum	   of	   value	   added	   over	   the	   period	   1990-­‐2003.	   The	   adjustments	  above	   make	   the	   data	   from	   different	   sources	   consistent	   despite	   slight	   changes	   from	   the	  original	  data	  and	  they	  are	  applied	  to	  other	  sectors	  as	  well.	  	  𝑊!:	  Labor	  income	  of	  agriculture.	  Rural	  collectives	  organized	  the	  majority	  of	  agricultural	  production	   in	   the	  Maoist	   era	   and	  were	   replaced	   by	   households	   in	   the	   reform	   era.	   State-­‐owned	   farms	   accounted	   for	   a	   negligible	   share	   in	   agricultural	   production,	   so	   I	   do	   not	  distinguish	  state-­‐owned	  farms	  from	  production	  units	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  relations	  of	  production.	  For	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1977,	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  consumption	  rate	  of	  rural	  residents	  (consumption	  of	  rural	  residents	  divided	  by	  labor	  income	  of	  agriculture)	  is	  a	  constant	  that	  equals	  to	  the	  consumption	  rate	  in	  1978.	  	  With	  this	  assumption,	  I	  estimate	  𝑊!	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for	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1977.	  The	  consumption	  data	  is	  from	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  1989.	  For	  the	  period	  1978-­‐2003,	  𝑊!	  is	  the	  agricultural	  compensation	  of	  employees	  from	  Hsueh	  and	  Li	  (1999)	   and	   NBS	   (2007).	   For	   the	   period	   2004-­‐2012,	  𝑊! 	  is	   calculated	   by	   subtracting	  agricultural	   taxes	   from	  𝑁𝑉! .	   The	   agricultural	   tax	   data	   is	   from	   various	   issues	   of	   China	  Statistic	  Yearbook.	  	  
A.2	  Industry	  (mining,	  manufacturing,	  and	  utilities)	  
𝑁𝑉!:	   Net	   value	   of	   industry.	   The	   industry	   sector	   is	   composed	   of	   three	   sub-­‐sectors:	  mining,	  manufacturing,	  and	  utilities.	  The	  data	  of	  𝑁𝑉!	  is	  from	  various	  issues	  of	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  and	  Hsueh	  and	  Li	  (1999),	  adjusted	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  𝑁𝑉!.	  	  𝑊!:	  Labor	  income	  of	  industry.	  For	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1977,	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  labor	  income	  of	  industry	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  wages,	  salaries,	  and	  benefits	  of	  industry	  is	  a	  constant	  that	  equals	  to	  this	  ratio	  in	  1978.	   	  With	  this	  assumption,	  I	  estimate	  𝑊!	  for	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1977.	  Data	   of	  wages,	   salaries,	   and	   benefits	   is	   from	  NBS	   (1985).	   I	   also	   use	   this	  method	   to	  estimate	   the	   labor	   income	   of	   construction,	   transportation,	   post	   and	   telecommunications,	  food	  services,	  and	  social	  services	  over	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1977.	  For	  the	  period	  1978-­‐2003,	  𝑊!	  is	  the	  compensation	  of	  employees	  in	  the	  industry	  sector	  from	  Hsueh	  and	  Li	  (1999)	  and	  NBS	  (2007).	   For	   the	   period	   2004-­‐2012,	  𝑊!	  is	   derived	   from	   the	   predictions	   of	   the	   following	  regression	  with	  the	  observations	  over	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2003.	  	   𝑊!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑊!,!!! + 𝛼!𝑒𝑚𝑝! + 𝛼!𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑤! + 𝜀!	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (A.1)	  	  In	  this	  equation,	  𝑊!,!	  is	  the	  labor	  income	  of	  industry	  in	  year	  𝑡,	  𝑊!,!!!	  is	  the	  labor	  income	  of	   industry	   in	   year	  𝑡 − 1,	  𝑒𝑚𝑝!	  is	   the	   employment	   of	   industry,	   and	  𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑤!	  is	   the	   average	  wage	   of	   industry.	   In	   addition,	  𝛼!	  is	   a	   constant,	  𝛼!,  𝛼!,	   and	  𝛼!	  are	   coefficients,	   and	  𝜀!	  is	   the	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error	  term.	  Data	  of	  employment	  and	  average	  wages	  is	  from	  various	  issues	  of	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook.	   I	   also	   use	   this	   method	   to	   estimate	   the	   labor	   income	   of	   construction,	  transportation,	   post	   and	   telecommunications,	   food	   services,	   and	   social	   services	   over	   the	  period	  2004-­‐2012.	  	  
A.3	  Construction	  
𝑁𝑉!:	  Net	   value	   of	   construction.	   The	   data	   of	  𝑁𝑉!	  is	   from	  NBS	   (1985),	   various	   issues	   of	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook,	  and	  Hsueh	  and	  Li	  (1999),	  adjusted	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  𝑁𝑉!.	  	  𝑊!:	   Labor	   income	   of	   construction.	   The	   data	   for	  𝑊!	  is	   from	   various	   issues	   of	   China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  and	  Hsueh	  and	  Li	  (1999).	  The	  method	  used	  to	  obtain	  𝑊!	  is	   the	  same	  as	  that	  used	  to	  obtain	  𝑊!.	  	  
A.4	  Transportation,	  post	  and	  telecommunications	  
𝑁𝑉!:	  Net	  value	  of	  transportation,	  post	  and	  telecommunications.	  The	  data	  of	  𝑁𝑉!	  is	  from	  various	   issues	  of	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  and	  Hsueh	  and	  Li	   (1999),	   adjusted	   in	   the	   same	  way	  as	  𝑁𝑉!.	  	  𝑊!:	   Labor	   income	   of	   transportation,	   post	   and	   telecommunications.	   The	   data	   for	  𝑊!	  is	  from	  NBS	  (1985),	  various	  issues	  of	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook,	  and	  Hsueh	  and	  Li	  (1999),.	  The	  method	  used	  to	  obtain	  𝑊!	  is	  the	  same	  as	  that	  used	  to	  obtain	  𝑊!.	  	  
A.5	  Food	  and	  hotel	  services	  
𝑁𝑉!:	  Net	  value	  of	  food	  and	  hotel	  services.	  Since	  commerce,	  food,	  and	  hotel	  services	  are	  treated	  as	  a	  single	  sector	  in	  the	  data,	  we	  need	  to	  split	  the	  sector	  into	  the	  commerce	  part	  and	  the	  food	  and	  hotel	  service	  part.	  I	  use	  the	  retail	  sale	  data	  to	  split	  the	  sector	  over	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1977	  and	  the	  value	  added	  data	  over	  the	  period	  1978-­‐2012.	  The	  retail	  sale	  data	  is	  from	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various	  issues	  of	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook,	  and	  the	  value	  added	  data	  is	  from	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  2013.	  With	  the	  data	  of	  net	  value	  from	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  1994,	  value	  added,	  depreciation,	  compensation	  of	  employees	  from	  NBS	  (2007),	  we	  can	  exclude	  commerce	  and	  then	  obtain	  the	  data	  for	  food	  and	  hotel	  services	  only.	  Then	  I	  apply	  the	  same	  procedure	  used	  in	  the	  calculation	  of	  𝑁𝑉!	  to	  obtain	  𝑁𝑉!.	  	  𝑊!:	  Labor	  income	  of	  food	  services.	  With	  the	  data	  for	  food	  and	  hotel	  services,	  I	  apply	  the	  same	  procedure	  used	  in	  the	  calculation	  of	  𝑊!	  to	  obtain	  𝑊!.	  	  
A.6	  Social	  services	  
𝑁𝑉!:	  Net	  value	  of	  social	  services.	  NBS	  (1997)	  provides	  the	  value	  added	  of	  social	  services	  over	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1978.	  Hsueh	  and	  Li	  (1999)	  provide	  data	  of	  value	  added,	  compensation	  of	  employees,	  and	  depreciation	  of	  fixed	  assets	  of	  social	  services	  over	  the	  period	  1978-­‐1995.	  For	   the	   period	   1978-­‐1995,	  𝑁𝑉!	  is	   calculated	   with	   the	   data	   from	   Hsueh	   and	   Li	   (1999)	   by	  subtracting	  depreciation	  of	  fixed	  assets	  from	  value	  added.	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  net	  value	  to	  the	  value	  added	  of	  social	  services	  is	  a	  constant	  that	  equals	  this	  ratio	  in	  1978,	  with	  which	  I	  estimate	  𝑁𝑉!	  over	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1977.	  NBS	  (2007)	  and	  China	  Statistic	  Yearbook	  2013	   do	   not	   provide	   data	   of	   social	   services	   but	   provides	   data	   of	   “other	   services”	   which	  includes	  social	  services.	  Thus,	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  share	  of	  social	  services	  in	  “other	  services”	  is	  constant	  and	  that	  the	  share	  of	  depreciation	  in	  the	  value	  added	  of	  social	  services	  is	  the	  same	  as	   the	   share	  of	  depreciation	   in	   the	  value	  added	  of	   “other	   services”,	  with	  which	   I	   estimate	  𝑁𝑉!	  over	  the	  period	  1996-­‐2012.	  	  𝑊!:	  Labor	  income	  of	  social	  services.	  I	  estimate	  𝑊!	  over	  the	  period	  1956-­‐1977	  with	  data	  of	  wages,	  salaries,	  and	  benefits	  from	  NBS	  (1985),	  using	  the	  same	  method	  for	  estimating	  𝑊!	  over	   the	   period	   1956-­‐1977.	   For	   the	   period	   1978-­‐1995,	  𝑊! 	  is	   the	   compensation	   of	  employees	   of	   social	   services	   from	   Hsueh	   and	   Li	   (1999).	   I	   assume	   that	   the	   share	   of	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compensation	  in	  the	  value	  added	  of	  social	  services	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  share	  of	  compensation	  in	  the	  value	  added	  of	  “other	  services”,	  with	  which	  I	  estimate	  𝑊!	  over	  the	  period	  1996-­‐2003.	  I	   use	   the	   regression	  method	  used	   for	   estimating	  𝑊!	  to	   estimate	  𝑊!	  over	   the	  period	  2004-­‐2012.	  	  
A.7	  Commerce	  
𝑁𝑉! + 𝐶𝐼!:	   Sum	   of	   labor	   income,	   profits,	   taxes,	   and	   costs	   of	   inputs	   of	   commerce.	   This	  sum	   coincides	   with	   the	   “social	   total	   value”	   of	   commerce.	   China	   Statistic	   Yearbook	   only	  provides	  the	  social	  total	  value	  of	  commerce,	  food	  and	  hotel	  services	  over	  the	  period	  1952-­‐1992.	  In	  order	  to	  estimate	  the	  social	  total	  value	  of	  commerce,	  food	  and	  hotel	  services	  over	  the	  period	  1993-­‐2012,	  I	  estimate	  the	  following	  regression.	  	  	   𝑆𝑇𝑉 = 𝛾! + 𝛾!𝑅𝑆! + 𝛾!𝑅𝑆!! + 𝜀! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (A.2)	  	  In	  this	  equation,	  𝑆𝑇𝑉	  is	  the	  social	  total	  value	  of	  commerce,	  food	  and	  hotel	  services,	  𝑅𝑆! 	  is	   the	   retail	   sale	   of	   commerce,	   and	  𝑅𝑆!!	  is	   the	   retail	   sale	   of	   food	   and	   hotel	   services.	   In	  addition,	  𝛾! 	  is	   a	   constant,	  𝛾! 	  and	  𝛾! 	  are	   coefficients,	   and	  𝜀! 	  is	   the	   error	   term.	   I	   use	   the	  estimated	  coefficients	  and	  the	  data	  of	  retail	  sale	  to	  estimate	  the	  social	  total	  value	  over	  the	  period	   1993-­‐2012.	   Furthermore,	   I	   use	   the	   retail	   sale	   data	   to	   split	   the	   data	   of	   social	   total	  value	  into	  the	  commerce	  part	  and	  the	  food	  and	  hotel	  service	  part,	  then	  we	  obtain	  𝑁𝑉! + 𝐶𝐼! .	  	  
A.8	  Self-­‐employment	  
𝑁𝑉!:	   Net	   value	   of	   self-­‐employment	   units.	   SAIC	   (1992)	   and	   Cheng	   (2010)	   provide	   the	  data	  of	   operating	   revenue	  of	   self-­‐employment	  units	  over	   the	  period	  1981-­‐2008.	   I	   assume	  that	  operating	  surplus	  and	  the	  depreciation	  of	  fixed	  assets	  account	  twenty-­‐five	  percent	  and	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one	   percent	   of	   the	   operating	   revenue,	   respectively.	   Further,	   I	   assume	   that	   the	   ratio	   of	  operating	  surplus	  to	  compensation	  of	  employees	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  ratio	  calculated	  with	  the	  data	   of	   rural	   self-­‐employment	   units	   from	  MOA	   (2009).	   Data	   of	   taxes	   of	   self-­‐employment	  units	   is	   from	  SAIC	  (1992)	  and	  Cheng	  (2010).	  With	  these	  data	  and	  assumptions,	   I	  estimate	  𝑁𝑉!	  over	  the	  period	  1981-­‐2008.	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APPENDIX	  C	  A	  COMPARISON	  OF	  NEOCLASSCAL,	  POST-­‐KEYNESIAN,	  AND	  MARXIAN	  APPROACHES	  
In	   this	   appendix,	   I	   make	   a	   comparison	   of	   neoclassical,	   post-­‐Keynesian,	   and	   Marxian	  approaches.	  Simple	  models	  are	  used	  only	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  comparison.	  	  	  
C.1	  Neoclassical	  approach	  
For	  neoclassical	  economics,	  the	  labor	  share	  question	  is	  not	  an	  independent	  question	  of	  theoretical	   interests.	   This	   question	   is	   addressed	   by	   answering	   two	   questions:	   first,	   the	  technology	   question,	   asking	   what	   kind	   of	   technology	   can	   produce	   certain	   movements	   of	  labor’s	   share;	   second,	   the	   “efficiency”	   question,	   asking	  whether	   the	  movements	   of	   labor’s	  share	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  theoretically	  “efficient”	  allocation	  of	  resources	  by	  the	  market.	  Hence,	   the	   neoclassical	   approach	   addresses	   the	   labor	   share	   question	   with	   a	   single	  production	  function.	  The	  form	  of	  the	  production	  function	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  technology	  in	  use.	  The	  prices	  of	  production	   factors	  are	  determined	  by	  marginal	  productivities,	   as	   the	  result	  of	   the	   “efficient”	   allocation	  of	   resources.	   Following	  Bentolila	   and	  Saint-­‐paul	   (2003),	  the	  following	  equations	  illustrate	  the	  neoclassical	  approach.	  	  	   𝑄 = 𝐹 𝐿,𝐾 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.1)	  𝑤 = 𝑄! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.2)	  𝑧 = 𝒘𝑳𝑸 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.3)	  	  All	  the	  variables	  in	  Equation	  (C.1)-­‐(C.3)	  are	  measured	  in	  real	  terms.	  𝑄	  is	  the	  net	  output.	  𝐿	  and	  𝐾	  is	   hired	   labor	   and	   capital	   inputs.	  𝑤	  is	   the	   real	   wage,	   which	   is	   equal	   to	  𝑄! ,	   the	  marginal	   productivity	   of	   labor.	  𝑧	  is	   the	   labor	   share.	   The	   model	   can	   be	   either	   simple	   or	  
128	  	  
complex,	  depending	  on	  the	  form	  of	  the	  production	  function.	  Given	  the	  constant	  elasticity	  of	  substitution	   (CES)	   production	   function—a	   general	   form	   of	   neoclassical	   production	  functions—we	  can	  rewrite	  Equation	  (C.1)-­‐(C.3)	  as	  follows.	  	  	   𝑄 = 𝛼 𝐴𝐾 ! + 1 − 𝛼 𝐵𝐿 ! !/! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.4)	  
𝑤 = 1 − 𝛼 𝐵! !! !!! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.5)	  
𝑧 = 1 − 𝛼 !"! ! = 1 − 𝛼 𝛼 !"! ! + 1 − 𝛼 !! = 1 − 𝛼 𝐴𝛿 ! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.6)	  	  𝐴	  and	  𝐵 	  are	   the	   coefficients	   for	   capital-­‐augmenting	   and	   labor-­‐augmenting	   technical	  progress,	  respectively.	  𝜀	  is	  the	  constant	  elasticity	  of	  substitution.	  𝛼	  is	  the	  capital	  share	  when	  the	  CES	  function	  is	  reduced	  to	  the	  Cobb-­‐Douglas	  function.	  𝑘	  and	  𝛿	  are	  the	  capital-­‐labor	  ratio	  and	   capital-­‐output	   ratio,	   respectively.	   Thus,	   labor’s	   share	   is	   determined	   by	   a	   bundle	   of	  technical	  parameters	  and	  the	  capital-­‐labor	  ratio	  (or	  the	  capital-­‐output	  ratio).	  Based	  on	  this	  framework,	  Bentolila	  and	  Saint-­‐paul	  (2003)	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  relationship	  between	  labor’s	  share	  and	  the	  capital-­‐output	  ratio.	  A	  lot	  of	  empirical	  studies	  take	  this	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  relationship	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  empirical	  models.	  In	  these	  studies,	  some	  institutional	  factors	  would	  make	  labor’s	  share	  deviate	  from	  the	  relationship	  in	  different	  ways,	  thus	  those	  factors	   are	   also	   included	   as	   explanatory	   variables.	   In	   a	   log-­‐linear	   form,	   the	   estimated	  coefficient	   for	   the	   capital-­‐output	   ratio	   is	   viewed	   by	   these	   studies	   as	   an	   estimation	   of	   the	  constant	   elasticity	   of	   substitution,	   whose	   sign	   matters	   for	   the	   trend	   of	   labor’s	   share	   as	  capital	  intensity	  increases	  over	  time.	  	  This	   approach	   is	   theoretically	   problematic	   in	   general.	   First	   of	   all,	   “technical	   changes”	  that	  the	  approach	  claims	  is	  actually	  unverified	  ex	  post	  speculations.	  The	  approach	  takes	  no	  account	   on	   how	   capitalists	   in	   the	   labor	   process	   substitute	   capital	   for	   labor	   and	   why	   the	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substitution	   of	   factors	   happens.	   Second,	   the	   approach	   does	   not	   distinguish	   the	   difference	  between	  hired	   labor	  and	   labor	   input,	  or	   labor	  power	  and	   labor	  using	  Marx’s	   terms.	  Third,	  the	  approach	  assumes	  that	  labor	  in	  the	  neoclassical	  approach	  is	  efficiently	  allocated	  so	  that	  no	   involuntary	   unemployment	   exists;	   thus	   there	   is	   no	   effect	   imposed	   by	   the	   unemployed	  labor	  forces	  on	  the	  power	  of	  workers.	  	  
C.2	  Post-­‐Keynesian	  approach	  
In	   contrast	   to	   the	   neoclassical	   approach,	   the	   post-­‐Keynesian	   approach	   explicitly	  underscores	   the	   role	   of	   distribution	   in	   capital	   accumulation.	  The	   simplest	  post-­‐Keynesian	  growth	  model	  is	  composed	  of	  the	  Cambridge	  saving	  equation,	  an	  investment	  equation,	  and	  the	  equilibrium	  condition	  of	  savings	  and	  investment.	  	  	   !! = 𝑠 𝑧 𝑢𝜎	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.7)	  !! = 𝑖 𝑧, 𝑢 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.8)	  !! = !!	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.9)	  	  In	   Equation	   (C.7)-­‐(C.9),	  𝑆	  and	  𝐼	  is	   savings	   and	   investment,	   respectively.	  𝑢	  is	   the	   rate	   of	  capacity	  utilization.	  According	   to	   the	  Cambridge	  saving	  equation,	   total	   saving	  (normalized	  by	  capital	  stock)	  is	  determined	  by	  distribution,	  measured	  by	  labor’s	  share	  (the	  profit	  share,	  the	  profit	  rate,	  or	  the	  mark-­‐up)	  and	  the	  output,	  𝑢𝜎	  (here	  𝜎	  is	  a	  constant	  ratio	  of	  the	  potential	  output	   to	  capital).	   Investment	   (normalized	  by	  capital	   stock)	   is	  determined	  by	  distribution	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  capacity	  utilization.	  	  Different	   post-­‐Keynesian	   models	   may	   have	   different	   viewpoints	   in	   regard	   to	   the	  variability	  of	  the	  rate	  of	  capacity	  utilization	  in	  the	  short	  run	  and	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  In	  Kaleckian	  models,	   distribution	   measured	   by	   the	   mark-­‐up	   is	   externally	   determined	   by	   institutions	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associated	  with	  the	  monopoly	  power	  of	  firms	  while	  the	  rate	  of	  capacity	  utilization	  changes	  to	  accommodate	  the	  equilibrium	  condition	  of	  savings	  and	  investment	  (Dutt,	  1984;	  Bhaduri	  and	  Marglin,	  1990;	  Hein,	  2013).	  In	  some	  other	  post-­‐Keynesian	  models,	  the	  rate	  of	  capacity	  utilization	   is	   fixed	  on	   a	  desired	   level	   of	   firms	  while	  distribution	   changes	   to	   accommodate	  the	  equilibrium	  condition	  (Skott,	  1989).	  The	  post-­‐Keynesian	  approach	  can	  also	  be	  extended	  to	  a	  dual	  economy	  in	  which	  the	  real	  wage	  of	  workers	  is	  pinned	  down	  by	  the	  real	  income	  of	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  (Skott	  and	  Larudee,	  1998).	  In	   general,	   according	   to	   the	   post-­‐Keynesian	   approach,	   there	   are	   two	  ways	   to	   find	   the	  determinants	   of	   labor’s	   share.	   One	   way	   is	   to	   follow	   Kaleckian	   models	   to	   look	   for	   the	  institutional	  factors	  determining	  the	  monopoly	  power	  of	  firms	  and	  then	  reinterprets	  these	  factors	   as	   determinants	   for	   labor’s	   share.	   The	   other	   way	   is	   to	   fix	   the	   rate	   of	   capacity	  utilization	   on	   a	   desired	   level	   and	   then	   look	   for	   the	   dynamic	   relationship	   between	   the	  accumulation	   rate	   and	   labor’s	   share.	   Also,	   this	   dynamic	   relationship	   can	   be	   put	   in	   a	   dual	  economy	  in	  order	  to	  add	  the	  industrialization	  dimension	  into	  analysis.	  	  The	  post-­‐Keynesian	  approach	  provides	  a	  relatively	  autonomous	  role	  to	  labor’s	  share	  in	  capital	   accumulation,	   with	   which	   one	   can	   generate	   a	   variety	   of	   models	   to	   explain	   the	  changes	   of	   labor’s	   share	   considering	   the	   characteristics	   of	   an	   economy.	  The	   only	   concern	  here,	   however,	   is	   that	   this	   approach	   does	   not	   put	   the	   power	   relation	   in	   its	   analysis.	   The	  production	   function	   for	   the	   post-­‐Keynesian	   approach	   is	   usually	   Leontief	   with	   a	   constant	  potential-­‐output-­‐capital	   ratio.	  The	   rate	  of	   capacity	  utilization	  can	  change	   in	  accordance	   to	  the	  equilibrium	  condition	  of	  the	  product	  market	  but	  not	  to	  the	  power	  relation.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  incorporates	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  its	  core	  analysis.	  	  	  	  
C.3	  Marxian	  approach	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The	  Marxian	  approach	  for	  analyzing	  the	  determinants	  of	  the	  labor	  share	  is	  built	  on	  two	  key	  propositions.	  The	   first	  proposition	   is	   that	   the	  actual	   labor	   input	   can	  deviate	   from	   the	  amount	   of	   hired	   labor	   due	   to	   factors	   in	   the	   labor	   market	   and	   in	   the	   labor	   process.	   This	  proposition	  is	  traditionally	  derived	  from	  Marx’s	  argument	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  labor	  and	   labor	   power.	   Capitalists	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   reserve	   army	   of	   labor	   and	   various	  management	  practices	  to	  discipline	  workers	  in	  order	  to	  extract	  the	  surplus	  value	  from	  the	  labor	   process.	   The	   relative	   size	   of	   the	   reserve	   army	   of	   labor	   and	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  management	  practices	  would	  affect	  the	  power	  of	  workers	  and	  thus	  the	  actual	  labor	  input	  in	  production.	  	  The	   second	   proposition	   is	   that	   the	   value	   of	   labor	   power	   is	   socially	   and	   historically	  determined,	  which	   shares	   the	   same	   spirit	  with	   the	   Lewis	  model	  while	   contrasts	  with	   the	  neoclassical	  marginal	  productivity	  theory.	  	  In	   the	   literature,	   there	   are	   different	   versions	   of	   Marxian	   models	   for	   growth	   and	  distribution	  (Goodwin,	  1967;	  Marglin,	  1984;	  Bowles	  and	  Boyer,	  1988).	  The	  Goodwin	  model	  is	   focused	  on	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	  growth	  rate	  of	   the	   real	  wage	  and	  employment	  over	  business	   cycles;	   thus	   it	   is	   not	   straightforward	   to	   explain	   long-­‐run	   changes	  of	   labor’s	  share	  with	  the	  Goodwin	  model.	   In	  Marglin	  (1984),	   institutions	  exogenously	  determine	  the	  real	  wage,	  as	  the	  second	  proposition	  of	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  suggests.	  In	  Bowles	  and	  Boyer	  (1988),	  the	  real	  wage	  and	  the	  labor	  productivity	  (the	  effort	  level)	  are	  jointly	  determined	  by	  a	  labor	  discipline	  model.	  	  The	   Marxian	   approach	   also	   considers	   technology	   as	   a	   factor	   to	   determine	   the	   labor	  productivity	  and	  thus	  labor’s	  share.	  The	  Marxian	  approach	  suggests	  that	  capitalists	  tend	  to	  use	  the	  technology	  that	  enhances	  the	  productivity	  of	   labor	  but	  reduces	  the	  productivity	  of	  capital—the	   so-­‐called	  Marx-­‐biased	   technical	   progress	   (Foley,	   1986;	   Basu	   and	   Vasudevan,	  2011).	  The	  intrinsic	  motivation	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  technical	  progress	  lies	  in	  capitalists’	  purpose	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to	  more	  effectively	  control	  the	  labor	  process.	  To	  avoid	  the	  overdetermination	  problem,	  here	  I	  employ	  the	  classical	  assumption	  that	  all	  savings	  are	  invested;	  thus	  the	  Marxian	  approach	  can	  be	  expressed	  as,	  	  	   𝑤 = 𝑤 𝜃! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.10)	    𝑞 = 𝑞 𝜃!, 𝑘 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.11)	    𝑧 = 𝑤 𝑞	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.12)	  !! = !! = 𝑠 𝑧 𝑞 𝑘	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C.13)	  	  In	   Equation	   (C.10)-­‐(C.13),	  𝑤	  is	   the	   real	   wage.	  𝑞	  is	   the	   labor	   productivity.	  𝜃!	  and	  𝜃!	  are	  both	   specific	   sets	   of	   social	   factors.	   Labor’s	   share,	   the	   labor	   productivity,	   and	   the	   capital-­‐labor	  ratio	  𝑘	  determine	  the	  amount	  of	  savings.	  All	  the	  savings	  are	  invested,	  which	  increases	  the	  capital-­‐labor	  ratio	  of	  the	  next	  period.	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